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This thesis represents a re-evaluation of Hans Morgenthau’s theory undertaken in 
the context of a revived interest in classical realism, and in the normative elements of 
Morgenthau’s thought in particular. This reading is built on a recognition of the 
central place occupied by morality in Morgenthau’s thought, and points to 
Nietzsche’s and Weber’s role in the articulation of Morgenthau’s perspective. The 
thesis contributes to the ongoing reinterpretation of Morgenthau’s theory by 
introducing and discussing the following topics and concepts: the centrality of the 
issue of meaning in Morgenthau’s account, and its relevance to the 
modemity/postmodemity dichotomy; Morgenthau’s commitment to the Nietzschean 
and Weberian diagnosis of the ‘death of God’; Morgenthau’s interpretation of power 
as meaning imposition; his examination of the disenchantment of politics; his vision 
of man as the source of both destruction and construction; Morgenthau’s concept of 
thoughtful leadership, which represents the constructive force of re-enchantment in 
politics.
The thesis will also address the supposed tension in Morgenthau’s account 
between his endorsement of Nietzschean and Weberian assumptions regarding the 
plurality of values and truths which follows the death of God, and his arguing in 
favour of a renaissance of tradition with all its metaphysical certainties. The present 
interpretation will show that this is a superficial tension, and will argue that
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Morgenthau advances a viable solution to the challenges raised by contemporary 
politics, which tries to reconcile identity with difference, unique creativity with 
universal humanity, while also justifying the continuing relevance of tradition, 
perceived as a barrier against the proliferation of action for action’s sake. The key 
role is held by the statesman, whose responsible imposition of meaning transcends 
differences and leads to order and construction in an otherwise anarchic 
environment. As the thesis will show, in Morgenthau’s interpretation the practical 
skill of political leadership resolves the dichotomous choices of 
modemity/postmodemity and the contemporary predicament that Morgenthau 
perceived of the disenchantment of politics.
5
1. Context, Assumptions, Method
In the introductory part of one of his best known essays political philosopher Leo 
Strauss asserts, while tackling the issue of what he calls ‘the crisis of modernity’: 
‘that such a crisis exists is now obvious to the meanest capacities’(Strauss quoted in 
Hilail 1975, p. 81). At the time of putting this thought on paper, Strauss was telling 
the academic world nothing new: in emphasising that ‘modem Western man no 
longer knows what he wants’, that he ‘no longer believes that he can know what is 
good and bad, what is right and wrong’ (Strauss quoted in Hilail 1975, p. 81), Strauss 
echoed some of the pessimistic assessments regarding central developments within 
modernity, which had been formulated and reflected on since the nineteenth century. 
Moreover, Strauss echoed many voices within his own generation, voices of 
witnesses to the horrors of the Second World War, whose life experiences had made 
them agree with philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche: ‘God is dead’, and the world is in 
crisis.
Within this context, the present thesis argues that International Relations scholar 
Hans Morgenthau -  a colleague of Strauss at the University of Chicago, and also a 
war survivor - should be regarded not only as is customary, namely as ‘the pope of 
IR’ (Griffiths 1992, p. 36), the ‘crusader’ (Aron 1966, p. 599), and the ‘leading 
modem spokesman’ of realism (Gilpin 1981, p. 213). As argued in this thesis, the
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importance of Morgenthau’s work stems from the fact that it has introduced a 
sophisticated kind of philosophical reflection in IR, which connects it to wider 
debates within the social sciences, regarding the unfolding of modernity. 
Morgenthau’s thought is valuable and addresses ongoing topics of debate such as the 
status of truth and legitimacy of universal values, much discussed in the aftermath of 
the ‘death of God’, which to Morgenthau represents the defining moment for his 
political theory. As will be shown in the thesis, the ‘death of God’ constitutes an 
interpretation of the times which Morgenthau adopts from Nietzsche, and he sees it 
as the ‘death’ (disintegration) of an international morality ‘composed of Christian, 
cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 191).
The central goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that, in Morgenthau’s work, 
issues such as the unpredictabilities of human life, the individual’s longing for 
security and certainty, and his feeling of ‘homesickness’ (Connolly 1988, p. 137), are 
constituted within an overarching theme which preoccupies Morgenthau all his life: 
the quest for ‘meaning’. At present, is there a ‘God’, that is a ‘meaning generator’, in 
the international realm? What events caused his ‘death’, and what are the 
implications of such an event? What do we find in God’s place? How can we 
overcome this ‘death’? In the present interpretation, these are the questions which 
can be fruitfully explored in relation to Morgenthau’s interest in philosophy, as a 
realm from which he expected support, in his ‘quest for the meaning of human 
existence’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 64).
In the interpretation put forward in the thesis, Morgenthau implies that the ‘death 
of God’ makes the creation of meaning central to man, and that the godless world 
man now inhabits grants him opportunities and stimulating conditions for the 
unfolding of his creative capacities in this regard, but it also encompasses traps.
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Furthermore, the meaning of existence and its interpretation, the credibility of its 
long established values, the individuals’ ‘will to meaning’, and their relevant creative 
potential -  all form a scholarly concern which, as will become clear throughout this 
thesis, Morgenthau shares with his intellectual mentors, Friedrich Nietzsche and Max 
Weber. This is a positive and productive reading of Morgenthau, whose innovative 
character stems from its discussion of the following: the role of Nietzsche and Weber 
in the articulation of Morgenthau’s perspective; his interpretation of his mentors’ 
diagnosis of the ‘death of God’; the centrality of the topic of meaning in 
Morgenthau’s theory; the subsequent interpretation by Morgenthau of power as 
meaning imposition and as an inter-relational concept; Morgenthau’s examination of 
the disenchantment of human life and of politics in particular; his vision of man as 
the source of both destruction and transcendence; Morgenthau’s concept of the 
creative, responsible and thoughtful leader, who represents the artisan of the re­
enchantment of politics.
In addition to the detailed reading of relevant secondary literature, this 
reinterpretation benefits from the scrutiny of both Morgenthau’s published writings 
and the full archive of his manuscripts, held at the US Library of Congress. The 
Morgenthau archive contains more than eighty thousand items, which make up 
almost two hundred boxes. It comprises papers written by Morgenthau mainly 
between 1925 and 1981, both in Europe and the US, and it covers unpublished 
lectures, drafts of published work, personal notes and diaries, newspaper clippings, 
and an extensive intellectual correspondence. The archive is useful in illuminating 
further Morgenthau’s arguments made in published writings, and represents a 
valuable source of information, which helps one gain an in-depth understanding of 
Morgenthau’s theory.
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The thesis does not intend to examine Morgenthau’s concept of the national 
interest in detail, or the interpretation of power in materialistic terms, both of which 
have been analysed by various scholars already. Instead, it addresses the concept of 
power interpreted as meaning imposition, and points to Morgenthau’s vision on the 
topic as one which echoes views commonly associated with postmodern IR thinking. 
Without claiming that Morgenthau was a postmodern, this reading nevertheless 
points to the commonalities of approach between Morgenthau and IR postmodern 
strands of thinking, and depicts the significance of the Nietzschean and Weberian 
reading experiences in the articulation of Morgenthau’s perspective, and in his 
discussion of meaning in particular. As will be shown below, postmodernism opened 
up the realist theory to reinterpretation, and emphasised the plurality of the concept 
of truth in a way which Morgenthau himself was no stranger to.
In order to better understand this discussion of Morgenthau’s scholarly 
contribution, in what follows, the chapter will provide an elucidation of two terms 
which are crucial to the thesis: ‘modernity’ and ‘postmodemity’. Following the 
interpretation provided by Rengger (1995), section 1.1 will portray ‘modernity’ as 
carrying two broad senses: ‘modernity as mood’ (the sense which permeates 
Morgenthau’s thinking), and ‘modernity as socio-cultural form’ (Rengger 1995, p. 
39). As will be shown below, the present thesis understands postmodemity to be a 
mood within modernity, ‘a reaction to, or perhaps a dissolution, of modem moods 
and intellectual categories’ (Rengger 1995, p. 200). In setting up the background for 
the present interpretation, the first section also draws on the work undertaken by 
Toulmin, Lyotard and Bauman, without however departing from Rengger’s 
approach, which is useful to the thesis because it conveys an image of postmodemity 
circumscribed within modernity which fits best with Morgenthau’s critical attitude.
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While performing his critique of modernity as a mood, Morgenthau nevertheless 
places himself within modernity’s soil of certainty, and he still longs for 
metaphysical foundations despite being critical of the human individual’s need for 
security and certainty, as expressions of foundationalism.
Section 1.2 will provide a literature review which will comment on previous 
readings of Morgenthau’s account, showing their strengths and weaknesses and also 
their relevance to the present interpretation. Section 1.2 will also unveil some of the 
central claims made in the thesis, which will then be summarized in section 1.3. The 
last section will take up the question of the methodological assumptions on which the 
present thesis is based, and will detail the ways in which it draws on Skinner’s and 
Gadamer’s approaches.
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1.1 On Modernity and Postmodemity in IR
According to Rengger (1995), modernity understood as a mood is an epoch 
which, he argues borrowing from Connolly (1988), carries ‘no well defined 
beginning or end’ (Connolly 1988, p. 2; see also Rengger 1995, p. 41), and which 
has ‘more to do with the growing dominance of certain ways of thinking and certain 
sets of assumptions than it does with discrete historical periods’ (Rengger 1995, p. 
174). As Rengger puts it, we can find this sense of modernity in many different 
periods, although ‘it has unquestionably been given a particularly influential 
elaboration over the last couple of hundred years’ (Rengger 1995, p. 175). Rengger 
quotes approvingly Bernstein’s usage of a term borrowed from Heidegger, whose 
meaning mirrors that of the first sense of modernity: modernity is seen as a 
Stimmung, a mood which is ‘amorphous, protean, and shifting, but which 
nevertheless exerts a powerful influence on the ways in which we think, act, and 
experience’ (Bernstein 1991, p. 11).
While these considerations point to modernity as a philosophical question, 
Rengger’s second sense of modernity -  as socio-cultural form -  pictures it as raising 
sociological issues, and it echoes the institutional analysis developed by, for 
example, Anthony Giddens. In this latter sense, modernity is much more obviously 
tied to a time and place (Rengger 1995, p. 41), and it denotes ‘the structure of
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modem life rather than a sense of it as a response within/to the stmcture of modem 
life’ (Rengger 1995, p. 41). Rengger makes a strong case that modernity as a socio­
cultural form is made up by a complex matrix of forces, and it encompasses ‘cultural 
ones such as habits, and biological and ethnographic ones, as well as material ones 
such as economic and social structures’ (Rengger 1995, p. 175). In Rengger’s view, 
in terms of the economic and social stmctures that we usually identify as 
distinctively modem, the last two hundred years ‘have been both encouraged by and 
supportive of those elements of modernity as mood that have been most obviously 
criticised’(Rengger 1995, p. 175). As noticed earlier, Rengger is quick to emphasise 
that these two senses of modernity, although often treated separately by theorists, 
should nevertheless be thought of in connection one to another, as two sides of a 
complex concept:
How and in what manner we understand ‘modernity as mood’ will in part depend 
on how we see the relations between the ontological, advocacy and conditional 
elements of modem social life, and thus the relations between modernity as mood 
and modernity as socio-cultural form (Rengger 1995, p. 115).
Coming back to the interpretation of modernity as mood in more detail, in order 
to illuminate this understanding of modernity, the thesis draws on Toulmin’s seminal 
contribution (1990). The perpetuation of grand, universal narratives, and its so-called 
‘religion of rationality’ (Toulmin 1990, p. 176) -  embodied in a series of 
assumptions regarding humans’ rational capacities, and the generalised application of 
methods derived from the natural sciences - are the features of modernity which 
prove to be of most importance for Toulmin. At the beginning of Cosmopolis, he
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points to the debates which surround the issue of devising an all-encompassing 
definition of ‘modernity’ (that is, ‘modernity as mood’, in Rengger’s interpretation). 
Nevertheless, he is quick to add that throughout the current controversy, the 
arguments
rest on shared assumptions about rationality. All parties to the debate agree that 
the self-styled “new philosophers” of the 17th century were responsible for new 
ways of thinking about nature and society. They committed the modem world to 
thinking about nature in a new and “scientific” way, and to use more “rational” 
methods to deal with the problems of human life and society (Toulmin 1990, pp. 
9-10).
The foundation of what Toulmin calls ‘the framework of Modernity’, is made up 
of a central belief in, and tmsting of, man’s reason, in the rational capacities which 
are present in all human beings, and in the positive outcomes of using them, as 
serving the general progress of humankind. As Toulmin argues, thinking in terms of 
a universal theory was as common in the 17th century as it is today: ideas about 
humanity and nature, rational mind and causal matter, ‘were spoken of as “allowed 
by all men”, or “standing to reason”, and they were seen as needing no further 
justification than that’ (Toulmin 1990, p. 108). Reason is the guide in the discovery 
and application of universally valid principles, in sciences thought of as forming a 
homogeneous area of research, with similar methods being applied in all domains, no 
matter the disciplines’ particularities and variety. Following the line of thinking 
inaugurated by Descartes, modem philosophy shows an abiding concern for the 
‘deciphering’ of the processes of reasoning, granting them the status of human
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characteristics universal in scope. Toulmin makes a convincing argument that if we 
contrast this attitude of modem thinkers with that of humanists like Montaigne, we 
notice a change ‘from a style of philosophy that keeps equally in view issues of local, 
timebound practice, and universal, timeless theory, to one that accepts matters of 
universal, timeless theory as being entitled to an exclusive place on the agenda of 
“philosophy”’ (Toulmin 1990, p. 24). In contrast to previous discussions of clearly 
practical issues, and to the respect shown for complexity and diversity (Toulmin 
1990, p. 28), most modem philosophers commit themselves to questions of abstract 
theory (Toulmin 1990, p. 24). Philosophical inquiries ignore the particular, concrete, 
timely and local details of everyday human affairs, while shifting ‘to a higher, 
stratospheric plane, on which nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless, general, 
and universal theories’ (Toulmin 1990, p. 35). From the oral to the written, from the 
particular to the universal, from the local to the general, and from the timely to the 
timeless (Toulmin 1990, pp. 30-5) - these are, more precisely, the four main shifts 
which Toulmin points to, as those which characterise the advent of modernity. 
Moreover, a process of secularization unfolds, one in which God comes down to 
earth and is variously interpreted under the roof of modernity’s central concern for 
singularity. A Zygmunt Bauman argues convincingly,
‘God’ stands for the idea of the ‘one and only’, for the ‘thou shaft have no 
other gods before me’ idea in all its countless renditions and costumes: of Ein 
Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer, of one party, one verdict of history, one line of 
progress, one way of being human, one (scientific) ideology, one true 
meaning, one proper philosophy (Bauman 1997, p. 201).
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This quotation links the discussion of ‘modernity’ with ‘postmodemity’. For 
almost two centuries, modernity has proved to be not only an accepted framework, 
but also one which nurtured debates. Nietzsche’s verdict -  ‘God is dead’ -  stands as 
one emblematic manifestation of modernity’s critical self-awareness. Modernity’s 
employment of grand narratives and their lack of credibility, contingency, difference, 
insecurity, uncertainty, subjectivity -  from nineteenth century’s Romantics to 
contemporary proponents of the idea that we now live in ‘postmodemity’, these 
issues have surfaced within modernity. Today, its questioning is as actual as it was 
years ago, for Nietzsche or Weber, for Heidegger, Adorno or Strauss. Moreover, this 
questioning of modernity has intensified in the last three decades, with theorists 
talking about the earlier mentioned entrance into ‘postmodemity’ (see Lyotard 1984, 
Rengger 1995, Bauman 1997).
The present thesis employs the interpretation of postmodemity mentioned above, 
which comes from Rengger: postmodemity is a ‘mood within modernity’ (Rengger 
1995, p. 200), it is a ‘state of mind’ (Bauman quoted in Rengger 1995, p. 200), not 
only critical of modernity, but also constmctive by virtue of its reflectivity. As 
Bauman puts it, postmodemity represents ‘modernity conscious of its true nature’, 
taking ‘a full measure of the anticipated consequences of its historical work’ 
(Bauman quoted in Rengger 1995, p. 203), the most conspicuous features of the so- 
called ‘postmodern condition’ being institutionalized pluralism, variety, contingency 
and ambivalence. Showing how these concepts arise in Morgenthau’s work will 
make up an important part of the present thesis.
A more detailed interpretation of the postmodern condition which is important in 
the context of the present discussion is advanced by Jean Francois Lyotard (1984). In 
Lyotard’s view, the postmodern condition is a condition of knowledge, as it is
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manifested in the most highly developed societies, the Western ones (Lyotard 1984, 
p. xxiii). For Lyotard, a modem science is one which ‘legitimates itself with 
reference to a metadiscourse’, making ‘an explicit appeal to some grand narrative, 
such as the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the 
rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth’ (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiii). From 
this perspective, and ‘simplifying to the extreme’, as acknowledged by Lyotard, the 
postmodern condition signifies ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (Lyotard 1984, p. 
xxiv), that is, toward the overarching totalities -  the ‘one and only’ God, in all His 
embodiments - which modernity has encouraged. ‘Let us wage a war on totality’ 
(Lyotard 1984, p. 82), we are thus told. As Lyotard argues further, in postmodemity, 
the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation becomes obsolete, and to this 
obsolescence corresponds the crisis of metaphysical philosophy, whose 
consequences cut deep: ‘the narrative function is losing its great hero, its great 
voyages, its great goal’ (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv). Echoing Bauman’s assessment, 
Lyotard emphasises postmodemity’s respect for contingency and heterogeneity as 
one of its outstanding merits, and he contrasts it to modernity’s propensity for 
certainty and homogeneity. In Lyotard’s assessment, postmodern knowledge ‘refines 
our sensitivity to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable’ (Lyotard 1984, p. xxv).
Critics of the core assumptions of modernity outlined above argue that, in the 
aftermath of God’s death, there is no way that we can talk about an epistemological 
and moral unity of humankind, about universal principles, that men can arrive at with 
the use of their reason. On the contrary, in such elusive times, each one of us is free 
to ‘devise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative’ (Nietzsche 1971, p. 134). 
Each one ‘creates a meaning for the earth’ (Nietzsche 1954, p. 144): we are free to
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interpret everything, to be critical and reflective. There is no single one ‘reality’, but 
a multiplicity of interpretations, no ‘truth’, but oceans of perspectives. These times 
offer to human individuals conditions for the fuller expression of their potentialities, 
granting them what has been long denied.
However, as some scholars have pointed out, this liberation from the ‘one and 
only’ God of modernity also comes at a price: the loss of certainty and security. In 
Bauman’s assessment, ‘you gain something, you lose something else in exchange: 
the old rule holds true today as it was true then’ (Bauman 1997, p. 13). As Bauman 
argues further, while there are postmodern men and women who ‘find the open- 
endedness of their situation attractive enough to outweigh the anguish of 
uncertainty’, and who keep options open to all fixity of commitment (Bauman 1997, 
p. 13), nevertheless, many are still bewildered by ‘the paucity of sense, porousness of 
borders, inconsistency of sequences, capriciousness of logic and frailty of 
authorities’ (Bauman 1997, p. 124), and who crave for security and certainty. For 
them, modernity’s evolving into postmodemity, and the latter’s gifts - increased 
prospects for action, for creativity - are less valuable than the modem way of life, 
with all its embodiments. Unfortunately, security and freedom can hardly ever be 
fully reconciled (Bauman 2001, p. 5), and this gives birth to postmodern discontents 
nurtured by freedom rather than by oppression, which come from the kind of society 
‘which offers ever more individual freedom at the price of ever less security’ 
(Bauman 1997, p. 124). As the following chapters will show, the problematique of 
certainty and security is central to Morgenthau’s work, and he portrays man’s need 
of these as a metaphysical predisposition which follows the death of universal values.
The above outline of the meaning of ‘modernity’ and ‘postmodemity’ is useful 
for clarifying the general context which informs the present discussion of
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Morgenthau’s concepts of the death of God, meaning, power as meaning imposition, 
disenchantment and superior leadership. In what follows, this section will point to 
modernity and postmodemity in International Relations in particular, as the field 
within which Morgenthau acted, and to its moderns and postmodems and their core 
assumptions.
As Jim George argues convincingly, from its disciplinary beginnings, following 
the end of the First World War, the IR discursive tradition has been framed in 
modernist terms (George 1994, p. 77). From the liberal embracing of the concept of 
an international community united in its rational capacities, in its allegiance to the 
rule of law, and in its desire to follow the path of progress in the benefit of everyone 
all over the world, to the realist emphasis of a universal anarchy, and a generalised 
stmggle for power, and also to the ‘unity of science’ thesis, noticeable in the midst of 
the ‘behavioralist revolution’, the mainstream argument in IR bears the marks of 
modernity, as an ontological and epistemological attitude (George 1994, p. 77).
Michael Banks also demonstrates the modem character of IR. He contends that a 
major characteristic of the IR historical narrative is its ‘particular reading of a single 
body of thought’ (quoted in George 1994, p. 71), interpreted within the framework of 
some main traditions which, despite their substantive differences, have one thing in 
common: a typically modem desire to subsume their assumptions to an all- 
encompassing theory, built in universalist terms. IR appears as a homogenized field 
of knowledge, springing from homogeneous traditions, in which certain “great texts” 
of Western philosophy are accorded a meaning that corresponds with the real world, 
while others are marginalized or dismissed altogether (George 1994, p. 71). The IR 
theorists’ search for the essential, the universal, the permanent, their conformity to 
assumptions, approaches and interpretations, is manifested in a vision of history
18
which is ‘reduced to the incantations across the time, culture, and language of those 
whose eternal wisdom corresponds with that which is universally valid and 
foundationally real’ (George 1994, p. 71). As argued further by George, ‘great texts 
and great men punctuate a meaning script set, unproblematically, in dualized and 
dichotomized terms’ (George 1994, p. 70).
Therefore, in IR modernity as a mood manifests itself in the images of the world 
constructed and perpetuated by various theorists, which make up the main traditions 
present in this field -  those of realism and liberal internationalism. Taking the realist 
family of theories as an example, the modem way of analysing in terms of the 
universal, of totalities and oppositions, the attempt to discover an ‘essence’, an 
Archimedean point or a foundation, is obvious to some theorists: as George puts it, 
realism represents a quest for a grand (non)theory of existence ‘beyond specific time, 
space, and political purpose’ (George 1994, p. 12). Equally important, as noted by 
Frankel, the proponents of realism argue that there is a ‘reality’, and this reality is 
made up of things which exist independently of our thoughts and experience (Frankel 
1996, p. 13). This is a world with a concrete existence, comprehensible, far from 
perfect, yet hardly changeable: the only world that is, ‘immediately there, around us 
and disclosed to us by sensory information’ (George 1994, p. 11). The world of 
international politics is constituted by states, which act in an anarchical environment, 
and adopt instrumental rational policies in their pursuit of power, relying on the use 
of force, or on the threat to use force, in order to protect their interests. Here we 
encounter a picture constmcted around a modem ‘logic of contrasts’, which opposes 
‘war’ and ‘peace’, ‘bad’ and ‘good’, ‘anarchy’ and ‘hierarchy’, enflamed ‘struggle 
for power’ and cold-blooded ‘rationality’ - to quote George again, the positivist- 
realist identity ‘is represented as the opposition between the forces of rationality,
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unity, and progressive purpose and an anarchical realm of danger and threat in 
permanent need of restraint’ (George 1994, p. 71). For realists, this representation of 
the international realm is universally valid, and, as noted earlier, this is how things 
really ‘are’, and how they happen. The realist metanarrative is based on a series of 
universal concepts, such as: human nature, carrying within it a lust for power which 
is ‘common to all men’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16), structure (in the works of 
structural realist Kenneth Waltz), competition, anarchy, war proneness etc. This 
reading of realism will be dismissed as overly simplistic in the present thesis, which 
will expound an interpretation of Morgenthau that points to the richness and 
uniqueness of his thought. It will become clear that the above reading of realism does 
not do justice to Morgenthau’s theory and its specificities, and overlooks the strong 
normative aspects of his work.
In a time when many realists carried on with their work informed by a concern 
with power and balance of power, structure, anarchy etc, others started to pursue a 
novel task: a re-evaluation in IR. They disassembled the pieces of the old 
interpretation of realism and of its ‘great men’ and ‘great texts’. In this way, writings 
belonging to theorists who are thought of as predecessors (Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
Hobbes) or more recent proponents of realism (E.H. Carr, Morgenthau, Kennan) 
have been given new opportunities to ‘speak’ by researchers who consider 
themselves to be ‘dissidents’, and who plead for the opening up of ‘thinking space’ 
in IR (George 1994, p. 269). Preceded by a few seminal articles (Ashley 1981 and 
1984, Walker 1987), postmodernism in IR gained its power to speak with a ‘strong 
voice’ in 1989 -  1990, years which witnessed the printing of a few breakthrough 
contributions (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, International Studies Quarterly 1990), 
many of which supported a reinterpretation of central realist thinkers, and of the
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realist tradition more broadly. In a similar manner, the present thesis argues that the 
above sketch of realism built around a few concepts and dominant interpretations is 
inadequately equipped to capture the subtleties and originality of realist thinkers, and 
it intends to open up the thinking space, by examining Morgenthau’s work in greater 
detail.
The hallmarks on which the IR postmodems draw attention are the uncertainty of 
identity and community, the ambivalence and plurality of meaning (see Ashley and 
Walker in International Studies Quarterly 1990, p. 4), and the concept of reality as 
never complete or accessible to universalized understandings (George 1994, p. 11). 
IR postmodems do not search for a source of meaning and order already in place, but 
show a readiness to question how order and meaning are imposed (Ashley and 
Walker 1990, p. 8), to focus on human life’s contingencies and enigmas, and not to 
take modernity’s appeal to totalities for granted. As argued by Ashley and Walker, in 
one important contribution to the debate over modemity/postmodemity in IR, this 
field’s postmodems
Regard every historical figuration of sovereign presence -  be it God, nature, 
dynasty, citizen, nation, history, modernity, the West, the market’s impartial 
spectator, reason, science, paradigm, tradition, man of faith in the possibility of 
universal human community, common sense, or any other - as precisely a 
question (Ashley and Walker 1990, p. 368).
Closely related to this topic, IR postmodems bring into discussion the issue of the 
‘crisis of representation’: they argue that there is ‘no fixed and indubitable presence 
of an external object to which words, as re-presentations, might be referred’, and as a
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result, ‘the very possibility of truth is put in doubt’ (Ashley and Walker 1990, p. 
378). As Ashley suggests, in such times, theorists should definitely oppose a 
representation that ’arrests ambiguity and controls the proliferation of meaning by 
imposing a standard and standpoint of interpretation that is taken to be fixed and 
independent of the time it represents’ (quoted in Der Derian and Shapiro 1989, p. 
263). Consequently, the IR field is opened up to a multiplicity of re-evaluations. No 
singular interpretation should prevail. No singular tradition should monopolise 
theorists’ debates. No endeavour should be directed at making events ‘fit’ into old 
straitjackets. Within a world of dialogue, no voice should claim supremacy.
Last but not least, IR postmodems are interested in exploring the tensions which, 
they believe, exist within the IR supposedly unified traditions. Taking into account 
the wealth of attention devoted to the examination of the realist family of theories, it 
is not surprising that the exploration of the inner tensions, and the provision of 
challenging reinterpretations of this tradition’s key texts, have been of central 
concern to the postmodems. Scholars are urged to think of the IR ‘great texts’ as 
ambiguous and open to a variety of ways of reading (Ashley in Der Derian and 
Shapiro 1989, p. 263). In Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International 
Relations (Beer and Hariman 1996) for example, postmodern theorists re-read 
classical realists such as Kissinger, Carr and Morgenthau, in an attempt to interpret 
realism ‘as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory- 
practice, idealist-realist, and other synchronic and scholastic antinomies of world 
politics’ (Der Derian quoted in Beer and Hariman 1996, p. 281). Meanwhile, in 
Walker’s Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Walker 1993), 
a much older supposed advocate of realism, such as Machiavelli, ‘speaks’ in a way 
which is very different from the standard interpretation of his work. Yet in an article
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published in 1997, scholars are told to ‘forget IR Theory’, and to proceed to a new 
start, to theorize ‘without being constrained by the agendas, issues, and terminologies 
that are preset by orthodox debates’ (Bleiker 1997, p. 58). Modernity’s appeal to 
metanarratives, to ‘grand theories’ accounting for universal explanations and 
‘totalitarian’ interpretations, is to be eschewed and, in the end, hopefully forgotten.
The debates about modernity and postmodemity, in International Relations and 
social theory more generally, have opened up the question of the power of meaning 
construction. In IR, one way in which this question has been reintroduced is through 
re-interpretations of classical realism, within which the re-interpretation of 
Morgenthau in this thesis has to be located. This postmodern opening up of 
interpretations encourages new readings of realism which depart from the 
conventional picture of realism as an amoral or immoral theory, founded on the 
metaphysical unity of the stmggle for power. Moreover, it problematizes the concept 
of tmth and the validity of universal morality in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’, 
which this reading is interested in depicting in Morgenthau. Without representing a 
postmodern attempt, this thesis retains this opening up for its own purposes, and 
challenges accounts of Morgenthau which minimise his interest in values, meaning 
and tmth.
After clarifying the concepts of modernity and postmodemity to be used in the 
thesis, and after outlining the main assumptions which inform modem and 
postmodern readings in IR, this chapter now moves on to an overview of recent 
analyses of Morgenthau’s theory, in order to situate the present contribution in its 
proper interpretative context. The next section also discusses the interpretation 
Morgenthau was subjected to during the Cold War, which represents a reflection of 
the particular concerns of that period.
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1.2 Old and New Interpretations
‘People arrive at the conclusion that I  am not concerned with the problem o f  
morality. The truth is that I  am too much concerned with it ’ (Morgenthau quoted in
Russell 1990, p. 149)
The re-evaluation of Morgenthau’s theory has started off with theorists’ 
increased concern with Morgenthau’s views on morality, and morality has indeed 
been the central issue around which modem and postmodern readings of Morgenthau 
have been constmcted. This literature survey starts from the same place, and it 
depicts Morgenthau’s endorsement of a moral theory which emphasises humans’ 
potential for both destmction and constmction in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ 
announced by Nietzsche. This section of the chapter draws on previous writings 
which assert the moral character of Morgenthau’s theory, and on some contributions 
which make connections between Morgenthau and Nietzsche, and Morgenthau and 
Weber respectively. Unlike these writings however, this thesis is the first to analyse 
in depth the commonalities among Morgenthau’s, Nietzsche’s and Weber’s thought, 
and to point to Morgenthau’s endorsement of a vision of power understood as 
meaning imposition, and of responsible leadership which has the capacity to both
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destroy and construct, and which imposes meaning as a way towards peace and 
order.
During the Cold War Morgenthau’s reputation as a theorist of International 
Relations was predominantly that of an amoralist, and this for Morgenthau 
symbolised nothing less than a proof of his failure ‘in the task to make my meaning 
clear’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 204). Evidence of this dominant trend of 
interpretation comes from several sources. Rosecrance (1981) attests to the way in 
which in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Morgenthau’s power theory ‘was cited as an 
explanation and justification for the Cold War between East and West’, and in later 
years his doctrines ‘were often used to support rearmament at both strategic and 
conventional levels, and to rationalize the expansion of the “struggle for power” to 
the new nations of Southeast Asia and Africa’ (Rosecrance 1981, p. 751). Moreover, 
Spegele calls Morgenthau ‘the quintessential moral sceptic’ (Spegele 1987, p. 206), 
while Gellman emphasises that Morgenthau’s attitude towards power ‘has been 
reproached for being too accepting’ (Gellman 1988, p. 256). Perceived as nothing 
more than an advocacy of a cold-blooded struggle for power, Morgenthau ended up 
being criticised exactly for what he used to condemn so arduously: the neglect of 
moral considerations in the interpretation of events in the international political 
arena. Within this context, Krauthammer’s description of Morgenthau’s central plea - 
that ‘Miss Manners for statesmen is not yet morality’ -  comes as no surprise 
(Krauthammer 1986, p. 21). A well documented researcher such as Coser follows a 
similar path. Although accurately pointing to Morgenthau’s thinking as rooted in the 
German philosophical tradition, and to his moral vision, ‘that refused to concede to 
diabolic forces total dominance in the affairs of nations’, Coser nevertheless 
concludes that ‘the moral considerations which Morgenthau had thrown out the front
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door returned through the back’ (Coser 1984, p. 220). As I intend to argue in this 
thesis, such moral commitments are far from temporary or accidental in 
Morgenthau’s account. He never ‘throws’ them away, on the contrary, his theoretical 
edifice presupposes a moral foundation which places limits on the acquiring and use 
of power.
During the Cold War, a few scholars endorsed an approach which contradicted 
the dominant position, without however stimulating a debate on the issue. These 
attempts can be seen as no more than isolated exceptions, which do not constitute 
themselves into a strong interpretative trend. Robert Good, for instance, notes the 
transcendental character of Morgenthau’s formal ethic in an early article published in 
1960 (see Good 1960, p. 612), in which he analyses the concept of the national 
interest in Niebuhr’s, Morgenthau’s, and Kennan’s works. Good claims to find it 
surprising that more attention has not been given to Morgenthau’s views on morality 
and principle. As emphasised by Good, Morgenthau’s theory is more sophisticated 
than usually assumed, and it pleads in favour of moral absolutes that set boundaries 
not to be trespassed in the pursuit of interest, and which ‘do not permit certain 
policies to be considered at all from the point of view of expediency’ (Good 1960, p. 
612). In Good’s conclusion, ‘the widely held assumption’ that Morgenthau has 
simply updated Hobbes ‘does him serious injustice’ (Good 1960, p. 612).
Meanwhile, in a 1977 article on the development of International Relations in the 
US, Stanley Hoffmann points to Morgenthau’s appeal to norms, and to his desire to 
root the latter in the realities of politics, and ‘not in the aspirations of politicians or in 
the constructs of lawyers’ (Hoffmann 1977, p. 44). In a similar vein, in another 
article on the ‘limits’ of realism, published shortly after Morgenthau’s death, 
Hoffmann notes the tension present in Morgenthau’s work, between his awareness of
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the diversity of politics, and his desire to reduce politics to a simple type ‘he deemed 
politically prudent and ethically wise’ (Hoffmann 1981, p. 657). According to 
Hoffmann’s famous quote on the topic, it is precisely this desire which makes 
Morgenthau ‘an idealist in disguise, a somewhat conservative liberal in revolt against 
other, imprudent liberals’ (Hoffmann 1981, p. 657). In Hoffmann’s view, between 
the need to debunk grandiose utopias (which grew out of his scepticism, his sense of 
history and his life experiences), and the need for a radical leap between politics-as- 
usual (which derived from his sense of logic, his awareness of the significance of the 
absolute weapon, and his deep concern for peace), there was a gap which 
Morgenthau ‘never filled’ (Hoffmann 1981, p. 657).
Despite these few isolated exceptions (Good 1960, Hoffmann 1977, 1981), 
Morgenthau’s views of politics as a morally laden enterprise, and, more broadly, of 
morality’s place and role in people’s lives, have been largely overlooked, the 
dominant position being that according to which Morgenthau was an amoralist 
thinker. In Gellman’s view, ‘a pattern of misunderstanding and confusion’ was then 
running through numerous assessments of Morgenthau’s political realism (Gellman 
1988, p. 247). Several lines of argument can be advanced in order to explain this. 
One possible explanation is that the misunderstanding was triggered by 
Morgenthau’s style of argumentation, more exactly by the lack of precision and 
rigour, prone to nourish ambiguities and paradoxes. Jervis, for instance, takes that 
view that ‘like any subtle and supple thinker, he voiced too many contradictions to 
permit ready distillations’ (Jervis 1994, p. 853). As Frei puts this, on Morgenthau’s 
part there were few explanations and even less willingness to put things in 
perspective (Frei 2001, p. 201): ‘so convinced was he of the justice, the obviousness 
of his cause that he failed at times to make a convincing case for it’ (Frei 2001, pp.
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201-2). In Frei’s account, against what Morgenthau felt was a misleading view of the 
world, he asserted his own view as the “right”, in fact, as the only “right” 
perspective’, and he gave his views ‘the semblance of indisputable, self-evident 
truths’ (Frei 2001, p. 201). Moreover, at times, Morgenthau displayed neither much 
tolerance nor much awareness of the relativity of his own views, and his statements 
occasionally took the tone of dogmatic positions (Frei 2001, p. 201). For Frei, it is 
clear that Morgenthau’s style had its share of cutting short and distorting arguments:
So adamant was he in his assertions against ostensible liberal attempts to bypass, 
if not replace, the political realm, that these assertions were frequently 
misunderstood as a moral affirmation of politics -  as a positive appreciation of 
interest and power and hence as a depreciation of law and morality (Frei 2001, p. 
204).
A convincing interpretation which points to Morgenthau’s response to the 
contextual factors is provided by Richard Ned Lebow. A former student of 
Morgenthau, Lebow argues that the latter deliberately emphasised certain facets of 
his theory, with all the risks it implied, this being ‘a strategic as much as an 
intellectual choice’ (Lebow 2003, p. 238). Lebow explains that to Morgenthau 
politics was undeniably about power, but in the 1940s ‘he had emphasised it to the 
point of excluding other features of politics, as a reaction to the liberal idealist 
emphasis on law and morality’ (Lebow 2003, p. 238). In support of his assertion, 
Lebow quotes Morgenthau, who in an article published in 1966 maintained that 
‘when the times tend to depreciate the elements of power, international relations 
theory must stress its importance’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lebow 2003, p. 237). In a
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similar vein, to Morgenthau, ‘when the reality of power is being lost sight of over its 
moral and legal limitations, international relations theory must point to that reality’, 
and ‘when law and morality are judged as nothing, it must assign them their rightful 
place’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lebow 2003, p. 239).
Lebow’s interpretation makes Morgenthau’s stances meaningful by situating 
them within the context of the main debates of that time -  between utopianism and 
realism at first, then the debate upon methods in IR, stirred by the so-called 
‘behavioralist revolution’ (this is a method also applied in the present thesis, which 
partially relies on Quentin Skinner’s approach, as detailed in section 1.4). While 
reacting to liberal internationalism, Morgenthau deliberately emphasised the power 
element of politics, as a central concept ‘which allows the observer to distinguish the 
field of politics from other social spheres, to orient himself in the maze of empirical 
phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure of 
rational order within it’ (Morgenthau 1971a, p. 31). By applying this strategy 
however -  and with the lack of precision and detail noticed by Frei - he inadvertently 
appeared to reject any attempt to ascribe moral values to politics. Moreover, while an 
active participant in the debate over method, Morgenthau’s scarcely explained 
inclusion of the ‘six principles of political realism’ in the second edition of Politics 
among Nations led to him to being interpreted as a ‘hard-nosed positivist’ (Nobel 
1995, p. 65), despite his constant rejection of positivism and his appeal for a sensible 
understanding of his claims (see Morgenthau 1962a, p. 24). All these issues have 
concurred to paint a simplistic and misleading yet extraordinarily enduring picture of 
Morgenthau, which has only recently come under considerable attack.
Decades passed before the alleged amorality of Morgenthau’s theory started to be 
questioned more systematically. At present, the balance appears to have been
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reversed: after a plethora of readings which emphasised the power struggle as the 
first -  and even the only -  principle which underpins Morgenthau’s theory, recent 
revisionist works draw attention to its defining moral facet, and to Morgenthau’s 
commitment to the Judeo-Christian tradition of moral inquiry (Russell 1990, Murray 
1996 and 1997, Frei 2001, Mollov 2002). Furthermore, as indicated below, many re- 
evaluations point to the commonalities among Morgenthau and figures as diverse as 
Thucydides and Clausewitz (Lebow 2003), Augustine (Murray 1996 and 1997), 
Nietzsche (Petersen 1999, Frei 2001), and Weber (Frei 2001). These ongoing 
assertions of various positions share a common ground in pointing to Morgenthau’s 
moral claims. Their aim is to rediscover Morgenthau’s political theory, and to assert 
its relevance to present day developments, while also reconstructing and reassessing 
the principles of classical realism itself, as a relevant tradition.
One of the pioneering contributions to address Morgenthau’s normative claims is 
Russell’s Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics o f American Statecraft (Russell 1990). 
Russell’s key project regards the unearthing of Morgenthau’s largely neglected moral 
commitments, and of the latter’s importance in the context of Morgenthau’s political 
theory. Russell discusses Morgenthau’s trust in what he calls ‘the perennial truths of 
philosophy’, and asks the all important question: is Morgenthau really amoral, as 
most scholars proclaimed throughout the Cold War, or should we trust his expression 
(be it less obvious) of commitment to moral values which are universal in scope? 
After a thoroughgoing reinterpretation of his writings, Russell argues that 
Morgenthau did not lie to himself or to the others: he espoused an ‘abiding concern 
for those ethical vitalities -  the compelling force of judgments that give value and 
meaning to life -  that distinguish the human condition in all its conflictual and 
cooperative dimensions’ (Russell 1990, p. 148). For Morgenthau, the moral law was
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sacred: principles of morality were ‘binding for the conduct of all men regardless of 
nationality’, with each man having a noble and universal obligation to mankind 
(Russell 1990, p. 151). This vision, applied to his field of theoretical inquiry, led 
Morgenthau to argue that any international political theory ‘is a reflection of certain 
philosophic propositions’, the intellectual horizon of the political theorist extending 
‘to the identification and analysis of objective, general truths that exist regardless of 
time and place’ (Russell 1990, p. 60). Russell is quick to indicate that Morgenthau’s 
continuous reference to a transcendent realm of values is vague, ‘more implicit than 
explicit, and without clearly defined roots in any philosophical or theological system’ 
(Russell 1990, p. 164). However, he also emphasises that with the help of this 
reference to a framework of moral principles with universal applicability 
Morgenthau’s realist theory gains depth (Russell 1990, p. 69). In light of this 
interpretation, Russell concludes that ‘if Morgenthau’s position continues to raise 
doubts about the moral significance of political action, this is largely attributable to 
the relationship between his estimate of man’s nature and the use of transcendent 
norms in political analysis’ (Russell 1990, p. 169).
A similar, more recent interpretation which emphasises Morgenthau’s moral 
approach to politics, is that of Benjamin Mollov (2002). Mollov’s key project is that 
of depicting the influence that anti-semitism and his German-Jewish heritage had on 
Morgenthau's political thought, and it is within this context that he unearths the 
moral foundation of Morgenthau’s theory. He outlines Morgenthau’s close 
connection with the Jewish community, and goes on to analyse the spiritual aspects 
of his thought, with an emphasis on its transcendent character. According to this 
recent assessment, the main transcendent elements present in Morgenthau’s theory 
concern ‘morality in politics and statecraft’, ‘the responsibility of the intellectual to
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speak “truth to power’” , ‘the importance of philosophy to Morgenthau’s approach to 
international relations’, and his sustained emphasis upon the ‘spiritual forces in man 
and politics’ (Mollov 2002, p. 22). Just like for Russell earlier, these features support 
an assertion which recently has started to gain ground: ‘Despite his image as a 
Realpolitik thinker, Morgenthau throughout his career grappled with moral, 
philosophic and spiritual issues’ (Mollov 2002, pp. 31, 203).
An important trend in the ongoing re-evaluation of classical realism concerns its 
reconsideration as a political tradition, and within this context several interpretations 
of Morgenthau’s thought have been published lately. For instance, in one of his most 
recent contributions (Lebow 2003), Lebow builds upon an argument previously made 
by Gellman -  who, writing in 1988, emphasised that Morgenthau ‘comes remarkably 
close to Thucydides’ in arguing that the struggle between nations is ‘located 
essentially in human nature, and only then in the conditions of international affairs’ 
(Gellman 1988, p. 253). In his reading however, Lebow’s main argument is that 
Morgenthau and Thucydides, but also Clausewitz, share a sophisticated tradition: 
what he calls ‘tragic realism’. Clausewitz and Morgenthau did not write tragedy, but 
according to Lebow, they did share Thucydides’ ‘tragic perspective on life and 
politics’ (Lebow 2003, p. 20). These three thinkers address similar problems but in 
different cultural settings (Lebow 2003, pp. 61-2), and in their thinking, there is no 
fundamental contradiction between ethics and interests (Lebow 2003, p. 61). As 
Lebow is keen to emphasise, they envisage ‘a hybrid order that would maintain or 
resurrect the best features of the old system, but accommodate the kind of changes 
that were either unavoidable or held out the prospects of benefits’ (Lebow 2003, p. 
33). As this thesis intends to point out, Morgenthau’s awareness of the tragic 
character of life shows up in his theory forcefully, and from this perspective,
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Lebow’s account provides some useful insights. I will come back to Morgenthau’s 
‘tragic’ notion of life in chapter 3, where I will assess the way in which it is 
embedded in Morgenthau’s metaphysics, relying on Nietzsche’s and Weber’s 
diagnosis in the process.
Lebow portrays Morgenthau as a German and American intellectual and refugee, 
and he emphasises the importance of the inter-war life experience in the shaping of 
Morgenthau’s perspective (Lebow 2003, p. 16): this experience ‘brings politics, 
culture and scholarship together in the most pronounced way’ (Lebow 2003, p. 40). 
For Morgenthau, power is ‘the starting point, but by no means the end point, of his 
analysis of international affairs’ (Lebow 2003, p. 217). Lebow points to 
Morgenthau’s ethical concerns, to his focus upon the concept of justice, and his 
awareness that concepts of ethics ‘are shaped by cultural and historical experience, 
and must be considered in context’ (Lebow 2003, p. 16). Last but not least, Lebow 
also maintains that by 1970, Morgenthau had become ‘guardedly optimistic’ about 
the prospects for a far-reaching transformation of the international system (Lebow 
2003, p. 243). This assumption regarding Morgenthau’s growing optimism, outlined 
by Lebow and widespread among IR scholars, will be addressed in future chapters, in 
light of evidence which points to the complexity of the issue, and questions Lebow’s 
claim.
Another original reinterpretation of tradition is performed by Michael C. 
Williams (2005). Williams reads Morgenthau within the context of bringing 
arguments for proving the existence of a tradition which he calls ‘wilful realism’. 
This is a tradition which propagates ‘a continual concern with the relationship 
between knowledge and politics, the politics of knowledge, and a strong advocacy of 
the need for a politics both informed and suitably chastened by an understanding of
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the limits of knowledge’ (Williams 2005, pp. 5-6), and which seeks ‘a politics of 
limits that recognizes the destructive and productive dimensions of politics, and that 
maximizes its positive possibilities while minimising its destructive potential’ 
(Williams 2005, p. 7).
As pointed out by Williams, Morgenthau addresses both the destructive and 
constructive forces of politics, and he attempts to develop an understanding of 
domestic politics and foreign policy ‘that restrains modernity’s worst potentials 
while retaining its principled and productive possibilities’ (Williams 2005, p. 8). 
Williams is preoccupied with the articulation of the concept of ‘politics’ in 
Morgenthau’s thought, as a moral and political project placed within the confines of 
a modernity ‘whose loss of belief in the power of the divine, and of an interest in 
religion, has left individuals in an anomic condition, and whose societal 
rationalisation has increased the feeling of powerlessness’ (Williams 2005, pp. 121- 
2). Within this context, and following some earlier arguments (Walker 1993, Der 
Derian 1996, Guzzini 1998, p. 228), Williams emphasises the strong affinities 
between classical Realism -  that is, between Morgenthau - and postmodern 
approaches, the existence of unbreachable chasms in this regard being for Williams 
‘simply fallacious’ (Williams 2005, p. 164).
In the interpretation put forward by Williams, Morgenthau implies that 
uncertainty is the only thing we can be sure of in present times. The death of God, 
once proclaimed by Nietzsche, manifests itself forcefully within the field of politics, 
and the outcomes of this situation are often emphasised: the lack of fixed 
understandings of the good and the true stands as ‘the condition of modem politics, 
and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change’ 
(Williams 2005, p. 7). As emphasised by Williams, for Morgenthau, a correct
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understanding of the concept of politics is essential if a recognition of the role of 
power in politics is ‘not to be equated with a simple reduction of politics to nothing 
but power and violence, and Realism reduced to little more than a crude form of 
realpolitik’ (Williams 2005, p. 84). In Morgenthau’s account as spelled out by 
Williams, politics is ‘potentially a remarkably destructive dimension of human 
action’, yet at the same time, it is also ‘the protean centre of social life’ (Williams 
2005, p. 116). As Williams adds further, Morgenthau endorses a creative vision of 
politics, and ‘views the indeterminacy of politics as a potentially positive 
phenomenon, representing the possibility of change, and as a core principle of 
democracy’ (Williams 2005, p. 116).
A different account from Lebow’s and Williams’, which pictures realism as a 
tradition of political ethics and a form of Judaeo-Christian imperfectionism, is 
provided by Murray (1997). Unlike Lebow’s and Williams’, Murray’s endeavour is 
directed towards portraying Morgenthau, Niebuhr and Kennan as exponents of what 
he calls ‘Christian realist thought’. In Murray’s account, the central themes which 
connect these thinkers’ works are represented by the emphasis upon the 
transcendental moral code, and by the attempt to strike a balance between power 
political and cosmopolitan moral components. As Murray maintains, an explicitly 
Judaeo-Christian set of values permeate the realists’ approach, and any 
reinterpretation of their moral theory ‘must seek to understand how the concern with 
cosmopolitan moral principles fits with their emphasis on power politics’ (Murray 
1997, p. 8).
Murray points to the centrality ascribed to the critique of rationalism in the 
thought of Niebuhr, Kennan and Morgenthau, and he argues that the account of 
realism as part of the conservative rationalist orthodoxy is ‘fundamentally mistaken’
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(Murray 1997, p. 17). To Murray it is clear that realists consider choices to be 
constrained within the bounds of natural possibility, directed by the flow of historical 
trends, and conditioned by the historical context: ‘it is ultimately of the essence of 
realism that man is incapable of directing history according to some rational plan’ 
(Murray 1997, p. 75). Moreover, Murray maintains that the apparent contradiction 
produced in realism by its simultaneous affiliation to both the tradition of power 
politics and the tradition of Judaeo-Christian ethics ‘cannot be resolved adequately 
by interpreting realism through the lens of the tradition of pessimism centred around 
Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes’ (Murray 1997, p. 45):
We find ourselves in a circular process in which, once the realists are identified 
within this tradition, it is inevitable that confirming evidence becomes standard, 
and dissenting material becomes an anomalous contradiction or cynical self- 
justification. It is this structure which perhaps explains the extended dominance 
of amoral readings of realism, and the inability of revisionist writers to take the 
final step and provide an integrated account of the theory (Murray 1997, p. 46).
Most importantly, Murray argues that at the core of the realist theory stands an 
Augustinian ‘dialectic of absolutes’, in which absolute principles are maintained in 
tension with the requirements of political survival (Murray 1997, pp. 18, 73). In this 
account, the attempt to provide a framework in which a transcendental morality 
could be combined with a realistic appraisal of the conditions of life was central to 
Augustine (Murray 1997, p. 48), and it is exactly this attempt the one which Murray 
finds in Morgenthau as well. The latter’s is a sophisticated theory, replete with 
indications of a broader concern with the intersubjectivity of phenomena (Murray
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1997, p. 74), and informed by a return to pre-rationalist modes of thought (Murray 
1997, p. 47). In Murray’s interpretation, Morgenthau returns to Augustine’s attack on 
classical rationalism in order to make his own critique of modem rationalism, and 
moreover in order to find a framework within which to relate his moral statements to 
the power political facet of his theory (Murray 1997, pp. 47, 58).
Thus, unlike Lebow who integrates Morgenthau within a tradition of tragic 
realism, along with Thucydides and Clausewitz, and unlike Williams who points to 
wilful realism and its postmodern innuendos, Murray focuses on what he calls 
Christian realism and its inspiration (St Augustine) and followers (Morgenthau, 
Niebuhr and Kennan). All of these scholars discuss Morgenthau within different 
projects regarding the re-creation of a tradition. While their objectives diverge, what 
they significantly share is an awareness of Morgenthau’s moral concerns, and of the 
centrality ascribed by Morgenthau to values within his theory. The present thesis is 
based on the same recognition of the central place occupied by morality in 
Morgenthau’s thought, and points to Morgenthau’s scholarly interest in the 
imposition and stabilisation of meaning and values. This reading will nevertheless 
add to the interpretations summarised above, by demonstrating Morgenthau’s 
working out along a tension between assumptions regarding values typically modem 
and postmodern respectively, and his development of a solution to the dichotomous 
normative choices of modernity and postmodemity which emphasises the creative 
role of the superior human actor.
Coming back to Murray’s assessment, this thesis would like to point that St 
Augustine is one of the thinkers Morgenthau points to explicitly when asked about 
the influences which he absorbed throughout his career: in the unpublished, little 
known private correspondence, Morgenthau maintains that in the early years,
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Nietzsche, Husserl and Dilthey were some of the predominant influences, while later 
on in his career the writings of Aristotle, St. Augustine and Niebuhr were of the 
greatest importance (Morgenthau to Samuel Magill, 24 November 1961, Morgenthau 
Papers, Box 39, page 1). Considering the central place occupied by Morgenthau in 
IR theory, it is noteworthy that only in recent years systematic and detailed attention 
has been granted to Morgenthau’s scholarly development in his native Germany, and 
to the influences which shaped his thought in various ways.
While Murray focused on a later influence, a few other scholars have chosen to 
highlight Morgenthau’s early intellectual encounters. Within this context, as 
emphasised by Michael Joseph Smith (1987), Morgenthau’s relationship with Weber 
is of considerable importance. In Smith’s interpretation, there are five themes which 
make up Weber’s contribution to realism: his definitions of the state and politics; his 
view of international politics as an unending struggle among nations; his nationalism; 
his concern for leadership and lastly his formulation of the moral problem in 
statecraft as a conflict between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility 
(see Smith 1987, pp. 20-45). In discussing Weber’s impact on Morgenthau’s thought, 
Smith emphasises that questions regarding Morgenthau’s supposedly amoral 
approach miss the point altogether. Just like Weber, Morgenthau was deeply 
concerned with morality, and to Smith this concern is all too obvious. Moreover, he 
situates Morgenthau’s contribution within the context of US political developments, 
and argues that along with Kennan and Niebuhr, Morgenthau tried to provide 
American foreign policy with a moral basis, ‘which accurately reflected the realities 
of power in a divided world’ (Smith 1987, p. 18). Morgenthau’s project, Smith 
maintains, was not to get rid of morality in politics, but ‘to turn realism from a 
critique of utopianism and a characteristic approach to man and politics, into a
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comprehensive theory that would explain the underlying essence of relations among 
states, illuminate the moral problem in statecraft, and provide a sound basis for 
evaluating specific contemporary problems of national policy’ (Smith 1987, p. 20). 
As argued further by Smith, in his concept of the national interest Morgenthau 
claimed to define an approach to policy that would lead to both political success and 
ethical moderation, but his theoretical attempt failed to raise to the expectations: in 
Smith’s critical account, Morgenthau’s realism ‘may provide a way to structure the 
political and moral dilemmas of foreign policy, but it does not prove to be an 
especially reliable guide to empirical success or automatic morality’ (Smith 1987, p. 
135).
No literature survey on Morgenthau is complete without mentioning the 
innovative reading provided by Ulrik Enemark Petersen (1999). Petersen’s article - 
which is critically important for the views endorsed in the present thesis - breaks 
with readings such as above, and portrays Morgenthau as a political thinker 
influenced by Nietzsche, who struggled with issues similar to those presently dealt 
with by critical theory (Petersen 1999, p. 85). Petersen provides a reinterpretation of 
Morgenthau’s concepts of power and human nature. Most importantly, he also argues 
provocatively against situating Morgenthau within the realist tradition itself. As 
Petersen contends, ‘far from re-establishing continuity and stability within the realist 
narrative’, his analysis shows that Morgenthau ‘cannot in any meaningful sense be 
located within this narrative’, and that Morgenthau’s core concepts are ‘developed in 
direct opposition to the philosophical and theoretical assumptions that fuel 
contemporary realism’ (Petersen 1999, p. 84).
Petersen questions the ‘received wisdom’ regarding Morgenthau, whose 
hermeneutic horizon is defined by ‘the rich tradition of political realism’ (Gilpin
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1981), and by the assumption that Morgenthau was primarily an American thinker, 
operating comfortably within the established certainties of modernity. He pleads 
instead for the thorough consideration of Morgenthau’s intellectually formative years 
in pre-World War II Germany. In Petersen’s account, this was one of the most 
tumultuous and creative epochs of modem thought. It was ‘a period of political and 
philosophical upheaval and profound crisis, in which the mbble left by the collapse 
of established modes of thought had not yet been cleared away by viable alternatives’ 
(Petersen 1999, p. 85). Petersen emphasises the importance of Nietzsche’s and 
Weber’s thinking in this environment, and points to the basic assumption which 
guides his reinterpretation, and his focus on metaphysical and ontological issues: in 
Petersen’s view, Morgenthau, as a member of the above mentioned community, 
‘shared in the general task of trying to work out the implications of Nietzsche's re­
articulation of the relationship between man and world’ (Petersen 1999, p. 89). As 
Petersen claims further, Morgenthau's thought, ‘far from being the instigator of 
modem, scientific realism, and thus the spiritual father of neo-realism and the pupil 
of Hobbes and Machiavelli’, represents a response to the crisis of that very tradition, 
and marks a transition: ‘rather than being in the midst of the grand narrative of 
modernity’, Morgenthau ‘is balancing on its edge’ (Petersen 1999, p. 85). Thus, 
rather than grounding him in a tradition constituted on the firm soil of modernity, 
Petersen posits Morgenthau in a territory within which he questions modernity in a 
way that is reminiscent of Nietzsche’s critique.
In Petersen’s account, Morgenthau scmtinizes man and the nature of his 
relationship to the world. He emphasises the division which has occurred between 
man and the world, between self and other, ‘as the collapse of metaphysical certainty 
throws him back into the flux, uncertainty, and conflict that define his empirical
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existence’ (Petersen 1999, p. 89). For Petersen’s Morgenthau, the hope of identifying 
an Archimedean point of incontestable knowledge and pure identity is a mirage, and 
behind his arguments ‘lies the realization that radical and pure thinking as envisaged 
by Descartes leads not to certainty and firm foundations, but to absurdity’. It ‘does 
not bring man to Truth, but to himself - himself not as a universal subject capable of 
transcendence but as one whose fate is as a finite, limited being’ (Petersen 1999, p. 
89). As outlined in the present thesis, there are some indications in Morgenthau’s 
work that point towards the possibility of transcendence. The thesis will return to the 
relation between man’s finitude and his capacity for transcendence in the following 
chapters, and it will point out that this relation is more complex than Petersen 
suggests.
Petersen’s depiction of the connection between Morgenthau and Nietzsche has 
recently received important evidence in its support, with the publication of Frei’s 
Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (2001). Frei is the first scholar to 
undertake an extensive research of Morgenthau’s unpublished manuscripts held by 
the Library of Congress, and his book reconstructs Morgenthau’s ‘European past’, 
and the formative influences which shaped his intellectual trajectory, as a student and 
young researcher in Germany and Switzerland. From these manuscripts we find out 
that Nietzsche was ‘the god’ of Morgenthau’s youth (Frei 2001, p. 98), and that 
Weber exerted a similarly powerful impact on Morgenthau’s thinking.
The young Morgenthau portrayed by Frei refers to the ongoing crisis of morality, 
and points that ‘ours is not an age of faith’ (Frei 2001, p. 145). In Morgenthau’s 
view, in such times, anyone who wants to gain understanding ‘must always be a 
great skeptic’, he must be able to deny and abandon the firm soil of certainty. In the 
spring of 1936 he writes to Hugo Sinzheimer, one of his most esteemed former
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professors: ‘My findings lead me to the inescapable conclusion that ethics, like all 
the other normative realms, is in a state of total dissolution’ (Morgenthau quoted in 
Frei 2001, p. 143). Thus, for Morgenthau, just like for Nietzsche, God is dead: as 
Frei explains, ‘religion and dogmatic metaphysics have abdicated, all objective 
ranking of values has proved illusory -  such as Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the time (...) 
Ultimate values and ideals lose their normative strength’ (Frei 2001, p. 142). There 
are no firmly established concepts of good and evil, ‘it all depends on one’s ultimate 
values’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 147).
Like Petersen, Frei maintains that Nietzsche is a viable starting point for 
understanding Morgenthau’s thought, and for locating it within a tradition which 
questions the received wisdom of modernity. Against the overly optimistic views of 
life, Morgenthau posits what Frei calls ‘the tragic as an ineluctable condition of 
human existence’ (Frei 2001, p. 185). He restores the tragic dimension to history, 
‘altogether in the spirit of Nietzsche, and in the best German tradition’ (Frei 2001, p. 
187). Last but not least, for Morgenthau, as described by Frei, such times require the 
emergence of strong characters, able to counteract destruction, and to impose 
creatively. As Frei puts it, under Nietzsche’s influence, Morgenthau
had early on succumbed to an aristocratic radicalism, which induced him to value 
rank and greatness, the elite of the stronger, great deeds and great lives, and 
discipline and authority more highly than bourgeois notions of security and 
progress (Frei 2001, p. 157).
Frei’s contribution to the ongoing re-evaluation of Morgenthau is substantial. It 
points to important events which marked Morgenthau’s life and intellectual
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development, and engages with critics who argue the case of the supposed amoralism 
of Morgenthau’s theory, by raising awareness to a multiplicity of contexts in which 
Morgenthau’s moral commitment shines through. Frei’s work differs from those of 
the other authors discussed above by its genre (intellectual biography), but also by its 
objective of interpreting Morgenthau as a scholar influenced by Nietzsche, who 
seeks to accommodate moral uncertainty all his life. After an examination of 
Morgenthau’s diaries, private correspondence and unpublished papers written in 
Europe, Frei takes the Nietzschean intellectual heritage as a main starting point for 
his analysis, and works out the meaning of Morgenthau’s encounter with Nietzsche 
and its impact on Morgenthau’s theory in a way which does justice to contexts and 
debates. These issues will be examined in chapter 2 at length.
The scholars above provide readings that are useful to the present thesis, which 
intends to build on the literature, putting forward new insights regarding 
Morgenthau’s commitment to topics and positions relevant to both modernity and 
postmodemity, as defined in the first section of this chapter. In what follows, I will 
provide a summary of the chapter by chapter argumentation of the thesis, pointing to 
its innovative elements and their contribution to the ongoing re-visiting of realism. 
As mentioned earlier, according to the view advanced here, Morgenthau’s narrative 
addresses the central issue of meaning. To talk about meaning is to talk about 
morality. For Morgenthau, this is the meaning of meaning, and in this context, 
morality is the key concept to be analysed, when discussing the fate of man 
following the ‘death of God’. Along with the depiction of the centrality of the topic 
of meaning in Morgenthau’s theory, of Nietzsche’s and Weber’s importance in the 
articulation of Morgenthau’s perspective, and of Morgenthau’s specific interpretation 
of his mentors’ diagnosis of the ‘death of God’, the present thesis will also point to
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Morgenthau’s interpretation of power as meaning imposition, and to his examination 
of the disenchantment of human life and of politics in particular. Furthermore, the 
thesis will bring arguments to substantiate the claim regarding Morgenthau’s vision 
of man as the source of both destruction and transcendence, and will examine 
Morgenthau’s concept of the creative, responsible and thoughtful leader, who 
represents the artisan of the re-enchantment of politics.
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1.3 Power as Meaning Imposition; between Destruction and
Construction
The present reading is built on the assumption that there is a key concept in 
Morgenthau’s account -  meaning -  and this concept will be addressed throughout the 
thesis. After a discussion of the historical context which is very important for the 
development of Morgenthau’s views in native Germany, chapter 2 will introduce his 
fundamental intellectual encounters with Nietzsche and Weber. It will be shown that 
Morgenthau read Nietzsche and Weber around the same time, and he developed an 
interest in the diagnosis of the death of universal values which would remain a 
concern throughout his life. Chapter 2 will point to other intellectual encounters, both 
positive and negative, and will refer to Morgenthau’s experience of the American 
academia and the latter’s impact on him, and also to Morgenthau’s central place in 
the development of post-war US realism.
Chapter 3 will explore Morgenthau’s diagnosis of the times, which mirrors 
similar issues addressed by Nietzsche and Weber, according to the present 
interpretation. Morgenthau is fascinated with the issue of man’s fate in present times, 
which are plagued by an unprecedented increase in physical danger, social 
disintegration, and metaphysical doubt (Morgenthau 1971, p. 621), a present when 
humans play a role in a story ‘of inner insecurity, of the anticipation of impending 
doom, of metaphysical anxieties’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 9). Within this picture of the
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present, Morgenthau maintains, society is not the only entity which could fulfil 
man’s need for security and certainty: the realms of morality and religion, closely 
connected, should also normally perform this function. As Morgenthau reveals, 
however, these realms have lost their powers recently: in the twentieth century, 
men’s ‘intensified individual frustrations and anxieties’, became permanent, ‘as a 
result of the weakening of the ties of tradition, especially in the form of religion..., of 
increased rationalization of life and work, and of cyclical economic crises’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 77). Morgenthau is aware of the ‘twilight of international 
morality’ (Morgenthau 1948), of the collapse of the ‘common roof of shared values 
and universal standards of action’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 269) -  by which he means a 
moral realm composed of Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 191). He argues in one of his unpublished writings that the 
moral order is in ‘a state of total dissolution’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 
143), while in a later published work he decries the ascendancy of technology over 
morality (Morgenthau 1963c, p. 120).
Morgenthau’s interpretation of the times, and of man’s life within them, is a 
narrative about modernity’s enlightened potential, but also about its gloomy 
consequences, brought together in a dynamic relationship. A world ‘stripped’ of its 
wonders, subjected to universalised calculation, whose art, religion and metaphysics 
are discredited, where we thus meet ‘under an empty sky from which the gods have 
departed’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 196) -  this is our disenchanted world, in 
Morgenthau’s view. In such times, Morgenthau contends that humans can change the 
world through creating religious, moral and social worlds of their own. Morgenthau 
implies that this is, indeed, an era that grants man’s imagination - which ‘creates new 
worlds of religion, art, and reason that live after their creator’ (Morgenthau 1962c, p.
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20) - its proper place. Thus, starting from the position of ‘God’s death’, Morgenthau 
follows Nietzsche’s and Weber’s views also in what regards human beings’ 
increased prospects for agency manifestation, for individuals’ affirmation, as one of 
the consequences of this ‘death’. The present thesis maintains that there is no better 
way to understand Morgenthau’s vision of contesting individuals/meanings than to 
focus on his concept of ‘power’, which in this thesis is interpreted as meaning 
imposition. In chapters 3 and 4 it will be shown that for Morgenthau, the process of 
creating and imposing power is not about gaining material power, but power of a 
different, non-corporeal nature, obtained after a struggle of minds and wills. The 
thesis will argue that Morgenthau shares Nietzsche’s passion for grasping man’s 
nature, and also his emphasis upon humans’ creative potential, interpreting the well- 
known concept of the ‘will to power’ as ‘the power to create meaning’ (Habermas 
1987, p. 95), and regarding it as a cradle of both destruction and construction. 
Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ manifests itself in offering reinterpretations of the world, 
and, for the German philosopher, ‘to impose upon becoming the character of being’ 
stands as the ‘supreme will to power’ (Nietzsche, 1968, p. 330), this latter assertion 
being interpreted here precisely as above, as representing one’s striving to make 
her/his own created meaning -  which has the ‘character of being’, namely it is well 
crystallised -  prevail upon the others’ indefinite ‘becoming’. Morgenthau’s narrative 
reveals its author’s view concerning the importance of meaning creation, the 
possibility of human agency in a historical world (Warren 1985, p. 183), and the 
desirability of individual moral reconstructions, while touching upon the unfolding of 
phenomena whose consequences are critical for current times: nihilism and 
disenchantment.
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While chapter 3 will address Morgenthau’s metaphysics, chapter 4 will analyse 
the transposition of Morgenthau’s metaphysical assumptions on to the political 
theory domain. Chapter 4 will point to a certain kind of relativism and perspectivism 
which in Morgenthau’s view characterise the realm of politics, and will analyse 
power as meaning imposition - an interpretation which differs from that of power as 
influence (already discussed in the literature) by its emphasis on the creative value of 
the act of imposing meaning. Moreover, it will introduce a new concept in the 
literature -  that of the disenchantment of politics -  and will outline Morgenthau’s 
critique of this development, which in his view renders politics meaningless. 
Morgenthau maintains that in the political realm, one notices a disenchantment 
stimulated by technological fervour and bureaucratic development, which have 
rendered the old, traditional values meaningless, and have exposed the political act to 
the temptation of acting for the action’s sake. Chapter 4 will also focus on the 
creative facet of human nature, as represented by the responsible individual, who acts 
within the confines of a disenchanted political world. On the political scene, this 
individual is the thoughtful statesman, who imposes a particular interpretation 
through a creative re-working of tradition.
The analysis of Morgenthau’s concepts of universality, tradition and superior 
leadership will form the main part of chapter 5. In the essay ‘Epistle to the 
Columbians on the Meaning of Morality’ (Morgenthau 1962a, pp. 368-74), 
Morgenthau argues that the disparate normative systems which have permeated 
humankind’s history hold one thing in common: a foundation of moral understanding 
and valuation, which is ‘impervious to the changing conditions of time and place’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 372). The commands of this foundation, Morgenthau asserts 
further, are absolute and must be obeyed for their own sake (Morgenthau 1962a, p.
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370). The ‘Epistle’ is representative for Morgenthau’s ‘other side’ discussion of 
morality: he will always refer to ‘the sanctity of the moral law’ (Morgenthau 1962a, 
p. 372) -  that is, to the above mentioned universal foundation of values -  
respectfully, as to a realm which must be ‘superimposed’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 
325) on all human actions.
In Morgenthau’s account, although men are bom with a moral sense, this element 
alone is not enough for their life’s fulfilment, because this process also requires 
transcendental orientations (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 373), orientations ‘from which 
life receives its meaning’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 374). Putting it most clearly, 
Morgenthau argues that human existence ‘cannot find its meaning within itself but 
must receive it from a transcendent source’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 373). Creation, 
and man’s possibilities in this regard, following the ‘death of God’, now look like 
being granted a secondary place by Morgenthau. Instead, what is more important for 
him is that man’s own created meanings be in harmony with what he calls ‘an 
objective order’ (Morgenthau 1983, p. 20), by which Morgenthau implies norms 
which ‘act upon the moral consciousness of man with all the authority of aprioristic 
evidence’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 175). As emphasised by Morgenthau, 
religion and philosophy of necessity require an ‘objective position’ outside society, 
and objective standards through which society can be understood, judged, and given 
meaning (Morgenthau 1983, p. 228).
In the field of political thought, Morgenthau pleads for a restoration of timeless 
elements (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 3) - as he puts it, ‘political science is of necessity 
based upon, and permeated by, a total worldview -  religious, poetic as well as 
philosophic in nature -  the validity of which it must take for granted’ (Morgenthau 
1962a, p. 26). Meanwhile, in defining political action, he argues that it stands as ‘an
49
attempt to realize moral values through the medium of politics, that is, power’, and 
that it is only with the help of these values, springing from the above mentioned 
objective order, that power ‘must be tamed, restrained, and transformed’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, pp. 110, 317).
This is the moment when the apparent tension which informs Morgenthau’s 
vision of the present times -  the tension between nihilism and morality in a 
disenchanted world - becomes clear. A careful reading of Morgenthau’s works leads 
to the conclusion that, at the same time as praising the opportunities opened up by 
‘the death of God’, Morgenthau also emphasises the consolidation of a universal 
moral realm, with which men’s own created meanings should be harmonious -  and 
this is the complex issue the present thesis intends to explore. Chapter 5 will show 
that, if judged with an eye to the contexts and debates of the time, Morgenthau’s 
stances are not contradictory as argued by some observers. Moreover, they pave the 
way for a sophisticated account of leadership which retains much of the Nietzschean 
and Weberian ideas of the Ubermensch and responsible political hero respectively, 
and represents a viable model of politics which avoids action for action’s sake in the 
aftermath of the decline of universal values. This is a view that will be reinforced in 
the conclusion of the thesis, which will also point again to the relevance of 
Morgenthau’s writings to ongoing discussions regarding the concepts of modernity 
and postmodemity.
Coming back to the issue of context, the thesis would like to emphasise the 
importance of placing Morgenthau’s endeavours in illuminating contexts, and of 
reconstructing the questions to which Morgenthau’s texts are the answers. To 
accomplish these tasks properly, the thesis will use two approaches. First, when 
reflecting upon matters of context and intentions, the analysis will be guided by the
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method of studying political thinkers founded by Cambridge historian Quentin 
Skinner. Second, since this thesis shares the view that any text ‘must be understood 
as an answer to a real question’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 337), in attempting to reconstruct 
the questions and the answers which live in Morgenthau’s written contributions, it 
will follow Skinner (who addresses this issue as well), but also the considerations on 
the issue of textual interpretation that have been put forward by German theorist 
Hans Gadamer. The present reading will draw on aspects of Skinner’s and 
Gadamer’s approaches deemed pertinent for the task at hand, while also avoiding 
purism in favour of one author or the other.
The following section will explain the methodological importance of Skinner and 
Gadamer for the thesis in more detail, showing the ways in which elements of 
Skinner’s and Gadamer’s methods are useful for studying Morgenthau.
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1.4 Methodology
1.4.1 Quentin Skinner’s Method
In one of his seminal articles (Skinner 1988 [1969], pp. 29-67), Skinner accuses 
his colleagues in the study of the history of political thought of perpetuating three 
‘mythologies’. The first mythology to be described and critically assessed is also the 
most persistent in Skinner’s view: ‘the mythology of doctrines’. This mythology is 
driven by historians’ expectation that classic writers ‘will be found to enunciate some 
doctrine on each of the topics regarded as constitutive of the subject’ (Skinner 1988 
[1969], p. 59). It follows from this that, all too quickly, scholars are tempted to 
convert ‘some scattered or incidental remarks by a classic theorist into their 
“doctrine” on one of the expected themes’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 60). 
Consequently, if a thinker is considered to have apparently anticipated later 
doctrines, he will be congratulated for his clairvoyance; when, on the contrary, he is 
found ‘guilty of silence’ on the issue of one doctrine or another, he will be criticised 
for falling short of his proper task (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 64). As Skinner aptly 
asserts here, ‘it cannot be a correct appraisal of any agent’s action to say that they 
have failed to do something unless it is first clear that they could have had, and did in
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fact have, the intention to perform that particular action’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 
78).
Regarding the second mythology depicted by Skinner -  ‘the mythology of 
coherence’ -  this is perpetuated by scholars’ attempt, exposed so often, of 
reconciling contradictions obvious in classical texts, thus going ‘down the scholastic 
path of “resolving antinomies’” (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 69). Pervasive and very 
dangerous are, in Skinner’s view, the two directions - ‘metaphysical in the most 
pejorative sense’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 69) -  which constitute the degeneration of 
this mythology. The first tendency is revealed when historians of thought deem it 
necessary, in the interests of extracting a message of maximum coherence, to 
‘discount statements of intention that authors themselves make about what they are 
doing, or even to discount whole works that may seem to impair the coherence of 
their systems of thought’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 69). The second tendency shows 
up when scholars are urged by some of their colleagues to see that the correct 
question to ask ‘is not whether the given writer was inconsistent, but rather “how are 
the contradictions (or apparent contradictions) to be accounted for?”’, Skinner here 
adding, ironically, that ‘the explanation dictated by the principle of Ockham’s razor 
(that an apparent contradiction may be a contradiction) is explicitly set aside’ 
(Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 70). Contradictions are thus explained in ways which try to 
render them a meaning that discounts their contradictory nature itself: they turn out 
to be thought of in terms which implicitly point to them as being coherent, when they 
are obviously not. The present thesis will avoid falling into the trap of this mythology 
by pointing to the tensions in Morgenthau’s account, and to the lack of openness of 
explanation on Morgenthau’s part as the cause of these.
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Skinner also distinguishes ‘the mythology of prolepsis’, at work when scholars 
are more interested in the retrospective significance of a given episode than in its 
meaning for the agent at the time (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 73). What the author 
implies is ‘decoded’ in accordance to present day discussions, rendering to a writing 
‘an account of what its author was doing that could not in principle be true’ (Skinner 
1988 [1969], p. 73). The characteristic of this mythology is therefore, to use Skinner 
once again, ‘the conflation of the asymmetry between the significance an observer 
may justifiably claim to find in a given historical episode, and the meaning of that 
episode itself (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 73). The present thesis will not consider 
Morgenthau to be a postmodern, and will not argue that he was consciously writing 
post-modern theory. On the contrary, it will emphasise his importance for both 
modernity and postmodemity (the latter understood as a mood within modernity), 
while also cultivating an awareness of the Cold War and the ‘behaviouralist 
revolution’, in the midst of, and in reaction to which Morgenthau wrote.
Skinner’s critical notes on the study of the history of political thought form one 
of his contributions which this thesis will pay attention to. The other issue of interest 
here is his methodological approach itself. Skinner’s reputation in the field of the 
history of political thought was built throughout his lifetime effort to construct, and 
then to apply to the study of various texts, a method with whose help he has tried to 
recover what he calls ‘the historical meaning/identity’ of individual texts in the 
history of thought, seeing them as contributions to particular discourses, and 
recognising ‘the ways in which they followed or challenged or subverted the 
conventional terms of those discourses themselves’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 124).
Skinner distinguishes between what he calls the ‘two dimensions of language’: 
the dimension of meaning, and the dimension of linguistic action, the latter - which
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has constituted Skinner’s main area of concern - being described as ‘the study of the 
range of things that speakers are capable of doing in (and by) the use of words and 
sentences’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 3). For Skinner, there are two questions to be 
asked with reference to the meaning and understanding of texts: one is the question 
of what the text means, the other the question of what its author may have meant. In 
Skinner’s view, in order that scholars understand the texts they study, both of these 
questions must be answered (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 113).
For Skinner, it is the depiction of authorial intentions which makes up the main 
area of enquiry, although not the only one. As Skinner cautiously adds here, Austin’s 
theory of speech acts does not tell us ‘that the intentions of speakers and writers 
constitute the sole or even the best guide to understanding their texts or other 
utterances’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 110). Skinner urges historians of political 
thought to read a text ‘as action in context’, to pay attention to what its author is 
engaged in, in the way in which he ‘does things with words’ (Austin 1975) - 
attempting to make a change in the ideological context, to strengthen or weaken rival 
elements of it, to present a certain form of it intact against assault, or on the contrary, 
to give it a new twist or direction (Charles Taylor quoted in Tully 1988, p. 219). For 
Skinner, the essential endeavour of a scholar in the field of the history of ideas must 
therefore be directed towards the recovery of the intentions which animated thinkers, 
at the time when they wrote: he must depict what the author, ‘in writing at the time 
he did for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending 
to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance’ (Skinner 1969, p. 63). As 
Skinner later put it,
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There is a sense in which we need to understand why a certain proposition has 
been put forward if we wish to understand the proposition itself. We need to see 
it not simply as a proposition, but also as a move in argument. So we need to 
grasp why it seemed worth making that precise move; to recapture the 
presuppositions and purposes that went into the making of it’ (Skinner 1988 
[1969], p. 274).
In order to discover the ‘historical meaning’ of a text, it is necessary to 
understand ‘the “point” or “force” of the author’s argument’ (Tully 1988, p. 9). 
Skinner follows J.L. Austin precisely in the analysis of what the latter labelled the 
‘illocutionary force’ of utterances -  the dimension of language in use by which 
speakers perform an act of a certain kind, ‘engaging in a piece of deliberate and 
voluntary behaviour’ (Tully 1988, p. 261). Following Austin, Skinner also 
distinguishes between the illocutionary and perlocutionary force of utterances -  that 
is, between what we may be doing in saying something, and what we may bring 
about by saying something - his Austinian-like assumption being, as seen above, that 
speakers are able to exploit the dimension of illocutionary force in order ‘to do things 
with words’ (Tully 1988, p. 261). Skinner emphasises that the novelty of Austin’s 
theory springs from a rigorous act of theorising a dimension of language which we 
all use after all: ‘anyone who issues a serious utterance will always be doing 
something as well as saying something, and doing it in virtue of saying what is said’ 
(Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 262). In one memorable paragraph, Skinner acknowledges 
that it may indeed be impossible to recover more than a small fraction of the things 
that Plato, for instance, was doing in The Republic, yet he emphasises that the extent 
to which we can hope to understand Plato’s work depends in part on the extent to
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which we can recover Plato’s intentions (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 263) -  once again 
pointing to his assumption regarding the centrality of the analysis of intentions for 
the history of political thought.
Skinner illustrates his points from the main literature every time he mentions one 
of the assumptions endorsed by many of them, according to which the history of 
political thought incorporates a series of perennial questions, on a series of issues 
which various thinkers, from various epochs, have all tackled. Contrary to this 
widespread view, Skinner suggests that the history of thought should be understood 
‘not as a series of attempts to answer a canonical set of questions, but as a sequence 
of episodes in which the questions as well as the answers have frequently changed’ 
(Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 234), and also as a history ‘of the various uses to which 
ideas have been put by different agents at different times’ (Skinner 1990, p. 85). As 
Tully puts it, Skinner’s method is perspectival, reflective and critical, and it 
encourages a way of speaking ‘for a more radical contingency in the history of 
thought’ (Tully 1988, p. 176), and looks up to those attempts directed towards the 
challenge of well-known, ‘old’ interpretations. By using Skinner’s method, as its 
author puts it, we may acquire a perspective which can enrich our knowledge: we can 
view our own form of life ‘in a more self critical way, enlarging our present horizons 
instead of fortifying local prejudices’ (Skinner 1988 [1969], p. 125; for an 
interpretation which emphasises the similarities between Skinner, Nietzsche and 
Weber on this critical perspective on life, see Palonen 2003). Skinner’s vision of 
language is also dynamic. Language is not perceived only as a ‘given’ which 
constrains us, but also as a force which it is in our power to transform: language 
‘shapes us all’, yet we also ‘can use it to shape our world’ (Skinner 1990, p. 7).
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This thesis will show that Morgenthau endorses a vision which agrees with 
Skinner: his vision sees the history of political thought as a tradition informed by the 
same issues and questions, while also emphasising the creative re-interpretation and 
addressing of these issues, in light of concrete circumstances and developments. 
Moreover, following Skinner, the thesis will analyse Morgenthau’s contribution to 
the field of IR with an eye to the milieu in which his thoughts took shape, and against 
which they were projected by a Morgenthau stimulated by precise intentions. Within 
this context of discussion, the thesis is informed the 4 Skinnerian-Austinian’ closely 
related questions: What was Morgenthau doing in writing such texts?, What 
questions was he addressing, to which questions was he giving his answers? 
Consequently, the thesis will show that in his works Morgenthau addressed very 
precise issues and concrete situations: the demise of universal values, the 
behaviouralist revolution, the Cold War, president Carter’s human rights policy etc. 
Skinner’s approach will thus help at understanding Morgenthau’s positions by 
situating them in their relevant context, enriching our understanding of Morgenthau’s 
thought by pointing to their utterance with reference to particular situations.
Skinner’s method proves useful and appropriate to the examination of 
Morgenthau’s works because it raises awareness of the language dynamic and the 
illocutionary force of utterances, and points to the need for situating Morgenthau’s 
thoughts in a context which renders them meaningful. Along with Skinner’s method, 
this thesis will employ the methodological approach devised by Gadamer, which is 
relevant to the current re-interpretation of Morgenthau’s theory due to its provision 
of valuable insights regarding the subtleties of textual interpretation.
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1.4.2 Hans Gadamer and the Interpretation of Texts
‘We come close to the truth because we do not exist by ourselves’ (Gadamer 
2001, p. 49). In this short phrase, Gadamer condensed one of his most important 
assumptions regarding hermeneutics: in reaching understanding, we are never alone. 
Understanding begins ‘when something addresses us’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 266), and it 
is always arrived at in a process of dialogue, in the encounter between the 
perspectives (‘horizons’) that different people hold. This dialogue takes place in 
everyday situations, but also whenever a classic text is read once again, and granted a 
new way to ‘speak’ by its interpreters. Gadamer considers understanding a 
productive attitude (see Gadamer 1975, p. 264). From this perspective, the temporal 
distance between the author and the interpreter must not be regarded reluctantly, and 
tried to be overcome, in the spirit of the ‘old’ method of historicism: on the contrary, 
as it is ‘a positive and productive possibility of understanding’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 
264), it must be acknowledged, and be granted all the consideration it deserves.
This thesis has chosen Gadamer’s approach to the meaning of understanding 
because it has sought to establish a dialogue with Morgenthau’s works, a dialogue 
unhindered by what Gadamer calls ‘unproductive prejudgments’ -  in this case, by the 
‘old’ interpretations of this scholar’s ‘cold-blooded realism’, his ‘amorality’ etc. 
Moreover, it has decided to use Gadamer’s hermeneutical perspective because, with
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its help, we are able to understand ‘how certain questions came to be asked in 
particular historical circumstances’, grasping ‘the particular presuppositions whose 
demise makes the question no longer relevant’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 338).
According to Gadamer, all understanding involves interpretation (Gadamer 1975, 
p. 350), as a constitutive and creative feature of human existence in the world, and a 
sine qua non universal aspect of philosophy (Gadamer 1975, p. 433). Having 
acknowledged this, it becomes obvious that hermeneutics is not concerned with the 
development of a method for understanding, but with the clarification of the 
conditions in which understanding takes place: these conditions, as emphasised by 
Gadamer, ‘are not of the nature of a “procedure” or a method’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 
263). In Gadamer’s interpretation, hermeneutics is ‘an attempt to understand what 
the human sciences truly are, beyond their methodological self-consciousness, and 
what connects them with the totality of our experience of the world’ (Gadamer 1975, 
p. xiii). This experience therefore defines understanding, making it a specific case of 
the application of something universal to a particular situation (Gadamer 1975, p. 
278), the circular interplay involved in understanding revealing its ‘ontological 
structural element’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 261). ‘Openness’ stands here as a key word: 
within the hermeneutic dimension of our very being we are not imprisoned but 
opened (Gadamer 1975, p. xiv), and it is only through hermeneutical reflection that 
we are no longer unfree against ourselves (Gadamer 1976, p. 38). The doors opened 
to creativity by philosophic hermeneutics must not be shut, on the contrary: ‘all that 
is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other person or of the text’ 
(Gadamer 1975, p. 238).
In Gadamer’s view, in the process of deciphering the meanings of various texts, 
the interpreter inevitably has to deal with his own prejudgments, as they are formed
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within the tradition in which he is situated (as it will be shown in chapters 3 and 4, 
Morgenthau is aware of the above prejudgments too). In approaching a text, the 
interpreter always stands within a tradition (Gadamer 1975, p. 250), Gadamer argues, 
but this does not necessarily mean a bad thing: ‘to stand within a tradition does not 
limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 324), and 
tradition encourages the freedom which manifests itself in the interpreter’s 
reflectivity. This also means, however, that the interpreter should not passively 
accept the prejudgments contained within a tradition. Instead, prejudgments should 
always be challenged by the interpreter’s own understanding. From this perspective, 
understanding here involves the interpreter’s shattering of prejudgments, in view of 
disposing of those which hinder his understanding, and of encouraging those which 
nurture novel perspectives. In this context, Gadamer asserts that ‘it is constantly 
necessary to inhibit the overhasty assimilation of the past to our own expectations of 
meaning’, because ‘only then will we be able to listen to the past in a way that 
enables it to make its own meaning heard’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 272). Throughout the 
process of questioning previously gained prejudgments, during which ‘past and 
present are constantly fused’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 258), the meaning of the 
hermeneutical process reveals itself at its best. Its special significance springs 
precisely from such confrontations among differing, and differently situated, 
perspectives: ‘the place between strangeness and familiarity that a transmitted text 
has for us is that intermediate place between being a historically intended separate 
object and being part of a tradition. The true home of hermeneutics is in this 
intermediate area’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 263).
Gadamer’s central concept of the ‘fusion of horizons’ is important for the way in 
which this thesis perceives its reinterpretation of Morgenthau. As Gadamer explains,
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a ‘horizon’ is ‘the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 269). According to Gadamer, one’s 
having of a horizon does not mean that one stands within it constrained, enduring the 
suppression of critical thinking, on the contrary. That person is not limited to what is 
nearest, but able to see beyond it (see Gadamer 1975, p. 269). The dialogue with the 
other’s horizon grants the interpreter the chance to see the new unmasked. Here, 
again ‘openness’ is the key word: ‘through an encounter with the other we are lifted 
above the narrow confines of our own knowledge. A new horizon is disclosed that 
opens onto what was unknown to us’ (Gadamer 2001, p. 49). Here, it is important to 
mention that the ‘horizons’ that Gadamer writes about are not rigid, but mobile, in 
motion because our prejudgments are constantly put to the test (Gadamer 2001, p. 
47). ‘The old’, coming from within a tradition and perpetuated by prejudgments, and 
‘the new’ about to be created by the interpreter’s mind, cannot live one without the 
other, as in this way we get the aforementioned ‘fusion’:
The horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past. There is no more 
an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons. 
Understanding rather, is always the fusion of these horizons which we imagine to 
exist by themselves (...) In a tradition this process of fusion is continually going 
on, for there old and new continually grow together to makes something of living 
value (Gadamer 2001, p. 273).
Another useful assumption formulated by Gadamer concerns the way in which 
we can know that an interpretation is plausible. Which is the criterion that we should 
rely on, when making such an assessment? Gadamer’s answer is that in order for
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understanding to be accurately arrived at, interpretation must conform to the 
principle according to which the whole should be understood in terms of the parts, 
and vice versa. Hermeneutics involves a circular relationship, Gadamer insists, 
throughout which ‘the anticipation of meaning in which the whole is envisaged 
becomes explicit understanding in that the parts, that are determined by the whole, 
themselves also determine this whole’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 258). Thus, the movement 
of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part and back to the whole, and 
the task faced by the interpreter is that of extending, in concentric circles, the unity of 
the understood meaning. Most importantly, it is within this context that we get 
Gadamer’s crucial hint about the way in which we can spell out a ‘verdict’, and 
establish whether an interpretation is correct or not: ‘The harmony of all the details 
with the whole is the criterion of correct understanding. The failure to achieve this 
harmony means that understanding has failed’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 259). Thus, the 
relationship between the author and the interpreter is dynamic and open to a variety 
of outcomes, but a crucial criterion of their success is, in the end, the harmony which 
must exist between the whole and the parts.
The fact that we can establish the plausibility of an interpretation does not mean, 
however, that once it is acclaimed as ‘correct’ an interpretation may remain valid 
forever and in the eyes of all theorists. Gadamer’s view is that interpreters should 
never think of their interpretations as being the ‘best’ and the ‘final’ ones, and that, 
moreover, they should not expect universal acceptance. Theirs is an endless task 
filled by difficulties: ‘the discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is 
never finished; it is in fact an infinite process’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 265). Moreover, 
here it is important to notice the fact that interpretations depend not only on their 
interpreters’ abilities, but also on a variety of context-related factors: in this regard,
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there should come as no surprise that, for Gadamer, every age ‘has to understand a 
transmitted text in its own way’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 263), and that the real meaning of 
a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, is ‘always partly determined also by the 
historical situation of the interpreter, and hence by the totality of the objective course 
of history’ (Gadamer 1975, p. 263).
There are two common assumptions belonging to Skinner and Gadamer on which 
an eye will be kept throughout this thesis, and which will make the present 
methodological guidance adequate to the task of reinterpreting Morgenthau. First, 
there is the assumption that texts always raise questions related to contextual issues 
of debate within their times, and that by writing texts, the authors provide their own 
answers/solutions to these questions or problems. Second, both Skinner and Gadamer 
argue for audacity and unconventionality in the interpretation of past thought, for 
revaluations, for taking new and challenging perspectives. These two assumptions fit 
with the present reinterpretation of Morgenthau’s theory, which will pay attention to 
the context-related issues, preponderantly focused upon by Skinner, but not 
neglected by Gadamer as well, and also to the hermeneutical insights arrived at by 
the latter. These elements of their methods are useful in studying Morgenthau 
because they help the interpreter to engage in a fruitful dialogue with the writings at 
hand, and to arrive at an interpretation which is relevant to present day debates, while 
nevertheless consciously ‘speaking’ to the present within the confines of a certain 
historical period.
This chapter has provided a set of contexts for the development of the argument. 
It has pointed to the literature on Morgenthau and to the common assumptions 
regarding his work, and it has briefly indicated the line of argumentation which will 
be developed throughout the thesis, with an emphasis on Morgenthau’s discussion of
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meaning in International Relations, and on its importance and relevance to debates 
regarding modernity and postmodemity. As pointed out earlier in the chapter, this 
interpretation differs from others which re-visit Morgenthau by its assessment 
regarding the centrality of the issue of meaning in Morgenthau’s account, and by the 
importance ascribed in this regard to Morgenthau’s encounter with Nietzsche and 
Weber early in his career. This encounter has led Morgenthau to subscribe to his 
mentors’ diagnosis of the ‘death of God’, albeit interpreting it in light of concrete 
historical events, and to read power as meaning imposition. Morgenthau’s 
examination of the disenchantment of human life and of politics in particular follows 
from his endorsement of the ‘death of God’ diagnosis, and he perceives man as the 
source of both destruction and construction. In another innovative contribution to 
current re-examinations of Morgenthau’s theory, this thesis argues that Morgenthau’s 
vision of creative leadership stands as the source of hope and order, and represents in 
Morgenthau’s view a valid solution to the problems caused by death of God and the 
disenchantment of politics.
In what follows, the first elements of re-interpretation will begin to emerge. 
Chapter 2 will examine the intellectual roots of Morgenthau’s approach, and will 
explore his heritage of European thought and his experience in the US academic 
environment. It is a chapter which points to certain readings or encounters which 
have made an impact on Morgenthau, and to their relevance to his discussion of the 
concepts of meaning and disenchantment, and to his commitment to a particular 
vision of power.
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2. Life Experience and Intellectual Encounters
In 1976, Hans Morgenthau was asked to indicate the ten books which meant the 
most to him, in an article called ‘Books that Shape Lives.’ In an impressive list of 
authors and titles, among Carr, Arendt and Plato, along with Aristotle’s Politics and 
Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny o f Man, we find The Collected Works o f  
Friedrich Nietzsche and The Political Writings o f Max Weber (see Frei 2001, p. 
113). This list constitutes one of the very few public acknowledgments of the authors 
whom Morgenthau considered of utmost importance to him, and whose insights he 
deemed relevant to his theory, and employed for his own purposes. The present 
chapter intends to focus on the Nietzschean-Weberian section of Morgenthau’s list, 
and to emphasise these thinkers’ special role in the articulation of Morgenthau’s 
scholarly perspective, and of his concern with meaning and disenchantment in 
particular.
According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, there are two factors 
which shaped Morgenthau’s thinking in a profound and lasting way, and they both 
belong to that period between the two world wars which Morgenthau spent in his 
native Germany. The first factor is represented by the political context which 
accompanied Morgenthau’s passage to maturity as a Jew in an increasingly anti- 
Semitic society (see Rosenthal 1991, p. 13). He faced the Great War and its
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consequences: political instability, economic hardship, moral decay, and the 
escalation of hatred and intolerance, as perpetuated by the Nazis. These early 
confrontations with a polarised and hostile environment left an enduring mark on 
Morgenthau’s development, and led to his embrace of a confrontational, dynamic 
and tragic vision of politics (see also Frei 2001, p. 16).
Secondly, and more importantly, this thesis suggests that attention should be paid 
to the intellectual context in the midst of which Morgenthau grew up as an academic, 
and to the ideas by reference to which he positioned himself. After outlining the 
characteristics of the German inter-war intellectual environment, the chapter will 
focus on those key influences which were assimilated by Morgenthau at an early 
stage of his academic training, and which shaped his perspective in his main areas of 
academic concern: the forces at work in international politics, man’s life and nature, 
and morality in a post-metaphysical age.
The present assumptions regarding the importance of Morgenthau’s ‘German 
years’ in the development of his thinking are, to be sure, nothing new: the unearthing 
of Morgenthau’s lifework in Germany and Europe represents a focus of several 
scholars’ investigation (Amstrup 1978; Thompson 1980; Sollner 1987; Honig 1996; 
Pichler 1998; Frei 2001; Mollov 2002). With the help of Morgenthau himself, who 
approached these issues in an interview with Bernard Johnson (Thompson and 
Myers 1984, pp. 333-386), and also in an article first published in 1978 (Morgenthau 
1978, reprinted in Thompson and Myers 1984, pp. 1-17), scholars have reconstructed 
Morgenthau’s personal and intellectual ‘itinerary’ in his native Germany and in 
Europe more broadly, with a view to disclosing the major experiences which marked 
the evolution of his thought. Some of them (see Amstrup 1978) have looked mainly 
at Morgenthau’s early writings published in Europe, which dealt with issues
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pertaining to the domain of international law. Starting from the biographical data 
available, others (see Mollov 2002) have interpreted Morgenthau’s commitment to a 
vision of the world supported by moral values with universal application, as a 
symbol of a hope for transcendence which sprang from a terrible life experience. 
Last but not least, the study published by Frei in 2001 has brought to light many 
interesting comments made by Morgenthau regarding the years spent in Germany 
and his intellectual companions in those times. Frei’s study focuses on Morgenthau’s 
thoughts as expressed in his diaries and letters written as a student and incipient 
academic in Europe, and it contributes to the ongoing re-reading of Morgenthau as a 
normative thinker.
Why is it worth coming back to Morgenthau now? What is important and specific 
about his work? The answers to these questions are spelled out in this chapter. Both 
Nietzsche and Weber are central to current discussions on ‘modernity’ and 
‘postmodemity’, and this thesis argues that Morgenthau’s relevance for present day 
International Relations stems from the Nietzschean-Weberian core of his ideas 
(while putting Nietzsche and Weber together, the present interpretation also 
acknowledges the existence of an ‘intellectual debt’ that Weber himself owed to 
Nietzsche, a debt which has been thoroughly documented elsewhere - see Hennis 
1988, esp. pp. 146-62; Owen 1991, 1994; Warren 1992; Szakolczai 1998). 
According to the views advanced in the present thesis, Morgenthau takes the 
diagnosis of ‘modernity’ as a theme of philosophical and political reflection from 
Nietzsche and Weber, and he makes it its own, dealing with the issues of the loss of 
meaning and the disenchantment of politics extensively. Morgenthau assumes, in a 
Nietzschean-Weberian fashion, that ‘ours is not an age of faith’ (Frei 2001, p. 145). 
He mirrors Nietzsche’s and Weber’s concern for the fate of values in modernity, and
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his views are populated with the dynamic Nietzschean-Weberian picture of a battle 
among opposed value standards (within this context, it comes as no surprise that 
scholars’ recent interest in the ‘European’ Morgenthau has coincided with the 
rediscovery of the normative core of Morgenthau’s ideas). Moreover, while raising 
awareness about the dangers of nihilism and disenchantment, Nietzsche’s and 
Weber’s account also sheds light on man’s potential for creation through responsible 
action. This dualistic vision is replicated by Morgenthau.
The present thesis acknowledges that there are other intellectual companions that 
can be highlighted when writing about Morgenthau, and the list provided by 
Morgenthau in 1976 is all but exhaustive. This reading also attempts to raise 
awareness of the importance of the ‘American context’, in the midst of which 
Morgenthau wrote his main academic texts. Most importantly however, this 
interpretation shares with other scholars one crucial assumption, according to which 
Morgenthau developed some essential concepts on the nature of politics before his 
departure to the US, and he remained faithful to them (see Amstrup 1978, esp. p. 
173; Frei 2001). Moreover, this study suggests that Morgenthau did not find US 
philosophy potentially useful to his approach, and that he therefore did not attempt to 
incorporate it into his theory, as he had previously tried to do with psychoanalysis, 
for example. In light of the assumption above, this thesis maintains that the ‘German 
context’ is the one which deserves to be approached first and foremost when 
discussing the particularities of Morgenthau’s political theory.
Let us start with some biographical data and brief comments on the political 
context which accompanied Morgenthau’s development in native Germany. The 
chapter will move on to an outline of the mentors and negative influences during 
Morgenthau’s academic beginnings, and it will then develop into a detailed account
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of the impact of Nietzsche, Weber and of the American academic environment on 
Morgenthau.
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2.1 A Motivating Life Experience
Hans Morgenthau was bom in 1904 in the German city of Coburg, as the only 
child of a German-Jewish family. Currently a part of north eastern Bavaria, Coburg 
is granted by some historians the reputation of being ‘the first Nazi town’ (Hayward 
and Morris 1988). It is here that the National Socialist Party had a strong nucleus 
from its very inception, here Adolf Hitler made his debut public speech, in 1923, and 
here the Nazis celebrated their first victory in local elections, in 1929.
Morgenthau’s adolescence was marked by a series of political developments 
which succeeded at a high pace, in less than a decade, leading to a German inter-war 
highly polarised environment, and to multiple level crises -  to a ‘a disintegrating 
society’, as Morgenthau would later put it (Morgenthau 1978, p. 66). The majority of 
Germans believed that the Great War was ‘fresh and joyous’ (Morgenthau quoted in 
Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 334), and just like them, in 1918, young Morgenthau 
still felt ‘fully confident’ that the justice of the German cause would lead Germany to 
victory (Frei 2001, p. 15). Soon, however, a plethora of events succeeded quickly: 
the unexpected armistice, the November 1918 revolution, the Weimar constitution, 
and then an economic inflation which brought an ‘enormous moral, economic, and 
social devastation’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 335). In 
Morgenthau’s words, all these made up a very bad period, which ‘was of great
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benefit to the Nazis’, ‘really’ opening the door for them (quoted in Thompson and 
Myers 1984, p. 337).
From an early age, Morgenthau faced the consequences of the propagation of 
what he would later call ‘the stab in the back legend’, according to which ‘the 
German armies had not lost the war, but had been stabbed in the back by traitors 
from within’, such as trade unions, socialists, Jews, Catholics, Liberals, Free Masons 
and so on (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 335). Subsequently, 
he became more and more aware that his relation with the world around him would 
be forever influenced by three factors: he was a German, a Jew, and a boy whose 
maturation had taken place in the period following the First World War (see Frei 
2001, p. 24).
Around that time, Morgenthau lived as trapped between two poles: a ‘cruel and 
utterly devastating’ anti-Semitism (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 
1984, p. 339), and the domestic reality of a household under the command of his 
‘rather neurotic and oppressive’ father Ludwig (quoted in Thompson and Myers 
1984, p. 337). In the process of facing his father’s authoritarianism, and also the 
German anti-Semitists’ hostility, he felt the need to be away from companionship: 
his life experience also led to his withdrawal from the outside world (Frei 2001, p. 
23), and made him ‘serious’, ‘taciturn’ (Frei 2001, p. 23), shy and with great fear of 
being rejected (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 339). 
Morgenthau retreated into his own shell ‘in fear of disappointing human contacts’ 
(Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 339), and focused on study. 
However, even within school’s walls, life was far from easy for him in those times. 
As the only Jew, and also the best pupil in his class, Morgenthau often had to go 
through ‘terrible experiences’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p.
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339), such as that of being shouted insults upon his delivering of a speech at the 
celebration of the founder of the town, the Duke of Coburg (see Thompson and 
Myers 1984, pp. 340-1). As argued by Joel Rosenthal, ‘it is difficult to judge how 
prejudice might have affected the young Morgenthau and to what extent it shaped his 
views, but there can be little doubt that the effect was traumatizing and long-lasting’ 
(Rosenthal 1991, p. 13).
Unsurprisingly then, the ideas expressed in Morgenthau’s school compositions 
were often a mirror of his own experiences. In many of these papers, Morgenthau 
made it clear that he regarded negatively the blaming of the Jews for the difficulties 
experienced by the German people in the inter-war years. Moreover, he was eager to 
point out that the accusations directed against him as a Jew, were ‘totally 
unjustified’. Pleading in favour of his innocence, Morgenthau considered the hostile 
actions evoked by those accusations ‘a crying injustice and a dishonouring 
humiliation’ (Morgenthau quoted in Mollov 2002, p. 79). Moreover, at the end of an 
analysis of his fellows’ behaviour, he concluded in a remarkable paragraph that 
people ‘could live together in harmony if only they let their conduct be guided by the 
moral law’, but also that harmony among men is difficult to achieve, since man’s 
nature ‘is prone to inclinations that can thwart all law-abiding conduct in their 
unbridled power’ (quoted in Frei 2001, p. 104). Sources of motivation and toughness 
of spirit, such experiences exerted an impact on young Morgenthau’s assumptions 
regarding life’s meaning, dynamics and complexity. In one of the lectures delivered 
in the US, years later, when speaking about men’s ‘inclinations’, Morgenthau would 
point to the opportunities that the Nazi rule offered for satisfying the human longing 
for power, Nazis’ racial policy representing ‘a deliberate device to give at least 
partial satisfaction to otherwise unsatisfied power drives’, a doctrine which ‘gave
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meaning to life’ (quoted in Mollov 2002, p. 98. An extensive discussion on this topic 
will be performed in chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis).
Coming back to Morgenthau’s adolescence, it is important to mention that, at 
that time, Morgenthau felt ‘embittered by the years of loneliness, excluded from all 
the joys of youth, rejected’ (quoted in Frei 2001, p. 11). In one of his last high school 
compositions, he admitted that he had two hopes: he hoped for the lifting of the 
pressure to which he was exposed by the social environment, and also to find ‘a 
direction and a purpose’ for his future activities (Morgenthau 1978, p. 63). In the 
same paragraph, Morgenthau concluded that ‘the latter cannot be realized before the 
former is fulfilled’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 63). Subsequently, Morgenthau left Coburg 
in 1923 in order to pursue undergraduate studies at the University of Frankfurt.
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2.2 Studies, Mentors, Negative Influences
The intellectual context in which Morgenthau’s academic development took 
place paid tribute to the political and economic background that animated post-war 
Germany. The Great War had a tremendous impact all around Europe, yet it was in 
Germany that its most radical consequences unfolded: in Steven Ascheim’s analysis, 
the cheapening of life and the infusion of greater linguistic and physical violence into 
the public realm ‘may have been a generally European phenomenon, but in Germany 
it was exacerbated by defeat, revolution, and the persistent socioeconomic crisis’ 
(Ascheim 1992, p. 19). As Ascheim argues further, it was a period of ‘radical 
dislocation and polarization’, whose evolutions ‘increasingly provided the space for 
politically extremist alternatives’ (Ascheim 1992, pp. 154, 155). Struggles on the 
political scene -  often taking the form of open street confrontations between 
proponents of different ideologies - were replicated onto the intellectual one, where 
discussions regarding the struggle among values in modernity, and the emergence of 
strong, responsible leadership, blended with the critique of liberalism, and with 
discourses which emphasised the perils of technological thinking and practice. 
Morgenthau’s development took place in this heterogeneous space of intellectual 
concerns, in which he immersed and later also sought to make his own criticism 
heard, while engaging with some of the major strands of thought of the time.
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Moreover, Morgenthau positioned himself through the thinkers he deemed relevant 
to his academic concerns, especially Nietzsche and Weber, whose ideas were central 
to inter-war German intellectual debates (see Ascheim 1992). He self-consciously 
used Nietzsche and Weber to develop his political theory, and explored the topic of 
the ‘death of God’ at length in his works, with the loss of meaning and the 
disenchantment entailed by it.
As a teenager, Morgenthau was eager to bring his writing style up to perfection (a 
concern which would preoccupy him all his life), and he developed an interest in 
philosophy and literature (see Morgenthau 1978, p. 63). Upon leaving high school, 
he wanted to embark on the undergraduate study of literature, but after several 
discussions with his father, who was against such a potential choice, he realised this 
would not happen. Subsequently, in 1923, Morgenthau went to the University of 
Frankfurt with the aim of studying philosophy -  in his own words, ‘philosophy, so I 
thought, would answer my quest for the meaning of human existence and unravel the 
riddles of the universe’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 63). Morgenthau was however quickly 
disappointed by the manner in which philosophy was taught in Frankfurt at the time: 
‘nothing but epistemology’, ‘quite boring’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and 
Myers 1984, p. 342). He moved to Munich to study law after only one semester: as 
Morgenthau explained this, ‘once the fields in which I was really interested were 
eliminated -  academic philosophy in view of its lack of emotional appeal and 
literature because of the paternal veto -  law appeared to make the least demands on 
special skills and emotional commitment’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 63).
Not feeling attracted to law, while in Munich, Morgenthau limited his attendance 
to law lectures ‘to the bare minimum’; instead, he took various unrelated courses, 
whose subject matter and professors nevertheless interested him (Morgenthau 1978,
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p. 63). From the autumn of 1923 up to the spring of 1924, Morgenthau attended the 
classes taught by Hermann Oncken, an expert on nineteenth-century German history, 
a scholar ‘of unusual sensitivity’, who ‘entered into an historic period or personality 
and reconstructed it, laying bare the hidden connections of motivations, actions, and 
consequences’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 64). According to Frei (2001), Oncken instilled 
in Morgenthau ideas which are easily recognisable in the latter’s future writings: for 
Morgenthau, as it was for Oncken, politics represents a realm of life which is 
autonomous, yet thoroughly of this world, a realm with its own laws, for whose 
mastering higher faculties are needed, since politics is also an art (Frei 2001, pp. 120- 
1). An important thing to be mentioned here is that Morgenthau attended Oncken’s 
lectures on Bismarck’s foreign policy, and also those which focused on the principles 
of foreign and military policy, and the relationship between them. The latter area of 
study, in particular, made a profound impression on Morgenthau -  as he explained 
shortly before his death, ‘for the first time, I felt the impact of a coherent system of 
thought, primarily a distillation of Bismarck’s Realpolitik, that appeared to support 
my isolated and impressionistic judgments on contemporary issues of foreign policy’ 
(Morgenthau 1978, p. 64).
Another professor dear to the young student was Karl Rothenbucher, a former 
friend of Weber who, in the summer of 1925, organised a seminar on Weber’s 
political and social philosophy, which focused on Weber’s political writings. Years 
later, Morgenthau would emphasise that ‘it was a most fortunate coincidence for me 
that the intellectual and moral stature of Rothenbucher was commensurate with the 
subject matter of the seminar’, and that this was ‘a great experience, on account of 
the subject matter as well as the teacher’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 64).
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Morgenthau went through another formative experience, ‘both intellectual and 
personal’, when he attended a seminar on international law organised by Professor 
Karl Neumeyer. It is to Neumeyer that Morgenthau owed a foundational education in 
this field, which, over the years, did him ‘an enormous amount of good’ 
(Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 348). Following the encounter 
with Neumeyer’s rigorous, line by line analysis of international law core texts, 
Morgenthau learnt ‘to take nothing for granted in the so-called scholarly literature’ -  
as he put it in his intellectual autobiography, ‘whenever later on I came across 
outrageous statements that I hesitated to expose for what they were, I remembered 
Neumeyer’s seminar and took heart’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 65). Years later, in 
writing Neumeyer’s obituary for the American Journal o f International Law, 
Morgenthau would use touching words to praise his former teacher, portraying 
Neumeyer as a scholar with a ‘pious and noble soul’, who was endowed with 
intellectual honesty and with ‘a genuinely ethical aspiration to truth for truth’s sake’ 
(Morgenthau 1941, p. 672).
Another very important intellectual encounter was that between Morgenthau and 
Hugo Sinzheimer, a specialist in labour and criminal law who ran his own firm, and 
who also acted as a professor at the University of Frankfurt. Morgenthau met 
Sinzheimer in 1928, when he began a legal internship under the latter’s supervision. 
During the internship, he provided Sinzheimer with general research assistance and 
worked at the drafting of briefs for the Supreme Court, but he also had teaching 
assistant duties at the university, and often accompanied, and even represented, his 
boss in criminal cases (see Frei 2001, p. 36. For an account of Morgenthau’s activity 
during that period, see also Morgenthau 1978 and Thompson and Myers 1984). As 
one of the drafters of the 1919 Weimar Constitution, Sinzheimer had an outstanding
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reputation, being, in Morgenthau’s assessment, ‘one of the greatest criminal lawyers, 
and one of the two or three foremost labour lawyers in Germany’ (Morgenthau 
quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 348). In a letter sent in January 1934 to his 
supervisor and friend, Morgenthau wrote that he was grateful for having breathed 
‘the intellectual and moral air’ that Sinzheimer emanated, and concluded: ‘Giving up 
the ties that such an influence creates would mean giving up my own personality’ 
(Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 168).
In his research of Morgenthau’s diaries and private correspondence, Frei has 
examined the letters written to, and received from, Sinzheimer. Frei argues that the 
humanist ethics defended by Morgenthau’s law internship supervisor exerted a 
powerful attraction on the moralist in Morgenthau (Frei 2001, p. 170). Frei claims 
that, due to Sinzheimer’s influence, Morgenthau ‘came to embrace classical 
humanist values -  and he retained his convictions up until the end of his life’ (Frei 
2001, p. 170). According to Frei, along with the life experience accumulated in 
native Germany, Sinzheimer’s influence is one of the two crucial factors which have 
in the end made Morgenthau embrace ‘not only a humanist but also a decidedly 
liberal outlook’ (Frei 2001, p. 170), that emphasised the desirability of universal 
values, capable to satisfy modem man’s need for security and certainty.
Thanks to his knowing of Sinzheimer, Morgenthau met scholars such as Franz 
Neumann (a future US immigrant himself, who at that time acted as Sinzheimer’s 
assistant), Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, Carl Mennicke, Hendrik de Man and Friedrich 
Giese (see Frei 2001, p. 38). Moreover, Morgenthau also contacted the proponents of 
Marxism, grouped around the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, and 
psychoanalysts such as Erich Fromm and Karl Landauer (see Frei 2001, p. 126. The 
close relations between German inter-war Marxists and psychoanalysts are detailed
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in Jay 1973). Most importantly, around that time, while meeting the above scholars, 
Morgenthau also began to affirm his own critical voice. Morgenthau articulated a 
series of critical positions whose outline will help readers to understand his main 
theoretical commitments better. The targets of Morgenthau’s criticism are outlined 
below.
‘I could not abide that particular type of Marxist who considers Marxism to be a 
closed intellectual system, containing ready-made answers to all possible questions, 
to be elicited by correct interpretations’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 67) -  from this 
account, one grasps the reasons behind Morgenthau’s rejection of Marxism. 
Morgenthau criticised the Marxists for their reductionism. As he maintains in an 
unpublished lecture, ‘whereas there are of course economic elements determining 
foreign policies, I think it is one of the greatest mistakes, and a very primitive 
explanation of foreign policy, to try to reduce foreign policy to a mere reflection of 
economic conflicts and economic interests’ (Morgenthau Papers, 14 January 1946, 
Box 169, p. 4). Moreover, soon after familiarising himself with the scholars at the 
Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, Morgenthau was ‘repelled’ by the contrast 
between the political situation in Germany, and the ‘futile hair-splitting’ in which 
many of the Institute’s members were engaged: as Morgenthau put it in his
‘Intellectual Autobiography’, ‘the Nazi enemy was standing at the gate, aided and 
abetted from within, and these intelligent and learned people... found nothing better 
to do than search for the true meaning of one statement by Marx as against another’ 
(Morgenthau 1978, p. 67). As Morgenthau concluded in his 1978 article, since his 
encounter with Marxists, ‘the aversion to a dogmatism that sacrifices pragmatic 
effectiveness for logical or ideological consistency, has remained a persistent 
element of my intellectual attitude’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 67).
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Morgenthau’s encounter with psychoanalysis did not fare any better. In 1929, 
soon after finishing the preparations for the publication of his doctoral thesis, he 
started to think about developing a political theory that would provide ‘a general 
foundation’ for the specific relationship between politics and law, which he had 
written about in his doctoral thesis (Morgenthau 1978, p. 67). Psychoanalysis was 
much discussed in Germany at that time, and Morgenthau hoped that Freud’s insights 
might be able to provide him with such a foundation for his theory. For about a year, 
Morgenthau experimented with Freudian concepts and ideas, in an attempt ‘to 
construct a theoretical system of politics’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 67). However, he 
then realised that his experiments had been a failure (for an argument which 
highlights Freud’s importance for Morgenthau’s perspective, see Schuett 2007). 
Years later, he would criticise both psychoanalysis and Marxism for their 
reductionism. As Morgenthau would state in his 1978 article, ‘what defeats a 
psychoanalytical theory of politics is what has defeated a Marxist theory of politics: 
the impossibility for accounting for the complexities and varieties of political 
experience with the simplicities of a reductionist theory, economic or psychological’ 
(Morgenthau 1978, p. 67).
Moreover, the conservative revolutionaries’ ideas - their activist philosophy, their 
critique of rationalism, their glorification of war and support for strong leadership 
(see Phelan 1985 and Woods 1996) - were received by Morgenthau with mixed 
feelings. Morgenthau was in accord with the conservative revolutionaries’ 
assumptions regarding the consequences of technology, and the need for strong 
leadership in Germany; yet, unlike them, the emphasis on war and on conflict for 
conflict’s sake looked horrific to Morgenthau. Relevant to the present thesis is the 
fact that, in contrast to Ernst Junger in particular, Morgenthau argued in favour of
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‘morally relevant values’, and he maintained that ‘man’ has ‘a higher, spiritual 
vocation, to which instinctual drives must be subordinated’, that ‘man’ keeps striving 
‘to direct instincts toward objective, morally relevant goals’ (Morgenthau quoted in 
Frei 2001, pp. 164-5). In an unpublished article written in Germany, Morgenthau 
criticised Junger for his view on war as ‘a goal in itself, for glorifying war as a 
‘splendid emotional release’ which turned men into ‘magnificent beasts of prey’ 
(Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 164). This, Morgenthau argued, was an attitude 
which viewed ‘the unleashing of instincts as the ultimate goal, and the enjoyment of 
emotional outbursts as the ultimate value’, and which demonstrated Junger’s 
dangerous Tack of restraint, his barbarism, his egotistic hedonism, his hostility 
toward culture and society’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 164). In that 
manuscript, Morgenthau acknowledged the existence of human drives which sought 
release. War however, he concluded, was only one possible consequence of these 
drives, and by no means a necessary one (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 165).
In inter-war Germany, Morgenthau did not reject only Marxism, psychoanalysis 
and some of the conservative revolutionaries’ ideas, but also Carl Schmitt. 
Morgenthau met Schmitt once, in Berlin, and this meeting was an immense 
disappointment to him: as he would later put it, the encounter lacked ‘anything even 
approaching spontaneity’, it was ‘staged in every detail’, a cold, contrived and 
dishonest ‘charade’, ‘worthwhile only in revealing in capsule form the character of 
that brilliant, inventive scholar’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 68). According to 
Morgenthau, after their meeting, Schmitt apparently incorporated some of 
Morgenthau’s ideas (to be found in his doctoral dissertation) into the second edition 
of the Concept o f  the Political, without consulting him and without mentioning their 
source (Morgenthau 1978, p. 68).
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This time, the motives behind Morgenthau’s critique were not only theoretical, 
but also moral. While praising Schmitt for his immense, intellectually well-deserved 
prestige (Morgenthau 1978, p. 68), Morgenthau attacked him for his lack of 
theoretical constancy, for his passing from neo-Kantianism to Catholic political 
philosophy, and then to liberal democracy, authoritarianism and Nazism 
(Morgenthau 1978, p. 67). Morgenthau also despised Schmitt for what he considered 
the latter’s unprincipled scholarly behaviour. He criticised Schmitt for his 
argumentation in favour of Hitler’s blood purge of 1934, and for his making up of 
stories regarding Friedrich Julius Stahl, the founder of the Prussian Conservative 
Party (see Morgenthau 1978, p. 68). In Morgenthau’s view, ‘no German political 
thinker of the interwar period was more amply endowed with intellectual ability, but 
it is doubtful whether any surpassed him in lack of principle and servility to his Nazi 
masters’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 67).
Last but not least, between 1932 and 1934, Morgenthau developed a critique of 
another major strand of thought in inter-war Germany: Neo-Kantianism. To Hans 
Kelsen’s ‘pure’ theory of law, Morgenthau opposed what he called ‘the reality of 
norms’ (the title of his Habilitation thesis, published in 1934). Morgenthau sought to 
weaken the distinction between the ought to be and the is, central to (neo-)Kantian 
philosophy. As Frei explains, in Morgenthau’s interpretation, the ought to be need no 
longer be envisaged as a purely aprioristic category independent of experience, but 
one ‘in relation to an empirically ascertainable reality’ (Frei 2001, p. 135). 
Consequently, Morgenthau criticised the neo-Kantians for placing the normative 
realms ‘between heaven and earth... in these Elysian fields’, and he argued in favour 
of bringing the norms back to ‘earthly’ reality, in an attempt to construct ‘an 
empirical theory of a ideal phenomenon’ (Frei 2001, p. 135). For Morgenthau, the
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reality of norms was ‘either psychic or physical’, the ‘psychic reality’ of a norm 
being founded on its ‘capacity to influence the will of the person it addresses in the 
direction desired by the norm’ (Frei 2001, p. 135). Within his Habilitation thesis, 
Morgenthau criticised Kelsen for his withdrawal from ‘reality’, and for his refusal to 
acknowledge the existence of burning political problems (Frei 2001, p. 135). 
Morgenthau suggested that it was ‘mistaken, dangerous, and ultimately impossible to 
banish value judgments completely from the social sciences in order to keep them 
“pure”’ (Frei 2001, p. 151). Thus, to Morgenthau, norms had to be grounded in the 
‘reality’ of life and politics. As we will see in the next chapters, this was a position 
which he maintained throughout his life.
To sum up, while in Germany, Morgenthau met and admired teachers such as 
Oncken, Rothenbucher, Neumeyer and Sinzheimer. Moreover, he was not only a 
passive receiver of knowledge, on the contrary. He was an interpreter and a critic, 
and his criticism helps one to grasp Morgenthau’s positions on some of the major 
topics of discussion in those times. Most importantly, the present thesis argues that 
there were two thinkers with whose views Morgenthau felt like being broadly in 
accord: Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber. Their ideas encompassed valuable 
assumptions, many of which were in harmony with Morgenthau’s views regarding 
the death of universal values, the loss of meaning and the disenchantment of the 
world.
How did Morgenthau go about acknowledging Nietzsche’s and Weber’s 
importance in the articulation of his thought, and which of Nietzsche’s and Weber’s 
ideas did he share and incorporate into his theory, and which ones did he reject? The 
following section intends to answer these questions.
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2.3 Morgenthau’s Reading of Nietzsche and Weber
2.3.1 Friedrich Nietzsche
A feature which makes Frei’s intellectual biography unique and valuable is that it 
uncovers a relationship which Morgenthau has hardly ever talked or written about 
openly: between his thought and Nietzsche’s. Taking into account the generally 
hostile attitude developed against the Germans around the Second World War, and 
Nazis’ misuse of Nietzsche in particular, the acknowledgment of such a relationship 
may not have looked ‘intellectually safe’ to Morgenthau, even years after 1945. As 
for Frei, he is convinced that these must have been Morgenthau’s calculations upon 
entering the United States, in 1937: by the time he arrived in his adoptive country, 
many of his contemporaries ‘made no distinction between Nazis and Germans’, and 
it would have been ‘very imprudent, if not outright self-defeating for Morgenthau to 
have presented his views as a “German” theory of politics, or to have stressed the 
“German” origins of his ideas’ (Frei 2001, p. 110). Frei adds further that as a German 
Jewish immigrant, Morgenthau was ‘hardly alone’ in trying to conceal the German 
influences in his academic work (see Frei 2001, pp. 110, 112).
Frei performed an extensive reading of Morgenthau’s diaries and private 
correspondence, especially of those which were written in Germany, and he 
discovered that Morgenthau considered Nietzsche no less than the ‘god’ of his youth
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(Frei 2001, p. 98). Moreover, once, when writing to a friend, he put it plainly: ‘A 
most powerful and probably decisive influence has certainly been Nietzsche’ (Frei 
2001, p. 113). In light of the illuminating evidence available to him, Frei concluded 
that, in Morgenthau’s case, the reading of Nietzsche represented a crucial formative 
experience, which obviously ‘touched upon the very roots’ of Morgenthau’s thinking 
(Frei 2001, p. 108). Nietzsche confirmed and articulated Morgenthau’s own 
experiences (Frei 2001, p. 100), the convergence of the latter’s personal experiences 
with the former’s perspective and diagnostic method of inquiry leading to the 
creation of an ‘affinity of outlook’ between the two (Frei 2001, pp. 107-8). In Frei’s 
interpretation, the fact that to Morgenthau, Nietzsche clearly stood above all the 
other authors he read throughout his academic studies (for Morgenthau’s ‘reading 
list’ around that time see Frei 2001, p. 108) should not be underestimated, but given 
its proper place, and its significance recognised. The findings arrived at in this thesis 
are in their turn based on an in depth reading of Morgenthau’s manuscripts held by 
the US Library of Congress, as well as of all his published works and an extensive 
secondary literature, and they highlight the Nietzschean aspects of Morgenthau’s 
thought. However, as later chapters will demonstrate, the account provided here 
differs from Frei’s in its more detailed analysis of the Nietzschean and Weberian 
aspects of Morgenthau’s theory - especially of his concern with meaning, power as 
meaning imposition and disenchantment - and in the emphasis on Morgenthau’s 
originality and relevance to the discussion of modernity and postmodemity in 
International Relations.
Morgenthau first read Nietzsche in high school but Nietzsche did not make an 
impact on him at that time. His second, decisive encounter with Nietzsche occurred 
in early 1926. While passing through The Untimely Meditations, as a law student in
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Munich, Morgenthau ‘caught fire’ (Frei 2001, p. 99). It took him more than three 
years to work through the complete writings, and the systematic reading was 
followed by a written confession: Nietzsche, ‘the harbinger of a new Renaissance, 
much like the Quattrocento, strong, clear, without morality’, became the ‘god’ of 
Morgenthau’s youth (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, pp. 98, 147). Taking into 
account the sophistication and finesse of the insights he had arrived at, to 
Morgenthau Nietzsche ‘towered’ above all other philosophers, and he was one of the 
‘greatest Germans’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, pp. 110, 113). Morgenthau’s 
relationship with Nietzsche’s thought witnessed both ups and downs, Morgenthau 
praised, but at times also criticised his mentor (see Frei 2001, pp. 105-6). Yet, 
Nietzsche was never abandoned, and he remained ‘an important source of 
confirmation’ up until Morgenthau’s final years (Frei 2001, p. 94). This thesis will 
go beyond Frei’s account in order to demonstrate Nietzsche’s and Weber’s impact on 
Morgenthau as manifested in his discussion of meaning and disenchantment in 
particular, with a variety of examples from Morgenthau’s both published and 
unpublished works. The study of Nietzsche’s and Weber’s impact on Morgenthau 
will also help us to understand why it is important to return to Morgenthau at present, 
with a view to the discussions of the topic of modernity and postmodemity, on the 
concepts of meaning and values, and the legitimacy of truth. The points of 
convergence between Nietzsche’s, Weber’s and Morgenthau’s thinking will be 
hinted at below, and explored at length in the next chapters.
One of the outcomes of Morgenthau’s reading of Nietzsche is his engagement 
with the Nietzschean diagnosis regarding modernity after the ‘death of God’ - 
interpreted by Morgenthau as the ‘death’ (disintegration) of an international morality 
‘composed of Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements’ (Morgenthau
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1949, p. 191). As Nietzsche once put it, ‘one interpretation has collapsed; but 
because it was considered the interpretation, it now seems as if there were no 
meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in vain’ (Nietzsche 1968, p. 35). As 
a consequence of this collapse, ‘the highest values devalue themselves’ (Nietzsche 
1968, p. 9), and nihilism occurs. In light of his own beliefs, crystallised at an early 
stage of his career (also due to his encounter with Nietzsche), Morgenthau interprets 
modernity, as Frei points out, as a time with ‘no firmly established concepts of good 
and evil’ (Frei 2001, p. 147), with a plurality of conflicting meanings. The issue of 
meaning and what its loss entails preoccupies Morgenthau, who agrees with the 
‘death of God’ diagnosis, and is aware of the exceptional character of the situation. 
For Morgenthau, a strong, singular meaning of the world is absent, and the days 
when timeless values were accepted without question are gone forever (see Frei 
2001, p. 147). At first, like everybody else, Morgenthau strives for security and 
certainty (Frei 2001, p. 102). He then realises that, in a present stigmatised by the 
‘death of God’, the only feelings that he can experience are insecurity, and an 
uncertainty entailing ‘terrible suffering for the mind’ (Frei 2001, p. 102). As 
Morgenthau puts it in Scientific Man Vs Power Politics, in such times, although man 
‘cannot live without a philosophy which gives meaning to his existence’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 14), he discovers ‘many little answers, but no answer to the 
great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 176). 
Like the nationalistic masses which Morgenthau criticises for their destructive 
actions, men ‘meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 196. An extended analysis of Morgenthau’s views on this issue 
will be made in chapter 3).
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Nevertheless, like Nietzsche, Morgenthau is not only aware of the dangers, but 
also of the possibilities opened up by the death of God, and he welcomes what David 
Owen has called ‘the critical interrogation of our values that this ‘death of God’ 
makes possible’ (Owen 1999, p. 11). Thus, after emphasising that men live in the 
aftermath of ‘God’s death’, in a world lacking a ‘guiding light’, a source of 
universally accepted principles, Morgenthau argues that those who value certainty 
should now be looked at with doubt. As we will see in future chapters in detail, 
Morgenthau starts from the Nietzschean position of ‘God’s death’, and he also agrees 
with Nietzsche on one of the consequences of this ‘death’: human beings now have 
increased scope for the creative manifestation of their agency. The act of meaning 
imposition points to the creative potentialities embedded in the power struggle, and 
constitutes a positive interpretation of human capabilities.
A remark deserves special emphasis at this point: as Morgenthau’s critique of 
Junger and Schmitt demonstrates, his endorsement of Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the 
‘death of God’ does not mean that he succumbs to a relativism which denies the 
existence of any transcendental source of values whatsoever. On the contrary, the 
dangers implied by the continuous erosion of morality will preoccupy Morgenthau 
throughout his life. According to the present interpretation, Morgenthau gains from 
Nietzsche an awareness of a certain kind of relativism, one which takes into account 
historical and cultural variations (see Morgenthau 1979). Nevertheless, Morgenthau 
still rates Judeo-Christian and Kantian moral values highly. Furthermore, he regards 
the consolidation of a universal realm of values favourably (the implications of this 
very important position will be analysed in the thesis later on).
According to the present interpretation, another theme in whose articulation 
Morgenthau is in accord with Nietzsche is that of life as a struggle, perpetuated by a
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human individual caught between the opposing forces which constitute his nature. 
Morgenthau reminds us in Scientific Man vs Power Politics that in the aftermath of 
the death of God, ‘whatever man does or intends to do emanates from himself and 
refers again to himself (Morgenthau 1947, p. 163). Sharing with Nietzsche this 
interest in ‘man’, Morgenthau seems to ask, at his turn: ‘What can we know about 
the human?’ As Morgenthau acknowledges in an interview taken in 1964, his basic 
motivation has always been ‘to get at the truth about human nature and human 
action’: ‘that I addressed myself to the truth about politics was in a sense an accident’ 
(‘Sum and Substance’ interview, Morgenthau Papers, Box 172, p. 1).
While rejecting the uni-dimensional, ‘reason-based’, portrait of human nature, 
Morgenthau wonders ‘whether reason could possibly prevail over the other “forces’” , 
taking into account man’s natural inclinations (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 
106). Along these forces, he singles out the lust for power, whose outstanding 
dominance over ‘man’ makes life a perpetual struggle. Thus, in Morgenthau’s 
interpretation, similar to Nietzsche’s, life is not ‘only’ struggle: it is struggle for 
power. What determines your rank ‘is the quantum of power you are’ (Nietzsche 
1968, p. 330), and individuals’ awareness of this fact intensifies their appetite for 
such a form of domination. In Morgenthau’s account, which echoes Nietzsche’s 
views, there is no human action ‘which would not contain at least a trace of this 
desire’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 166). Society is created by ‘elemental bio- 
psychological drives’, ‘the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate’, common to 
all men (Morgenthau 1949, p. 17). Taking all these into account, Morgenthau writes 
in Scientific Man vs Power Politics that to deny the lust for power would mean to 
deny ‘the very condition of human existence in this world’ (Morgenthau 1947, p.
172).
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Morgenthau’s view on what power means is Nietzschean too. For Morgenthau, 
‘power’ represents ‘man’s control over the minds and actions of other men’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 73). We notice that one’s power needs others’ presence and 
recognition, that ‘power’ is clearly linked to the issue of social interactions. More 
important, in order for someone to have ‘power’, therefore ‘to make one’s own 
person prevail against others’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 166), (s)he must exert control 
over the minds. Such a form of control, manifesting itself as one’s ‘rule’ over others’ 
interpretations of events, points to man’s creative potential. Moreover, the above- 
mentioned control refers to one’s act of imposing a certain ‘version’, a certain 
interpretation, upon the others -  as a meaning imposition. The issue of meaning is 
central to Morgenthau, and in his view, man’s power resides in the successful 
imposition of interpretations. The human creative capacities are thus channelled into 
a continuous effort, performed by each human being, for imposing ‘his’ meaning, his 
particular positions, not by virtue of physical force, but of ‘the force of the mind’. 
This assumption regarding the centrality of a Nietzschean approach to power in 
Morgenthau’s theory, which focuses on creation as interpretation, and on struggling 
for meaning imposition, will be substantiated in the next chapters.
‘Who of you will renounce power, knowing and experiencing that power is 
evil?’, Nietzsche once rhetorically asked his readers (quoted in Kaufmann 1974, p. 
180). Mirroring this other Nietzschean position, Morgenthau tackles the issue of the 
power’s ‘demon’ (Kaufmann 1974, p. 197), what it makes men do, and how they 
gain this power. Time and again, Morgenthau points to the limitless character of 
humans’ lust for/will to power: while man’s vital needs ‘are capable of satisfaction’, 
the lust for power ‘would be satisfied only if the last man became an object of his 
domination, there being nobody above or beside him’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 172). As
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Morgenthau asserts further, ‘the selfishness of man has limits; his will to power has 
none’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 166). It is in this context that Morgenthau points to the 
omnipresence of ‘the tragic’. What he calls the ‘tragic meaning’ of existence, and 
also its ‘irrationality’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174), stem from man’s nature itself, from 
its characteristics - more precisely, from the limitations demonstrated in dealing with 
a lust for power which all so easily generates destruction.
However, it is worth emphasising that in Nietzsche’s and Morgenthau’s 
interpretation, man’s nature is viewed dichotomously, and in man we find both 
‘creature’ and ‘creator’. In Morgenthau’s account, humans’ desire for power carries 
within it, on the one hand, a highly destructive potential. On the other hand however, 
like in Nietzsche - for whom the Ubermensch, an ‘annihilator’ who breaks values 
(Nietzsche 1954, p. 228), turns into a creator, his act of destruction being, in the end, 
positively assessed -  in Morgenthau’s portrait of human nature we can perceive a 
second, positive facet. It is a facet symbolised by the possibility of overcoming 
through mastering and creation. Man, perceived as a creature governed by 
antagonistic forces, is also a source of creation, causing positive changes by means of 
his longing for transcendence. As it will become obvious in chapters 4 and 5, for 
Morgenthau, man’s essence comprises a dynamic relation destruction -  construction. 
Morgenthau suggests that, in order to succeed in ‘taming’ his destructive capabilities, 
men living in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’ should engage in an exercise in 
self-knowledge, in obtaining insights about their human condition, in understanding 
it as well as possible. Here, what is interesting is that this stance seems to mirror 
some of Nietzsche’s own assertions. As Ruth Abbey reveals, during his ‘middle 
period’, Nietzsche envisages ‘a conception of self-knowledge as a continuous quest 
to understand a protean, multiple, mysterious self, and ‘those who do not engage in
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careful self-observation misunderstand their passions and are unable to master them’ 
(see Abbey 2000, p. 22).
To overcome, to go beyond the limits of the ‘customary’, of ordinary 
experiences, to strive for fulfilling constructive endeavours, to aspire to better and 
greater - these are the other insights gained by young Morgenthau, during his 
Nietzschean reading experience. As chapter 5 will shown at length, Morgenthau’s 
superior hero grapples with ethical issues, animated by a desire to know more about 
his nature, and to be able to ‘tame’ it. He has ‘a special moral responsibility to act’, 
‘in accordance with the rules of the political art’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 159), and his 
successful actions make politics look like the ‘art of the possible’ (Weber 1948, p. 
124). We can see that Morgenthau’s ‘best’ characters, interpreted as wise 
personalities, who alone ‘should be in command’ (Frei 2001, p. 157), are thought of 
by Morgenthau in a way similar to that in which Nietzsche regarded his superior 
heroes, yet they have also undergone a political recasting. Re-shaping Morgenthau’s 
Nietzschean outlook, this process of political recasting was performed with the help 
of a scholar whose works young Morgenthau read around the same time as 
Nietzsche’s. His name is Max Weber.
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2.3.2 Max Weber
Morgenthau started to read Weber in the summer of 1925, during his attendance 
at the University of Munich of a series of seminars organised by Karl Rothenbucher, 
a professor of constitutional law. Morgenthau’s diaries do not speak about the 
impression Weber’s thought made on him. Instead, we find occasional references in 
his letters (see Frei 2001, p. 130, footnote 65), and two ‘official accounts’, in his 
interview with Bernard Johnson (Thompson and Myers 1984, pp. 333-86), and in the 
‘intellectual autobiography’ published in 1978 (Morgenthau 1978, reprinted in 
Thompson and Myers 1984, pp. 1-17). Professor Rothenbucher had a major 
contribution in generating, and then cultivating, Morgenthau’s admiration for Weber: 
a ‘great man, very intelligent, of great character and civic courage’ (Morgenthau 
quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 348), Rothenbucher ‘understood Weber’s 
mind and made it understood’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 64). Consequently, the 
encounter with Weber’s political thought, as mediated by Rothenbucher, was rated 
highly by Morgenthau: it stood as ‘one of the formative experiences’ of his 
intellectual life (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 347), and 
Rothenbucher’s Weber had ’a reassuring influence’ on him (Morgenthau 1978, p. 
64). According to Morgenthau’s detailed account of the reasons behind his 
admiration, Weber’s political thought ‘possessed all the intellectual and moral
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qualities I had looked for in vain in the contemporary literature inside and outside the 
universities’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 64). As a scholar, Weber was dear to Morgenthau 
because he was ‘everything most of his colleagues pretended to be but were not’ -  he 
was thus true to himself, and to the others. According to Morgenthau, while, as a 
citizen, Weber was ‘a passionate observer of the political scene and a frustrated 
participant in it’, as a scholar, he ‘looked at politics without passion and pursued no 
political purpose beyond the intellectual one of understanding’ (Morgenthau 1978, p. 
64).
As Weber once famously put it, ‘we now dwell in a world that has been 
intellectually shaped to a large extent by Marx and Nietzsche’, and ‘anyone who fails 
to acknowledge that he could not have accomplished a significant part of his own 
work without the contributions of these two men is deceiving himself and others’ 
(Weber quoted in Frei 2001, p. 108). The introduction to this chapter mentioned that 
various works which document Nietzsche’s influence on Weber, and the subsequent 
similarities between Nietzsche’s and Weber’s positions, have already been published 
(see Hennis 1988, esp. pp. 146-62; Owen 1991, 1994; Warren 1992; Szakolczai 
1998). In Weber’s works, young Morgenthau encountered some themes which must 
have looked very familiar to him, since he had already found them in Nietzsche. 
Most importantly, this thesis maintains that it is by means of recasting Nietzschean 
themes in institutional terms, Tending them a public and political import’ ‘found 
wanting’ (Horowitz and Maley 1994, p. 9), that Weber gained particular importance 
to Morgenthau. What Nietzsche expressed in philosophical terms, Weber ‘translated’ 
in political terms, and made it relevant to politics. In the interpretation put forward in 
the thesis, this ‘politicised Nietzschean’ facet of Weber was the most appealing to 
Morgenthau. In support of this assumption stands the fact that, when asked to
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assemble a list of those ten books which ‘shaped his life’, Morgenthau mentioned 
The Political Writings o f  Max Weber (see Frei 2001, p. 113). This represents an 
indication that to Morgenthau, Weber was important precisely for his political 
insights, with all their Nietzschean overtones. Moreover, the thesis argues that to 
Morgenthau, Weber’s economic writings were secondary at best, and consequently it 
does not see ‘Weber the economist’ in Morgenthau.
As various scholars have indicated (see for example Lassman 2000, esp. p. 83), 
the struggle for power and its inescapability represent a central theme in Weber’s 
social and political thought. Life as a generalised struggle, and politics as a struggle 
for power par excellence -  these are the main images of Weber’s dynamic account 
on the topic. For Weber, the idea of a world free from the rule of man over man is 
simply utopian. Moreover, politics means, above all, struggle for power - in Weber’s 
words, ‘anyone who goes in for worldly politics must... be free of illusions and 
acknowledge one fundamental fact: to be resigned to the inevitable and eternal 
struggle of man with man on this earth’ (Weber quoted in Lassman 2000, p. 84). The 
meaning of ‘power’ in this context Weber interprets as ‘every chance of imposing 
one’s own will within a social relation, even against resistance, regardless of what 
this chance is based upon’ (Weber quoted in Lassman 2000, p. 89). In a well-known 
formulation, Weber asserts that anyone engaged in politics is striving for power, 
either power as a means to attain other goals, or power ‘for its own sake’, ‘which is 
to say, in order to enjoy the feeling of prestige given by power’ (Weber quoted in 
Lassman, p. 85. According to Frei, almost identical formulations can also be found in 
Nietzsche. See Frei 2001, p. 130).
For Morgenthau then, life is a struggle, and politics is a struggle for power par 
excellence. Morgenthau argues that the distinctiveness between domestic and
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international politics is ‘one of degree and not of kind’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 14). In 
both cases, the lust for power is ‘the very essence of the intention, the very life-blood 
of the action’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 167): we encounter a generalised struggle of 
tremendous dynamics and proportions. In Morgenthau’s definition, political power 
consists in ‘the psychological relations between two minds’, giving to those who 
exercise it ‘control over certain actions of those over whom it is exercised’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 14). This definition echoes Weber’s definition, and, as 
suggested above, also Nietzsche’s account. Moreover, Morgenthau also borrows 
from Weber the well-known classification according to which political phenomena 
can be reduced to one of three basic types: ‘to keep power, to increase power, or to 
demonstrate power’, with their typical policies of the status quo, imperialism, and 
prestige (see Morgenthau 1949, p. 52). Here it is important to point that, when asked 
about the origins of this typology, Morgenthau did mention Weber’s name. He 
wrote: ‘I would hazard the guess that I was most strongly influenced by Max Weber’ 
(Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 130).
The disenchantment of the modem world constitutes another important topic in 
Morgenthau’s account. He adopts the Nietzschean-Weberian diagnosis of the times - 
comprising the ‘death of God’ and the advent of nihilism and disenchantment -  and 
applies it to his particular area of interest, trying to raise his contemporaries’ 
awareness on these developments. As the first scholar drawing ‘the most radical 
scientific conclusions from Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism’ (Hennis 1988, pp. 158- 
9), Weber points to the phenomenon of disenchantment as to no less than ‘the fate of 
our times’ (Weber 1948, p. 155). Modem men live in an era when ‘the ultimate and 
most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental 
realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations’
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(Weber 1948, p. 155). To Weber, we live in a world plagued by an ‘unceasing 
struggle of... gods with one another’ (Weber 1948, p. 152), in which ‘the reality of 
rule and the struggle for power’ will be given direction and substance ‘by the 
inevitable struggle of irreconcilable values’ (Lassman 2000, p. 86). The 
characteristics of the modem world, as spelled out by Weber, echo Morgenthau’s 
own assumptions, and amplify his eagerness to understand the inner mechanisms of a 
stmggle over meaning imposition, which takes place within a disenchanted life. In 
such a world, marked by scientific enterprises brought to the extreme, ‘one need no 
longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits’: 
technical calculations ‘perform this service’ (Weber 1948, p. 139). In the next 
chapters it will be shown that Morgenthau is particularly concerned with the topic of 
what this thesis has called ‘the disenchantment of politics’, as exacerbated by 
scientific enterprises. According to Morgenthau, the attempt to reform by means of 
rationalisation, to simplify an extremely complex reality, has made the burden of life 
‘harder to bear’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 110).
However, nowhere is Weber’s impact more obvious than in Morgenthau’s 
emphasis on the moral facet of the political act. This brings us back to the issue of 
‘man’, focused upon by all three thinkers analysed in this thesis. Both Nietzsche and 
Weber interrogate modernity from a perspective defined by the concept of the 
individual (see Owen 1991, esp. p. 82). Morgenthau approaches this theme in a 
similar fashion, and moreover, as seen above, an important part of his reading of 
Nietzsche regards man’s creative, interpretative potential. Weber also places a 
considerable emphasis on the creative, self-affirming opportunities provided by 
modernity, and on the role of great personalities in particular. Morgenthau is mainly 
interested in the political embodiment of such great personalities. Consequently, he
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borrows from Weber a particularly political perspective on the Nietzschean- 
Weberian leadership problematique: the individual statesman who embraces politics 
as a vocation and is the prototype of responsibility in the field of international 
politics.
Nietzsche develops the issue of responsibility in his work On the Genealogy o f 
Morals (1996). In Nietzsche’s view, a responsible man has to ‘think in terms of 
causality, to see and anticipate from afar, to posit ends and means with certainty, to 
be able... to reckon and calculate’ (Nietzsche 1996, p. 40). Nietzsche’s position on 
responsibility was later ‘politicised’ by Weber (see Horowitz and Maley 1994, esp. 
pp. 68-96). In Weber’s formulation, a person who acts in accordance to the ethics of 
responsibility has to give an account of the foreseeable results of his actions (see 
Weber 1948, p. 120). In the interpretation put forward in this thesis, Morgenthau 
picks up and continues his mentors’ project in this regard, especially within its 
Weberian, political formulation. Morgenthau engages with the issue of 
responsibility, and his superior political actor impresses by means of his wisdom, 
moral strength, calmness and ‘pathos of distance’.
To Morgenthau, the responsible statesman, caught between his inner poles of lust 
for power and morality, stands as ‘the common lot of mankind’, and he thus 
represents ‘the prototype of social man himself (Morgenthau 1947, p. 188). Because 
he grasps and then overcomes his nature’s evils, and due to his awareness of the 
moral facet of the political act, he nevertheless is a symbol of humanity’s superior 
embodiment. The statesman represents a living proof of human nature’s constructive 
force, and he ‘creates a new society out of his knowledge of the nature of man’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 189). He thus has the gift of recognizing ‘in the contingencies 
of the social world the concretisations of eternal laws’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187) -
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the already mentioned laws which animate human nature. The responsible statesman 
has a crucial role in ‘domesticating’ the all encompassing fight over power, ‘the 
enduring presence of evil’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 172) in political action. The ‘evil of 
power’ cannot be avoided, Morgenthau asserts, therefore what remains to be done is 
to ‘model’ it - as Morgenthau quotes from Goethe, ‘to accept the evils..., and then 
seek to counterbalance them’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 185).
According to Morgenthau, all action affecting others, ‘and hence political action 
par excellence’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174), is subject to the ethics of responsibility. 
In Morgenthau’s view, before the adoption of a decision, the statesman should first 
and foremost ask himself consequence-related questions, and, ‘beyond the victory of 
tomorrow’, his mind, ‘complicated and subtle’, must anticipate the ‘possibilities of 
the future’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 443). As emphasised by Morgenthau, the one ‘who 
thinks in legalistic and propagandistic terms is particularly tempted to insist upon the 
letter of the law... and to lose sight of the consequences which that insistence may 
have for its own nation and for humanity’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 441). Morgenthau 
raises his readers’ awareness to the fact that the success in preserving international 
order depends upon the ‘extraordinary moral and intellectual qualities which all the 
leading participants must possess’. Moreover, while quoting from Burke, 
Morgenthau warns that a statesman who does not rise to the high expectations 
implied by statecraft may ‘ruin his country forever’ by ‘judging contrary to the 
exigencies of the moment’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187). His mistake may, indeed, 
‘spell the difference between peace and war’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 445).
As Morgenthau tells us further, the social world ‘yields only to that intricate 
combination of moral and material pressures which the art of the statesman creates 
and maintains’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16). The importance and the subtlety of
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matters belonging to statecraft, clearly make it depart from all bureaucratic, vocation- 
less, ‘rationalised’ professions. In determining the goals of his country, in assessing 
those of others, in employing the adequate means suited to the pursuit of certain 
objectives, the statesman turns into an artisan, and his decisions are crucial not only 
for his country, but for humanity at large. Such responsible political actors, who 
correctly assess the distribution and relative strength of opposing forces, and who 
anticipate ‘the emerging pattern of new constellations’, are to Morgenthau ‘the true 
realists’, and they do justice to the nature of things (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174). In 
this interpretation, Morgenthau’s statesman represents the goal humanity must long 
for, and he redeems the world, by giving it its meaning. Morgenthau’s vision of 
leadership will be developed in chapter 5, which will examine these Weberian 
aspects of Morgenthau’s thinking in more detail.
This chapter has so far pointed to Morgenthau’s Nietzschean and Weberian 
reading experiences, which he went through as a student in native Germany. In what 
follows, it will provide an overview of Morgenthau’s encounter with the American 
tradition, and of his contribution to post World War Two IR debates. Morgenthau’s 
Politics among Nations had an extraordinary reception and a great impact on IR, and 
it consolidated Morgenthau’s place in US academia and the dominance of realism in 
the field. While a proponent of Nietzschean and Weberian assumptions (mentioned 
earlier), Morgenthau also immersed himself in the US academic environment, and 
his thinking was marked by certain intellectual encounters and concrete historical 
events, which the next section will point to in more detail.
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2,4 The American Experience
Hans Morgenthau arrived in the United States in 1937, after it had become clear 
to him that his situation was hopeless. In a Europe shadowed by the prospect of a 
new war, he was an unemployed academic and a Jew threatened by the Nazis, 
leaving Frankfurt for Paris, then Geneva for Madrid. By contrast, the US looked 
more peaceful and also like a genuine land of opportunity - as Morgenthau would 
later put it, ‘the complete hopelessness of a man in my position in Europe as opposed 
to opportunities in the United States is very impressive’ (Morgenthau quoted in 
Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 364). As he would gratefully admit, ‘there is no doubt 
in my mind that I would never have been able to establish myself as a scholar were it 
not for the opportunities offered to me by the United States’ (Morgenthau quoted in 
Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 385). In the US, he had the chance to prove his 
academic potential, and while doing this he was also able to advance (Thompson and 
Myers 1984, p. 385).
In his own admission, from an intellectual perspective, Morgenthau was ‘quite 
unprepared’ for the US (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 378). 
In Europe, he had read some of the works of the American pragmatist William 
James, but had found him ‘rather flat, common-sensical, and not particularly 
interesting’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 378). Having been
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brought up ‘in a tradition entirely different’, as soon as he familiarised himself with 
US academic environment, Morgenthau was ‘taken aback by the optimism and 
pragmatism of the American intellectual tradition’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson 
and Myers 1984, p. 379). To this optimism, as manifested in the field of International 
Politics, Morgenthau opposed a ‘realist’ approach, which emphasised the pervasive 
nature of the struggle for power, the primacy of the national interest, and the 
demanding tasks faced by responsible statecraft: as Frei puts it, ‘against the root evil 
of an overly optimistic view of life, he posited the tragic as an ineluctable condition 
of human existence’ (Frei 2001, p. 185). Unsurprisingly then, upon arriving at the 
University of Chicago, Morgenthau attracted a negative reception on the part of 
colleagues such as Charles E. Merriam, Harold Lasswell, David Easton, Leonard 
White and Gabriel Almond, who were supporters of the behaviourist movement, 
incipient during that period (Frei 2001, p. 190). In Fermi’s assessment, at Chicago, 
Morgenthau ‘contended with an intellectual atmosphere in political science that was 
hostile to philosophy’ (Fermi 1968, p. 84). As Morgenthau points out himself in his 
interview with Bernard Johnson, ‘very quickly there developed a certain tension 
between myself and the Merriam faction’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and 
Myers 1984, p. 379).
Morgenthau’s first book published in the US, Scientific Man vs Power Politics, 
came by his own admission ‘as a kind of a bomb into a peaceful environment and 
shocked people no end’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 207). As Fermi 
explains, the book launched ‘an original and forceful criticism of the social, political, 
and moral philosophy of modem Western thought and its consequences for political 
life’ (Fermi 1968, p. 84). Within this discussion, Fermi points to the contextual 
factors, emphasising that Morgenthau’s first book challenged the scientific approach
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to politics prevalent in the United States since the publication in 1924 of New 
Aspects o f Politics by Morgenthau’s colleague Charles E. Merriam (Fermi 1968, p. 
84). Fermi maintains that when Professor Leonard White -  who was a supporter of 
Merriam and Morgenthau’s chairman at the University of Chicago - read Scientific 
Man, he suggested ‘that Morgenthau teach a course in administrative law to put him 
back on the right track’ (Fermi 1968, p. 84).
Despite this cold reception on the part of his behaviouralist colleagues, 
Morgenthau persevered with his approach, eager to attain his goal and a ‘supreme 
task’, as his close collaborator Kenneth Thompson calls it: ‘the understanding of the 
meaning of politics’ (Thompson 1999, p. 19). As Thompson asserts further in his 
interpretation of Morgenthau’s contribution to IR, Morgenthau ‘was less defiant than 
determined in his mission or reordering thinking on international politics’, and he 
‘undertook to bring order and meaning to a body of information that would otherwise 
have remained a collection of disparate and unrelated information’ (Thompson 1999,
pp. 21, 22).
While Scientific Man vs Power Politics was intended to analyze ‘fundamental 
problems of understanding and existence’, Politics among Nations was a general and 
comprehensive writing, whose distinctive features set it apart from Morgenthau’s 
other works (Thompson 1999, p. 19). The impressive product of long years of study 
and reflection, Politics among Nations sought ‘to propound, especially as elaborated 
in 1954 in the second edition, a realist theory of international politics’, and it 
‘attempted to give the political scientist a focal point that would distinguish his 
inquiries from those of the economist, the lawyer, or the moral philosopher’ 
(Thompson 1960, p. 35). Power and interest were put forth as the ordering concepts 
in international politics (Thompson 1960, p. 36), and the crucial importance of the
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statesman’s mission in dealing with the contingencies of an anarchical environment 
was emphasised by Morgenthau at length.
In Thompson’s interpretation, Morgenthau was one of the scholars who helped to 
lay the foundation for international politics (Thompson 1960, pp. 32-3), and the 
publication of his first two books consolidated his prominence in IR theory, and 
stirred debates within the discipline. As two of Morgenthau’s re-evaluators put it, 
these debates ‘certainly’ had ‘some elements of a ‘cultural clash’ (Amstrup 1978, p.
173), and Scientific Man vs Power Politics in particular marked ‘the beginning of the 
conflict between a European social scientist and the new country he had come to 
know’ (Sollner 1987, pp. 163-4). By contrast to the American ‘idealists’, who 
optimistically pointed to the prospects for cooperation, Morgenthau emphasised the 
reality of international political competition. He continuously confronted what he 
called ‘the American tradition’ imbued with faith in reason and progress. In his 
characterization, this is a tradition which assumes ‘that all problems are susceptible 
of a rational solution’, and ‘that if they seem to resist such a solution, if you only 
spend more energy, more time, more manpower, and more money on them, they are 
bound to be solved’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 379). For 
his part, as indicated in his interview with Bernard Johnson, Morgenthau tried to 
make his American colleagues aware of the tragic character of political and social 
problems, which ‘escape a clear-cut solution, but which must be lived with and 
manipulated’, and which ‘cannot be exorcised by some technological, social, or 
political contrivance’ (Morgenthau quoted in Thompson and Myers 1984, p. 379). 
Morgenthau was, in Stanley Hoffmann’s words, ‘a refugee from suicidal Europe with 
a missionary impulse to teach the new world power all the lessons it had been able to 
ignore until then, but could no longer afford to reject’ (Hoffmann 1977, p. 44). He
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‘wanted to be normative, but to root his norms in the realities of politics’ (Hoffmann 
1977, p. 44). No wonder then that, following the publication of his first books, he 
started to be perceived as the ‘enemy number one’ of US liberal reformers 
(Thompson 1980, p. 2) -  a characterization shared by many, which in the present 
interpretation did not do justice to the multi-faceted character of Morgenthau’s 
thought.
As Lebow is keen to point out in The Tragic Vision o f Politics, Morgenthau’s 
intellectual growth did not stop with his early post-war books, but naturally 
continued throughout his career (Lebow 2003, p. 254). Lebow argues that by the 
time of the Vietnam War Morgenthau ‘had become disillusioned by American-style 
realism’, and had adopted ‘much of the agenda of his former idealist opponents’ 
(Lebow 2003, pp. 26-7). In Lebow’s view, by 1970 Morgenthau was ‘guardedly 
optimistic about the prospects for a far-reaching transformation of the international 
system’, and his commitment to some form of supranational authority ‘deepened in 
the 1970s’ (Lebow 2003, pp. 50, 245). Moreover, as Lebow argues further, during 
this period Morgenthau was much more optimistic about the prospects of avoiding 
nuclear war and restoring America’s purpose (Lebow 2003, p. 254). In Lebow’s 
assessment, Morgenthau’s optimism was ‘based on his renewed belief in the power 
of experience and reason to serve as engines for progress’, and it was ‘the result of 
his experiences in his adopted homeland’ (Lebow 2003, p. 254). The present thesis 
acknowledges the evolution of Morgenthau’s thought depicted by Lebow, which 
manifests itself in many of Morgenthau’s reflections on topics such as democracy, 
leadership and greatness, the latter as exhibited by Abraham Lincoln. Nevertheless, 
this reading intends to prove that certain themes -  such as the death of God, the 
disenchantment of politics, and power as meaning imposition -  are enduring in
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Morgenthau’s theory, and he continuously points to the perils nurtured by the above 
phenomena. The thesis will explore these elements and will demonstrate their 
continuity in Morgenthau’s account.
Moreover, in the context of this discussion of the impact of the US environment 
on Morgenthau, we would like to emphasise that by focusing on Nietzsche and 
Weber, this thesis does not imply that other sources of inspiration -  for instance 
those within the American academic environment, such as Reinhold Niebuhr -  were 
not important to Morgenthau. The thesis is far from underestimating the significance 
of Morgenthau’s encounter with Niebuhr, and it would like to point to Morgenthau’s 
own acknowledgment made in an unpublished letter, according to which in addition 
to Nietzsche’s ‘most powerful and probably decisive influence’, in later years, 
Aristotle, Saint Augustine and Niebuhr had been the most important (Letter to 
Samuel Magill, 5 January 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 39, p. 1). Nevertheless, the 
present reading would also like to point to the formative character of the Nietzschean 
and Weberian reading experiences, which far outweighs in significance 
Morgenthau’s later encounter with Niebuhr. As Morgenthau mentioned once, in the 
context of private discussion and correspondence, ‘Reinie and I come out about the 
same on politics’, and Niebuhr’s writings ‘have confirmed certain conclusions at 
which I arrived independently’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, pp. 110, 112). 
Thus, in Morgenthau’s own acknowledgment, his encounter with Niebuhr had more 
of a reconfirming character than a formative one.
After outlining the intellectual encounters of greatest importance for the shaping 
of Morgenthau’s account, the thesis will proceed now to unpack the latter. Chapter 3 
will explore the metaphysical foundation of Morgenthau’s theory only hinted at in 
the thesis so far, and will point to Morgenthau’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s and
107
Weber’s ‘death of God’ diagnosis, and to his scholarly interest in the status o f ‘truth’, 
as a value of pivotal concern to debates on modernity and postmodemity.
Furthermore, the chapter will reveal that, by arguing against the generalised 
application of scientific methods, and by emphasising the consequences stirred by 
rationalist endeavours, Morgenthau mirrors Weber’s insights. While doing this, he 
points to a dramatic phenomenon which will be analysed in chapter 4 at length, and 
which constitutes one of the original contributions brought by this reading to the 
ongoing re-evaluation of Morgenthau: the disenchantment of politics.
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3. The ‘Death of God’ and the Crisis of Philosophy
This chapter addresses the core of Morgenthau’s theory by examining the 
metaphysical assumptions which underpin it, with an emphasis on Morgenthau’s 
concern with the concept of ‘truth’. The analysis which follows is important because 
it unravels the significance of the question of meaning in Morgenthau’s theory, and 
argues implicitly for reconsidering strict materialistic readings of Morgenthau, and 
for focusing on the normative aspects of his thought, with all their value and 
sophistication. At the same time, this analysis points to the typically modem and 
postmodern opposite visions of ‘truth’ which both permeate Morgenthau’s account, 
and shows that the issue of ‘truth’ is central to unlocking significant aspects of 
Morgenthau’s metaphysics.
By contrast with other interpretations, this reading focuses on Morgenthau’s 
concern with metaphysics explicitly, and it will analyse his arguments against the 
tmth arrived at through rationalist methods, explaining them with an eye to 
Morgenthau’s embracing of Nietzschean and Weberian assumptions. This chapter 
argues that Morgenthau adopts from Nietzsche the diagnosis of the ‘death of God’, 
and that the diagnosis exerts a fundamental influence on Morgenthau’s thought: this 
grand theme pervades his vision of tmth and power, of man and morality. Moreover, 
the problem of the status and legitimacy of tmth is closely related to Morgenthau’s
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concern with the disintegration of morality: Morgenthau is aware that following the 
death of God, ‘truth’ as a value is called into question.
Despite the centrality assigned by Morgenthau to the concept of truth (see for 
example his essays which make up a book length discussion in Truth and Power, 
1970), few scholars have attempted to analyse his account of ‘truth’ explicitly and 
systematically. A recent exception is represented by an article written by Sean 
Molloy, in which the author argues convincingly that ‘truth’ is a core concept, which 
dominates and conditions Morgenthau’s thought about the nature of politics (Molloy 
2004, p. 1). According to Molloy, Morgenthau’s career revolved around a 
commitment to the discovery of the ‘truth’ of international politics, and an assertion 
of the primacy of power in this realm (Molloy 2004, p. 1). In Molloy’s interpretation, 
for Morgenthau, the truth about international politics is ‘intrinsically bound to 
power’, the centrality of power standing as ‘the ultimate reality and truth of 
international politics, as it permeates the social and political fabrics of human 
existence’ (Molloy 2004, pp. 1-2).
The analysis undertaken here highlights Morgenthau’s commitment to ‘truth’ as 
an ‘ultimate value’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 14), and his interpretation of the ‘truth’ of 
the international realm, as captured by the dynamic picture of the struggle for power, 
understood as a struggle for the imposition of ‘the truth’ among various competing 
truths. This text will point to Morgenthau’s reading of Nietzsche and Weber as the 
main factor which made an impact on his theory, and triggered metaphysical 
concerns which animated Morgenthau throughout his life. Moreover, this chapter 
will show that Morgenthau’s interest in establishing the ‘truth’ of international 
politics parallels his similarly pivotal concern regarding the fragmentation of a 
universal realm of values, which in his view can hardly place any moral restrictions
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upon the fight for power, and over truth, anymore. For Morgenthau, truth, power and 
morality are closely connected, and his analysis stands as a critique of central 
assumptions within modernity.
Belief in a harmonious ontology, endorsement of a universal concept of the self, 
uninhibited by specific location in time and space, and the subsequent denial of 
man’s historicity and finitude, are in Petersen’s view, the main characteristics of 
modernity, or what he terms ‘modem thought’ (Petersen 1999, p. 87). As Petersen 
reminds us, the ‘death of God’ ‘denies modem thought access to the metaphysical 
resource it has relied upon, consciously or unconsciously, to successfully negotiate 
the dilemmas and uncertainties of man's empirical existence’, and it ‘throws into 
doubt the very possibility of tmth, identity, and meaning by uprooting them from 
their foundation’ (Petersen 1999, p. 87). Nietzsche's announcement -  ‘God is dead’ - 
bears devastatingly upon the stmcture of modem thought, because the notion of God 
embodies ‘a silent assumption, guaranteeing that human efforts to secure certainty in 
the realms of knowledge, meaning, morality, and political principles would not be in 
vain’ (Petersen 1999, p. 87). Petersen concludes that Morgenthau is one of the 
scholars who try to work out the implications of Nietzsche's rearticulation of the 
relationship between man and the world (Petersen 1999, p. 87), and by doing this, he 
positions himself in an unusual way along the IR spectmm: rather than being in the 
midst of the grand narrative of modernity, Morgenthau ‘is balancing on its edge’ 
(Petersen 1999, p. 87).
As the present chapter will show, Morgenthau endorses the Nietzschean 
diagnosis regarding the disintegration of values, and argues that in the aftermath of 
the ‘death of God’ man ‘discovers many little answers, but no answer to the great 
questions of his life, no meaning, no direction’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 176). He
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adopts a certain kind of relativism, which in this thesis is interpreted as a 
philosophical orientation according to which, as Nardin describes it, ‘we must 
acknowledge the existence of many truths, each determined by whatever standards 
are used to define and measure truth’ (Nardin 1988, p. 150). Relativism implies that 
what counts as true in a given context depends upon the conventions of particular 
societies, traditions, scientific paradigms, or modes of discourse (see Nardin 1988, 
pp. 150-1). As Morgenthau puts it in Science: Servant or Master? -  and this is a 
position he took throughout his career - ‘behind the multiplicity of truths that offer 
themselves as “the” truth, the concept of truth itself disappears’ (Morgenthau 1972, 
p. 21). Moreover, as Morgenthau argues in a famous 1979 lecture on the topic of 
human rights, one cannot say that this situation or that action is immoral per se: ‘you 
have to put it into context and adapt your judgment to particular circumstances’ 
(Morgenthau 1979, p. 10). The ‘truth’ of morality is plural to Morgenthau, and this 
makes him conclude in his book In Defence o f the National Interest, that ‘the appeal 
to moral principles in the international sphere has no concrete universal meaning’, a 
situation which he is keen to portray and to examine extensively (Morgenthau 1982, 
p. 35). Morgenthau’s interest in metaphysics and his advocacy of a certain kind of 
relativism must have been challenging within the US academic environment, 
dominated by pragmatism, positivism, and by an overall optimism regarding the 
possibility of peace, progress and living universal values. As this thesis demonstrates 
with examples from both published and unpublished works, despite some aversion to 
his ideas, Morgenthau did not change them, and he continued to hold them up 
confidently to the end of his career.
By focusing on humans’ desire for meaning, certainty and security, Morgenthau 
exhibits a concern with the fate of human agency in a post-metaphysical world.
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Moreover, as we will see, Morgenthau holds an understanding of the ‘power 
phenomena’ which emphasises creation through interpretation and meaning 
imposition, and he regards these phenomena as forming a unity in multiplicity, with 
each unit in the ‘whole’ -  each man -  containing the forces of destruction and 
construction, which actually symbolise the dangers and the possibilities opened up 
by ‘the death of God’. What Morgenthau calls the ‘tragic meaning’ of modem 
existence, and also its ‘irrationality’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174), stem from man’s 
nature itself, from its characteristics - more precisely, from the limitations 
demonstrated in dealing with a desire for power which all too easily generates 
destructiveness. Nevertheless, Morgenthau’s account also reflects the well-known 
Nietzschean theme of overcoming. He suggests that, through mastering the lust for 
power - by, at first, acknowledging its existence and understanding its inner 
dynamics, and then by employing power responsibly - man’s actions may account 
not only for destmction, but also for constmction. Here, and especially in the 
portrayal of the genuine statesman, as a responsible, constructive force acting within 
the confines of a disenchanted political scene, we can perceive Weber’s contribution 
to the shaping of Morgenthau’s perspective. A detailed analysis of the key concepts 
in Morgenthau’s theory, according to the present interpretation -  disenchantment/re­
enchantment of politics, responsible and wise leadership - will be undertaken in 
chapter 4.
The present chapter begins with an examination of Morgenthau’s interpretation 
of the ‘death of God’, and of man’s fate in such times characterised by relativism and 
perspectivism, and by a rationalization which Morgenthau is keen to criticize. 
Morgenthau regards the death of God as both a loss and an opportunity, and he 
maintains that it provides conditions for both destructive and constructive
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endeavours. The chapter continues with an analysis of the dark, destructive side of 
human nature in Morgenthau’s account, which fights over power, and then employs 
it to bring about disastrous outcomes. The chapter concludes with an outline of 
Morgenthau’s vision of the superior human agent, whose act of meaning imposition 
is portrayed positively. While this chapter focuses on Morgenthau’s metaphysics, 
chapter 4 will concentrate on Morgenthau’s translation of his metaphysics into an 
understanding of politics, with an emphasis on Morgenthau’s account of political 
leadership.
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3.1 The Experience of Nihilism and Disenchantment
Hans Morgenthau’s interpretation of modernity following the ‘death of God’ 
forms the foundation on which he posits his theory of the political, and as such it 
makes up a sophisticated background which remained remarkably unchanged 
throughout his career. This approach helped him to develop a complex view on the 
topic, which he refined and enriched throughout the years, adding more to his 
discussion of meaning and disenchantment. To his disadvantage, he was vulnerable 
to accusations of rigidity and un-openness, and appeared uneasy with 
accommodating change. The present thesis interprets this as a self-imposed strategy 
on Morgenthau’s part, who continuously attempted to raise his contemporaries’ 
awareness on the same topics of the death of God and the disenchantment and loss of 
meaning in politics, in his belief that changes had yet to take place. Judging from 
Morgenthau’s constant pessimism on the topic, it can be argued that Morgenthau did 
not see any particular change taking place with regard to the death of the universal 
God of values and the disenchantment of the political space. As such, he did not see 
reasons to alter his assumptions, and he maintained his views by virtue of their 
ongoing relevance to the topic of his enquiry, and in accord with his strategic aim of 
raising the others’ awareness.
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In one of the early unpublished international relations lectures, Morgenthau 
points to the breakdown of universal religion and universal humanism, and argues 
that the ‘universal ties’ which bind men together have become weaker and weaker 
(Lecture 16, 6 February 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 8). To him, modems 
live in a revolutionary age, which ‘has broken with the political, moral, and 
technological traditions of the Western world’ (2nd Lecture at the Oriental Institute, 
31 March 1950, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 1). Meanwhile, in Scientific Man vs 
Power Politics, his first book published in the United States, Morgenthau asserts that 
man is a creature which has recently Tost its animal innocence and security’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 9), and he is aware of the role played by the disintegration of 
the value systems of a religious nature. Years later, in The Decline o f Democratic 
Politics, we find Morgenthau pointing to the ‘successful attack’ to which the 
tradition of Western thought has been exposed in the last two centuries, to ‘the 
disintegration of the great intellectual systems from which the Western world used to 
receive its meaning’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 4). Furthermore, in an article published 
in 1971 and a book from 1972, Morgenthau focuses his attention on the same theme, 
and advances similar conclusions: he argues that modems live in a secular age which 
has lost ‘faith in individual immortality in other worlds’ (see Morgenthau 1972, p. 
150). They live in a threatening world, plagued by an unprecedented increase in 
physical danger, social disintegration, and metaphysical doubt (Morgenthau 1971, p. 
621), a world in which they experience the ‘existential dread’, and get to taste ‘the 
transitoriness and absurdity of all life’ (Morgenthau 1971, pp. 626, 629).
Morgenthau’s picture of the world encompasses no ranking of values, and faces 
instead stmggle and devaluation. Morgenthau maintains in Scientific Man vs Power 
Politics that the modem world resembles a stage where the human individual plays a
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role in a story ‘of inner insecurity, of the anticipation of impending doom, of 
metaphysical anxieties’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 9). Morgenthau emphasises that in the 
nineteenth century, man’s sense of insecurity started to increase, nourishing within it 
an acute social instability, and that in the twentieth, ‘intensified individual 
frustrations and anxieties’ became permanent, ‘as a result of the weakening of the 
ties of tradition, especially in the form of religion, of increased rationalization of life 
and work, and of cyclical economic crises’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 77). Time and 
again, Morgenthau mentions that humans live in an age in which religion can no 
longer assure salvation. Within this context, in an early work he makes reference to 
the ‘twilight of international morality’ (Morgenthau 1948), while in a later one he 
points to the current ‘general decline’ in the adherence to moral values (see 
Morgenthau 1979, esp. p. 10). In Morgenthau’s account, the moral restraints that in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries contributed greatly to the civilized relations 
among nations ‘are in the process of weakening, if not disappearing’ (Morgenthau 
1979, p. 3). He warns his readers about the ‘total dissolution’ of the moral order 
(Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 143) and, in Science: Servant or Master?, he 
points to the ‘empty transcendent space’ pessimistically (Morgenthau 1972, p. 14). In 
one of Morgenthau’s most famous metaphoric formulations, expressed in the seminal 
work Politics among Nations, all men now meet ‘under an empty sky from which the 
gods have departed’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 196). The decline of metaphysics with all 
its certain meanings and values supposedly fixed once and for all represents a 
continuous concern for Morgenthau. He reacts to environmental factors and 
questions the optimism of the American academia, with a view to raising awareness 
on the above collapse of tradition and its constituting values, and on the perils of 
meaninglessness.
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It is here that one can notice Morgenthau’s taking up of the Nietzschean 
problematic of the ‘death of God’, which as Ansell-Pearson notes, encompasses the 
degradation of ‘the traditional metaphysical-moral structure which enables us to 
make sense of existence, to give it a meaning’ (Ansell-Pearson 1994, pp. 85-6). As 
Nietzsche once put it, ‘one interpretation has collapsed; but because it was 
considered the interpretation, it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in 
existence, as if everything were in vain’ (Nietzsche 1968, p. 35). A consequence of 
this collapse is represented by the fact that ‘the highest values devalue themselves’ 
(Nietzsche 1968, p. 9), and nihilism occurs. In Nietzsche’s words, ‘our existence 
(action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning, ‘the pathos of “in vain” is the 
nihilists' pathos—at the same time, as pathos, an inconsistency on the part of the 
nihilists’ (Nietzsche 1968, p. 211).
Pangle argues that Nietzsche is aware of man’s striving for meaning (a position 
and a concern which we find in Morgenthau as well), and of the fact that the death of 
God brings forward the issues of meaning and historicity: ‘God’s existence, like 
every other meaningful existence, is temporal or historical’ (Pangle 1983, p. 45). In 
Pangle’s assessment of the Nietzschean position, people must experience meaningful 
existence, their physical being ‘must be understood as dedicated to, and in some 
circumstances to be sacrificed for, some way of life which makes demands far 
beyond what is required for security or creature comforts (Pangle 1983, p. 47). 
Pangle correctly identifies that for Nietzsche, it is this need that defines the human, 
setting man apart from all other existence’ (Pangle 1983, p. 45, p. 47). Following the 
death of a universal realm of values likely to provide guidance, man’s shifting, 
subjective will stands as the only source of meaning and order (Pangle 1983, p. 65), 
and the awareness of the historicity and subjectivity of all meaning triggers man’s
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discontent with his life. As Pangle concludes, in the aftermath of the collapse of 
values, meaning springs from ‘the mutable inventiveness or creativity of man’ 
(Pangle 1983, pp. 49, 66).
Similarly to Nietzsche, Morgenthau maintains that it is in man’s nature to strive 
for security and certainty (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 102), and to value 
these highly. However, he also notes that following the ‘death of God’, instead of 
feeling certain in his beliefs and secure within the boundaries of his existence, the 
human individual experiences the opposite: he is lost in uncertainty, feels insecure 
and lonely. This position is expressed most clearly in Morgenthau’s ‘twin’ books, 
which outline similar perspectives on similar topics, despite being written 25 years 
apart, Scientific Man vs Power Politics and Science: Servant or Master? (1972) In 
the first one, Morgenthau argues that man finds himself at the center of an unceasing 
struggle, between his understanding and the ‘riddles of the world’. In a moving 
paragraph, he explains that this is
a struggle which offers with each answer new questions, with each victory a new 
disappointment, and thus seems to lead nowhere. In this labyrinth of unconnected 
causal connections, man discovers many little answers but no answers to the 
great questions of his life, no meaning, no direction (Morgenthau 1947, p. 176).
Meanwhile, in Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau argues that, in 
confronting a threatening world, overwhelmed by such a moral crisis, man’s strength 
springs from his becoming conscious of experience through thought (Morgenthau 
1972, p. 44). However, he is aware that now man’s quest for causes, laws, and 
meaning is answered ‘incompletely or not at all’, and that all that man can be sure of
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at present, are ‘the illusion of knowledge and the certainty of ignorance’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, pp. 25-6). In Morgenthau’s diagnosis, in the sphere of the natural 
sciences, it is at best ‘still possible’ to distinguish between true and false. Meanwhile, 
in the field of social action, ‘one can still distinguish between useful and useless, but 
no longer between good and bad, valuable and worthless’ (Morgenthau 1972, pp. 28- 
9).
As noted earlier, Morgenthau is concerned with the status and appeal of truth, 
following the collapse of universal values. For him, in such times when certainty and 
security are difficult to be achieved, truth as a universal standard with a settled 
meaning is called into question. In Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau 
emphasises that instead of a singular truth springing from a singular interpretation, 
humans now live in a competition over truth - in Morgenthau’s formulation, the 
place of truth ‘as a universally valid principle’ is occupied by ‘a multiplicity of 
different truths, coordinated to different types of man’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 21). 
When truth received meaning from transcendent objective values, truth had a claim 
on the individual (Morgenthau 1972, p. 3). At present, Morgenthau implies that this 
does not seem to be the case anymore, and the concept of ‘truth’ itself disappears 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 21). As Morgenthau warns in his 1979 lecture on the topic of 
human rights, the breaking up of ‘truth’ has led to an interpretative hiatus whose 
consequences humans are only ‘dimly aware’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 34).
As seen from the introduction to the chapter, by adopting this position regarding 
the plurality of truths which comes after the ‘death of God’, Morgenthau agrees with 
a certain degree of relativism, which can be understood as a philosophical orientation 
which implies that there are many kinds of truth, and that what counts as true in a 
given context ‘depends upon the conventions of particular societies, traditions,
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scientific paradigms, or modes of discourse’ (Nardin 1988, pp. 150-1). In line with 
the Nietzschean diagnosis, Morgenthau emphasises the relativity of moral judgment, 
and moreover he sees it as both a loss and an opportunity. As he states, truth is 
plural, and ‘you cannot say that this action or that action is immoral per se’, but ‘you 
have to put it into context and adapt your judgment to particular circumstances’ 
(Morgenthau 1979, p. 10). Anthony Lang correctly identifies in his discussion of 
Morgenthau’s lectures on Aristotle that on the one hand, Morgenthau refuses to 
accept the relativistic accounts of the political realm, ‘pointing out that our daily 
discourse is imbued with moral principles’ (Lang 2004, p. 7). On the other hand 
however, he ‘does argue for a larger form of moral relativism, one based on a 
historical frame and national context’ (Lang 2004, p. 7). As Morgenthau puts it, in 
the context of his discussion of the supposedly universal character of human rights,
It is a relativism in time (...) when certain principles are applicable in one period 
of history and not applicable in another period of history, and it is a relativism in 
terms of culture -  of contemporaneous culture -  in that certain principles are 
obeyed by certain nations, by certain political civilizations, and are not obeyed by 
others (Morgenthau 1979, p. 4).
Moreover, Morgenthau’s diagnosis emphasises perspectivism, the latter 
representing Morgenthau’s Nietzschean-like attempt to replace epistemology with, as 
Strong remarks, ‘an understanding of the self and of knowledge that does not posit 
any particular position (or self) as final’ (Strong 1985, p. 165). By submitting to this 
perspectivist vision Morgenthau implies, in a Nietzschean-like fashion, that the ‘real 
world’ has become ‘a myth’: humans can not grasp ‘one’ reality, instead they
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encounter a flow of various interpretations, and a diversity of meanings of ‘the truth’. 
Perspectivism frames the problem as one of the relation between the individual and 
the external world, and following from this, Morgenthau always maintains that 
norms, truth and meaning are constituted at the level of autonomous individuals. As 
emphasised by Morgenthau in a relevant unpublished lecture, the influence of the 
‘personal equation’ of the observer upon the truth should not be overlooked: in a 
given situation, there can be ‘if not 5 different truths, then 5 different formulations of 
truth stressing different points of view’ (Lecture 2, 4 January 1946, Morgenthau 
Papers, Box 169, p. 12).
For Morgenthau, modernity symbolises a time of opportunity, but also one of 
loss: the ‘death of God’ and the subsequent awareness of relativism and 
perspectivism allow for the unfolding of man’s creative powers (the positive 
outcome), while refusing him certainty and security (the negative outcome). 
Morgenthau often points to the decline in the adherence to moral values, and to what 
he takes to be a general decay of the respect for human life, ‘probably stimulated by 
technology’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 14). His theory is an ethical theory, and it exhibits 
its author’s concern with morality, in an age in which the transcendent space is 
empty, religion can no longer assure salvation (see Morgenthau 1972, esp. p. 40), 
and various interpretations and perspectives stand in conflictual positions with each 
other. In such times, when there is no universal moral order able to provide guidance 
anymore, Morgenthau argues that men live consciously in the presence of death 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 54), in empirical and metaphysical danger. As Morgenthau 
points out in Science: Servant or Master?, in an ingenious reinterpretation of a well- 
known Kantian dictum, ‘to live in consciousness of danger means to live in fear, and
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to live like that is a risky adventure. That is what sapere aude means’ (Morgenthau 
1972, p. 55).
What strikes us as particularly important in Morgenthau’s account of modernity 
in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’, is that his diagnosis is always accompanied by 
the forceful expression of his discontent with humanity’s response to the crisis. 
Morgenthau states that men now live in an era characterised by a devastating ‘crisis 
of philosophy’, an age ‘first, of uneasy confusion, then, of cynical despair’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 10). Equally important for Morgenthau, the situation is 
aggravated by humans’ inability to address the ongoing decline properly: man’s 
response is inadequate and weak to Morgenthau, and it perpetuates the crisis. As he 
puts it, what we see as novelty in the current situation is human anxieties’ ‘strength 
and confusion’, but also ‘their absence in the main currents of philosophy and 
political thought’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 9). Keen to raise awareness of the impasse in 
which we find ourselves today, from a philosophical point of view (see Lang 2004, p. 
22), Morgenthau argues in the 1979 human rights lecture that humans face a 
‘revolutionary’ situation, from which they have not drawn ‘any important 
consequences in terms of organization, way of thinking, and moral principles’ 
(Morgenthau 1979, p. 42).
Which is the philosophy whose inadequacy is emphasised by Morgenthau in the 
above quotations? His answer to the question develops into a thoroughgoing critique 
of this mode of thought, characterised by a glorification of the force of reason: it 
represents what Morgenthau calls ‘the philosophy of rationalism’, or ‘scientism’. To 
eliminate doubts over his employment of the terms, Morgenthau states in an 
unpublished lecture that, in his interpretation, ‘rationalism’ and ‘rationalistic’ refer to 
‘the philosophical movement which is identified with the Age of Reason, and whose
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tenets, especially in the form of positivism and scientism, have since become an 
intrinsic element of our culture’ (undated lecture, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169).
One of the first significant expositions of Morgenthau’s critique is contained in 
Scientific Man vs Power Politics, which was written against the background of the 
behaviourist revolution, then emerging in US universities. Morgenthau tells his 
readers that the main characteristic of this trend of thought is the reliance on reason 
to find ‘the truths of philosophy, ethics, and politics alike and through its own inner 
force to re-create reality in the image of these truths’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 10). A 
further analysis reveals two important features:
The conception of the social and the physical world as being intelligible through 
the same rational processes... and the conviction that understanding in terms of 
these rational processes is all that is needed for the rational control of the social 
and the physical world (Morgenthau 1947, p. 11).
This mode of thought, which gives the appearance of ‘eternal verities’ to certain 
assumptions ‘which are true, if at all, under the conditions of a particular historical 
experience’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 12), praises a concept of the physical world 
‘erected into an idol and emulated as a model’, pervaded by rational laws, and 
capable ‘of complete rational determination’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 115). Like 
Nietzsche who, in Jurgen Habermas’s words, wanted ‘to explode the framework of 
Occidental rationalism’ (Habermas 1987, p. 74), with its never ending trust in reason, 
Morgenthau in his turn is eager to prove the flawed nature of this trend of thought. 
He argues that the present age lives under the signs of both confidence and despair, 
and points out that this state of affairs works against rationalism: while confidence is
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directed to the power of reason, as represented by modem science, to solve the social 
problems, its ‘twin feeling’ -  the much more pervasive despair -  is stirred by the 
significant failure of scientific reason to solve them (Morgenthau 1947, p. 9). Last 
but not least, Morgenthau asks us to approach rationalism critically. We will then see 
that it ‘misunderstands the nature of man, the nature of the world, and the nature of 
reason itself (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174). What rationalism’s proponents praise is 
‘simple, rational, mechanical’, while what they have to deal with is ‘complicated, 
irrational, incalculable’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 86).
It is important to emphasise at this point that, despite his aversion to rationalism 
and to what he perceives to be its proponents’ efforts to impose a meaning which is 
alien to the social realm, characterised by unpredictable changes, Morgenthau 
nevertheless hangs on to a sense of the rational, and he is against irrationality. This 
view is supported by Molloy, who indicates that Morgenthau’s main complaint with 
rationalism is ‘its misunderstanding of the nature of social knowledge’, and that 
Morgenthau constructs his stance in opposition ‘to the excessive empiricism of the 
American foreign policy elite’ - and here the importance of the contextual factors is 
emphasised (Molloy 2004, pp. 3, 4). This does not mean, however, that Morgenthau 
‘dispenses with the category of the rational in its entirety’ (Molloy 2004, p. 3). As 
emphasised by Molloy, there is a clear distinction in Morgenthau’s works between 
rationalism and rationality: ‘where rationalism provides merely an illusion of control 
over knowledge derived from a traditionalist interpretation of science, rationality is 
an effective approach to knowledge, it is what makes knowledge possible in 
international relations’ (Molloy 2004, p. 3). Molloy contends further that the 
argument of rationality giving meaning to the social world represents ‘the foundation 
of Morgenthau’s approach to the formulation of the six principles of political
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realism’ (Molloy 2004, pp. 3-4). Morgenthau’s approach to knowledge and his 
endorsement of rationality will be fully explored in the next chapters.
As with his later works, in Scientific Man vs Power Politics Morgenthau is 
categorical: he claims that rationalism ‘cannot give meaning to the experiences of the 
mid-twentieth century’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 10). Moreover, he points to the most 
dangerous consequence of employing the same rationalist processes when addressing 
social issues: modem mind’s tendencies ‘to look in social affairs for a certainty in 
planning and prediction that is as unattainable here as elsewhere’ (Morgenthau 1947, 
p. 120), have left man ‘impoverished in his quest for an answer to the riddle of the 
universe, and of his existence in it’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 111). In Morgenthau’s 
picture, the individual subjected to such ‘rational enterprises’ is ‘poorer’:
By destroying the confidence of the human mind in the answers that art, religion, 
and metaphysics could give and by holing out the hope, bound to be 
disappointed, that it had all answers to all questions, rationalism has left man the 
poorer and has made the burden of life harder to bear (Morgenthau 1947, p. 110).
In Morgenthau’s account, in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’, rationalization 
has stripped the world of its wonders, and has de-magified humans’ existence, 
opening it up to a variety of interpretations, meanings and self-proclaimed truths. 
The mysteries of the world have ceased to amaze with their secrecy, and have 
become instead victims of a ruthless drive to impose a rationalist interpretation of 
them all. At this point we can start to see our ‘Weberian Morgenthau’, who links 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the ‘death of God’ and the awareness of nihilism, to the 
topic of disenchantment, thoroughly analysed by Max Weber.
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The never-ending ‘worship’ of reason’s scientific embodiment is regarded with 
horror by both Weber and Morgenthau. Against those who assert the positive 
contribution of technology and rationalism to the construction of society, 
Morgenthau emphasises the cancerous growth of technology, which duplicates the 
meaningless growth of science (Morgenthau 1947, pp. 11, 23). As Morgenthau 
mentions in one of his unpublished lectures, the factory assembly line stands as a 
metaphor of life after the death of God, and it replicates the degeneration of the 
meaningfulness of work: ‘the individual is no longer capable of understanding what 
he is working for, and he no longer derives any satisfaction from it’ (Lecture 10, 10 
May 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 11). Morgenthau’s attack against 
rationalism and technology shows up in many of his writings, and technological 
advancement is presented as inherently bad. In the context of a bipolar world made 
of two superpowers eager to increase their weapons arsenal, and with a view to 
Morgenthau’s witnessing of the horrors of the Second World War made worse by 
technological developments, his critique is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, it is also 
uni-dimensional and ignores the benefits brought about by technological 
advancement (such as those in the field of medicine for instance), and this represents 
a weakness in Morgenthau’s account.
We have already seen that Hennis identifies Weber as the first scholar who draws 
‘the most radical scientific conclusions from Nietzsche’s diagnosis of nihilism’ 
(Hennis 1988, pp. 158-9). Weber points to the phenomenon of disenchantment as no 
less than ‘the fate of our times’ (Weber 1948, p. 155). At present, Weber argues, one 
can, in principle, master all things by calculation, since ‘there are no mysterious 
incalculable forces that come into play’ (Weber 1948, p. 139). In one of his most 
famous quotations, Weber maintains that modem life is comprised of an unceasing
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struggle among various gods, who, since they are disenchanted, take the form of 
impersonal forces. Weber warns his readers that our civilization ‘destines us to 
realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a 
thousand years’ by the orientation towards the ‘grandiose moral fervor’ of Christian 
ethics (Weber 1948, p. 144). As Weber maintains, the ultimately possible attitudes 
toward life are irreconcilable, the struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion, 
and thus ‘it is necessary to make a decisive choice’ (Weber 1948, p. 140).
In the ongoing battle over values, science can only prove its weaknesses and 
inabilities. Scientific knowledge is unable to provide meaning when applied to the 
social sciences domain because here it cannot provide clear cut answers. Moreover, it 
also brings about negative outcomes, by disenchanting the field of enquiry within 
which its methods are applied. After all, Weber asks rhetorically, who else, aside 
from certain ‘big children’ to be found in the natural sciences, still believes ‘that the 
findings of astronomy, biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything about 
the meaning of the world?’ In Weber’s categorical conclusion,
If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the 
belief that there is such a thing as the 'meaning' of the universe die out at its 
very roots (Weber 1948, p. 145).
Weber’s concerns are echoed by Morgenthau, whose interpretation of the 
issue mirrors his interest in depicting the outcomes of the rationalization 
enterprises in the political realm. Morgenthau argues that the modem technology 
of warfare represents a new element in the history of the western world, which can 
lead either to peace or to universal destmction. While wishing for the former,
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Morgenthau is also very concerned with the increased prospects for arriving at the 
latter. As he contends in Truth and Power, science has given us mastery over a 
doubly monstrous world, which ‘sacrifices human ends to technological means, as 
well as the needs of the many to the enrichment and power of the few, and thereby 
diminishes the stature of man, and threatens his very existence’ (Morgenthau 
1970, pp. 433-4). Moreover, in Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau decries 
the fact that the human individual has turned into a hapless object of the 
technological developments and political possibilities, and he is now ‘shaking his 
fists in impotent rage at those autonomous forces, which control a goodly fraction 
of his life, but which he cannot control’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 4). Morgenthau 
emphasises the contrast which, in his view, exists between the achievements and 
promises of science, on the one hand, and ‘a malaise that, for the first time in 
recorded human history, is not limited to a particular civilization, but has become 
a universal phenomenon encompassing humanity’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 4). In 
this account, humans enjoy ‘diminished freedom’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 434):
While science thus elates man with the promise to transform homo faber, the 
maker of tools, into homo deus, the maker of worlds, it also depresses him. By 
the same token that it promises him the creation of new worlds, it threatens to 
destroy the only world he has known, and has already destroyed a significant 
part of it (Morgenthau 1972, p. 2).
A detailed interpretation of what I will refer to as ‘the disenchantment of 
politics’, which is caused by the proponents of rationalism, will be undertaken in 
chapter 4. In what follows, I will return to the original point of departure -  the
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diagnosis of ‘the death of God’ -  in order to lead the reader to Morgenthau’s 
interpretation of the human individual, who occupies a central place in this diagnosis, 
and who can both generate and alleviate the above disenchantment, in his ruthless 
fight over meaning imposition. As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau, like Nietzsche, is 
aware of man’s need to find meaning in his life, and of his metaphysical disposition 
towards security and certainty. In both their accounts, the death of God makes the 
creation of meaning of utmost concern to individuals. For both Nietzsche and 
Morgenthau, the process of meaning creation is central in a time in which the desire 
for self-affirmation clashes with the need to find refuge in the certainty provided by 
universal standards and a universal interpretation. It is a contradictory situation, 
which both interpreters are eager to examine.
In Purpose o f American Politics, Morgenthau admits that, well after the 
weakening of universal moral values, man still values security, preferring ‘the 
certainty of what he has achieved to the risks and promises of further achievements’ 
(Morgenthau 1983, p. 236). However, the act of valuing security, despite knowing 
that ‘beyond the frontiers of his achievements still lie so many new worlds to be 
conquered’ (Morgenthau 1983, p. 236), appears to Morgenthau as detrimental to the 
affirmation of man’s creative potentialities. In a similar vein, he argues that the 
society of present times ‘compels its members to live below their capabilities’, it 
‘misdirects their energies’, and discourages and neglects excellence that does not 
conform (Morgenthau 1983, p. 225). In Morgenthau’s interpretation, by seeking 
security in ‘collective myths’ rather than in his own soul, modem man abandons his 
‘creative solitude’ for a collectivization in which he ‘loses the fearful disquiet in the 
face of the incomprehensible and, with it, the ability to comprehend’ (Morgenthau 
quoted in Russell 1990, p. 77). Morgenthau argues that, instead of seeking comfort in
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the illusion of a universal meaning, what humans must do now is to take advantage 
of the opportunities provided by the ‘death of God’.
Thus, to Morgenthau, like Nietzsche, these times offer men conditions for the 
fuller expression of their potentialities, these times are here to grant them what has 
been long denied -  as Nietzsche asks rhetorically, ‘what could one create if gods 
existed?’ (Nietzsche 1968, p. 122). Moreover, Morgenthau argues that now suffering 
is a main feeling experienced by humans, yet he also highlights the relevance and 
value of creation, in this context -  let us not forget that for Nietzsche, creation was 
‘the great redemption from suffering and life’s growing light’ (Nietzsche quoted in 
Kaufmann 1954, p. 199). Echoing the Nietzschean dictum, Morgenthau pleads for ‘a 
new way of thinking’, for ‘a transformation of man himself in his moral, rational, and 
political qualities’ (Morgenthau quoted in Russell 1990, p. 70). He asks his fellow 
men to put to rest conformism, certainty and security, and to wake up to their 
creative capabilities, letting their imagination accomplish relevant creative tasks. In 
Morgenthau’s view, the death of God should be regarded as an excellent opportunity 
for man to re-invent himself, and such an opportunity should not be missed. As he 
argues in Science: Servant or Master?, a ‘new man’ is set to emerge, one who ‘can 
only create himself step by step, piecemeal, through the absorption of every new 
experience with which the technological age confronts him’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 
71). The ‘death of God’ is definitely a time of taking chances: although unable to live 
without ‘social ties’, the individual alone, in the solitude of his autonomous 
reflection, decides his fate. Man’s future depends ultimately upon himself 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 71).
In such times, when ‘whatever man does or intends to do emanates from himself 
and refers again to himself (Morgenthau 1947, p. 163), Morgenthau argues that the
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human individual’s dynamic, multiply layered nature, should be a main theoretical 
area of concern. As the present analysis demonstrates, Morgenthau taken on a vision 
of the human which echoes Nietzsche’s: the human self stands as a place of 
struggles, overwhelmed by opposed forces. Most importantly, Morgenthau maintains 
that man’s essence comprises a dynamic relation between destruction and 
construction: as he asserts in an unpublished manuscript, ‘man is a mixture of good 
and evil tendencies’ (Lecture 7, 24 April 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 3). 
As Nietzsche once put it, ‘in man there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, 
madness, chaos; but in man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness of the 
hammer, the divine spectator and the seventh day’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 155). For 
Morgenthau as well, as seen from the above quotation, in man “‘creature and 
“creator” are united’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 155). In Kaufmann’s formulation, for 
Nietzsche man is ‘the human and the all-too-human, the superhuman and the 
animalic’ (see Kaufmann 1974, p. 310). As Morgenthau puts this in a published 
work, when he discusses the status of man as the object of study of the social 
sciences, the human individual should not be regarded as a product of nature, ‘but as 
both the creature and the creator of history in and through which his individuality 
and freedom of choice manifest themselves’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 441).
In Morgenthau’s account expressed in Science: Servant or Master?, man once 
‘beheld in shocked wonderment the sun and sea, the beasts and the elements, birth 
and death’; by contrast, he now searches ‘for the understanding and mastery of the 
incomprehensible yet familiar threats emanating from himself (Morgenthau 1972, p. 
29). In Morgenthau’s pessimistic conclusion, the mysteries which man has 
understood and mastered to such an unprecedented extent in inanimate nature, make 
him ‘helpless in the face of human nature, that is, his own’ (Morgenthau 1972, p.
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29). The source of the threat is to be found in the destructive potential, which man 
carries within him. Thus, in man there can be no construction without destruction in 
Morgenthau’ vision. As we will see in chapters 4 and 5 in detail, he is far from 
pleading in favour of purposeless destruction, and advocates actions carried out 
responsibly, and directed towards re-enchantment.
The next section turns to the ‘creature’ facet of man’s nature, mentioned above, 
and to Morgenthau’s interpretation of power as meaning imposition, while the final 
section will examine the ‘creator’ facet, and it will also pave the way to the analysis 
of Morgenthau’s political theory to be undertaken in chapter 4.
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3.2 Man as Creature: the Fight over Power as Meaning Imposition
On many occasions, Morgenthau links his discussion of power as meaning 
imposition with that of the negative outcomes stirred by the ‘death of God’. He is 
aware of the negative potential of the struggle for power understood as action for 
action’s sake, and refers to the latter in negative terms. In Science: Servant or 
Master? for example, he emphasises the dangers likely to follow from the death of 
God. In a time with no values universally endorsed, man returns to an obscurantist, 
aimless activism -  what Morgenthau calls an ‘intoxication of incessant activity’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, pp. 47-8). In his view, man is likely to find in ‘action as such’ the 
highest source of meaning, and he sets out to transform the world through the vital 
force of his individuality (Morgenthau 1972, p. 48). Morgenthau draws our attention 
to the fact that the refuge into action is common to man and beast. Despite this 
similarity, the beast ‘does not need a further refuge because it is not reflectively 
conscious of the insufficiency of action’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 53). Unlike the 
animals, man experiences in action his ‘impotence’ as well: in an interesting 
formulation which echoes Nietzsche’s, Morgenthau tells us that man alone ‘has the 
gift of reflective consciousness, of thinking of the past and the future’ (Morgenthau 
1972, p. 53).
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Morgenthau is keen to emphasise that action for action’s sake does not provide 
man with answers to the ‘metaphysical shock’, that salvation from ‘empirical misery’ 
and ‘metaphysical doubt’ is not possible by means of acting in this way (Morgenthau 
1971, pp. 622-3). He points out that action as such carries no creative force within it, 
and it hardly reconciles the ‘perplexity’ of the human soul with an unfriendly world. 
He argues against filling in the aftermath of the death of God with a philosophical 
attitude which celebrates creativity for its own sake, against succumbing under the 
‘insufficiency of action’, and under an empty activism. Within this context, in his 
essay The Escape from Power, Morgenthau points critically towards totalitarianism, 
as an example of such a philosophical attitude. As he maintains, for the totalitarian, 
power is not only a fact of social life, but also ‘the ultimate standard for judging 
human affairs and the ideal source of all human values’ (Morgenthau 1962a, pp. 316- 
7).
What Morgenthau emphasises -  and this is a very important distinction to draw 
attention to - is the idea that man now has the possibility to engage in genuine 
creative deeds, which are not simply imbued with the glorification of action for 
action’s sake, and of power per se (Morgenthau’s solution advanced against 
meaningless creation/action for action’s sake will be discussed at length in chapter 
5). Thus, starting from the Nietzschean diagnosis of the ‘death of God’, Morgenthau 
follows Nietzsche’s views also concerning human beings’ increased prospects for 
agency manifestation, for individual affirmation, as one of the consequences of this 
‘death’.
In Morgenthau’s interpretation, the human being, a creature who has Tost its 
animal innocence and security’, is now striving to recapture this innocence and 
security ‘in religious, moral and social worlds of its own’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 9).
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These words spell out Morgenthau’s view regarding our times’ creative 
opportunities. Morgenthau implies that this is, indeed, an era that grants man’s 
imagination - which ‘creates new worlds that live after their creator’ (Morgenthau 
1962c, p. 20) - its proper place. For Morgenthau, the social world captures man in his 
overwhelming dynamism, in all his gestures and capacities, as endowed with the gift 
of creating his own interpretation of the world, that is, his own ‘version’ of the 
meaning of existence, his own tablet of values: as Nietzsche himself once put it, now 
each mind ‘creates a meaning for the earth’ (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann 1954, p. 
144). One of the innovative features of the argument of this thesis, which departs 
from materialistic readings of Morgenthau in order to demonstrate the importance of 
the issue of meaning for his discussion of politics, is the focus on Morgenthau’s 
interpretation of creation as the creation of values. Consequently, the argument that 
follows will focus on this particular understanding. This thesis argues that there is no 
better way to grasp Morgenthau’s views on the topic of creation than to analyse the 
concept of ‘power’, which Morgenthau interprets as meaning imposition. The thesis 
maintains that the triad creation-power-meaning imposition works best in spelling 
out Morgenthau’s vision of politics, and it illuminates an understanding of power 
which points to the latter’s creative essence. To Morgenthau ‘power’ is not 
synonymous to a mere act of one’s influencing of the other, but to a creative 
endeavour par excellence, to a creative struggle of imposing particular values and 
interpretations.
Morgenthau makes a distinction between irresponsible power and creation for 
creation’s sake, and responsible power, employed by the superior agent who creates 
and then imposes values which are in accord with the teachings of what Morgenthau 
calls ‘tradition’. In his article The Evil o f Power, published at the beginning of his
136
academic career in the US, and in which we can distinguish reminiscences of his 
personal experience, Morgenthau maintains that power is not a metaphysical 
abstraction ‘which has an essence, a life, a behaviour of its own’ (Morgenthau 1950, 
p. 514). In Morgenthau’s account, power is an intrinsic element of life, which 
manifests itself in various forms, and has a protean nature, changeable and 
contingent -  as he argues, when criticising what he calls ‘bad metaphysics’, ‘the 
metaphysics of power distorts, if it does not blot out, the reality of power’ 
(Morgenthau 1950, p. 515). Moreover, in Morgenthau’s view expressed at length in 
his centrepiece Politics among Nations, ‘power’ stands as ‘man’s control over the 
minds and actions of other men’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 73). As Morgenthau nuances 
his position in a later work, power stands as a psychological relationship in which 
one controls certain actions of another ‘through the influence he exerts over the 
latter’s will’ (Morgenthau 1962c, p. 193). Man’s aspiration for power is not ‘an 
accident’ of history, or a temporary deviation: to Morgenthau, it is ‘an all-permeating 
fact which is of the very essence of human existence’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 312). 
The struggle for power represents ‘a general phenomenon of human life in society 
and must be regarded as such’: our whole social life ‘is interspersed with the element 
of power’, Morgenthau argues in an unpublished lecture (Lecture 7, 16 January 1946, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 5). Last but not least, in a much quoted essay, 
Morgenthau compares love and power -  an unusual comparison by his own account 
-  and concludes that the two are similar since they both try to overcome loneliness, 
and the sense of man’s insufficiency ‘which stems from this loneliness’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 8). Through power, Morgenthau maintains, man ‘seeks to impose his will 
upon another man, so that the will of the object of his power mirrors his own’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 8). Moreover, while love is ‘reunion through spontaneous
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mutuality’, power ‘seeks to create a union through unilateral imposition’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 8).
Petersen emphasises that, like Nietzsche, Morgenthau is preoccupied with 
searching for ‘a new metaphysical principle’ (Petersen 1999, p. 89). Moreover, 
Morgenthau’s thinking - rather than being epistemological or methodological in 
character - is ‘first and foremost metaphysical and ontological’ (Petersen 1999, p. 
89). Petersen argues that Morgenthau’s concept of power ‘represents the next stage 
in his fundamental Auseinandersetzung, or critical encounter, with the modem 
tradition’ (Petersen 1999, p. 90), and that power, or more precisely the lust for 
power, appears like ‘an alternative metaphysical principle through which to make 
intelligible the existence of order’ (Petersen 1999, p. 89). As Petersen argues further, 
for Morgenthau power ‘does not refer to an absolute hovering above or beyond the 
world, but to the quality of the concrete relations through which a world is made to 
stand’ (Petersen 1999, p. 90). The Nietzschean will to power ‘makes unity and 
totality intelligible without grounding them in a higher unity’, and Morgenthau’s 
concept of power appears to Petersen ‘to have such an all-encompassing quality, that 
it gives the lie to the idea that it is simply, as is commonly assumed, to be equated 
with material capabilities’ (Petersen 1999, p. 93).
Petersen’s account is persuasive and important in its findings regarding the 
metaphysical character of Morgenthau’s writings and his views of power in 
particular. This vision of power is forcefully outlined in Morgenthau’s discussions on 
the topic, especially in his assumptions according to which in order for someone to 
have ‘power’, thus ‘to make one’s own person prevail against others’ (Morgenthau 
1947, p. 166), (s)he must exert control over the minds. Such a form of control, 
manifesting itself as one’s ‘rule’ over others’ opinions, decisions and subsequent
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actions, points to intra human relations as the locus clasicus in the shaping of power. 
Moreover, it is clear that it also points towards Morgenthau’s concern with man’s 
creative, interpretative potential. The above-mentioned control refers -  and this is 
one important contribution brought to the ongoing discussion of Morgenthau’s 
theory by the present thesis - to one’s act of imposing a certain ‘version’, a certain 
interpretation of reality, upon the others: a meaning imposition. The present 
reinterpretation thus builds on the findings popularised by Petersen in order to bring 
to light a facet of Morgenthau’s theory which has been neglected by observers: that 
of power as meaning creation and imposition, which exhibits Morgenthau’s concern 
with the idea of meaning in a post-metaphysical world, and demonstrates his 
relevance to current discussions on meaning and truth in modernity and 
postmodemity.
Morgenthau subscribes to an individualist ontology in which meaning imposition 
is less a matter of institutional relations, and more one of individual relations. In 
Morgenthau’s account, power is a relational concept. One’s power needs others’ 
presence and recognition, power belongs to the area of social interactions through 
which humans want ‘to assert themselves as individuals against the world by 
mastering it’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 31), and just like for Nietzsche, it is ‘the 
expression of the se lf.1 This does not mean that Morgenthau overlooks 
institutionally created meaning impositions. Nevertheless, his main concern regards 
the individually created meaning impositions, which shape and transform an ever- 
changing and dynamic social world. What is peculiar to humans, according to 
Morgenthau, is that, by virtue of one of their nature’s features, they continuously
11 am grateful to Sean Molloy for this formulation, articulated at the workshop ‘Rethinking the 
Realist Tradition’, Limerick, 24 November 2007.
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engage in attempts not only to create their own interpretations, but also to impose 
them upon their fellow men -  and, in this context, Morgenthau often points to the 
unilateral imposition which characterises a power relationship (Morgenthau 1962c, p. 
194). For Morgenthau, power is not primarily materialistic but ideational. The 
specific nature of Morgenthau’s conceptualization of power stems from this very 
commitment to an ideational vision of power, in which fight for meaning imposition 
constitutes a fascinating phenomenon, which surfaces after the weakening of 
universal values. Man’s power resides in the success of imposing his interpretation, 
and the human creative capacities are thus channelled into a continuous effort, 
performed by each man, for imposing ‘his’ meaning, his particular position, not by 
virtue of physical force, but of ‘the force of the mind’.
Morgenthau is careful to maintain a well-known Nietzschean distinction. Just as 
for his intellectual mentor, in his ‘last period’ stances, self-preservation was ‘only 
one of the indirect and most frequent consequences’ of the living thing’s desire ‘to 
vent its strength’ (Nietzsche 1990, p. 44), for Morgenthau, humans’ lust for power 
‘concerns itself not with the individual’s survival, but with his position among his 
fellows once his survival has been secured’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 165). Furthermore, 
Morgenthau mirrors the Nietzschean account on the greed for power’s area of 
manifestation: in Morgenthau’s view on the performance of the craving for power in 
the social realm, there is no action ‘which would not contain at least a trace of this 
desire’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 166). As emphasised earlier, here it is obvious that the 
view according to which Morgenthau’s concept of ‘power’ narrowly applies to the 
field of politics is mistaken. As Petersen notes, it ‘applies to the very constitution of 
our being, that underlies and seeks to make intelligible realms of knowledge, 
meaning, and morals -  good an evil, truth and falseness’ (Petersen 1999, pp. 100-1).
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Nietzsche’s ‘will to power’ manifests itself in offering reinterpretations of the world, 
as Nehamas puts it, ‘the greatest means for change, for establishing new conditions 
and creating new values’ (Nehamas 1985, pp. 97, 98) -  and throughout them, new 
meanings. For Nietzsche, ‘to impose upon becoming the character of being’ stands as 
the ‘supreme will to power’ (Nietzsche 1968, p. 330) -  and the latter assertion is 
interpreted by Morgenthau precisely as above, as representing one’s striving to make 
his/her own created meaning prevail. It is this Nietzschean approach to power, 
focusing upon the possibility of human agency in a historical world (see Warren 
1985, p. 183), upon creation as interpretation, and upon struggling for meaning 
imposition that forms the core of Morgenthau’s theory, according to this thesis. The 
present interpretation therefore suggests that in Morgenthau’s world, just like in 
Nietzsche’s, ‘what determines your rank is the quantum of power you are’ (Nietzsche 
1968, p. 457), and the individuals’ awareness of this fact intensifies their appetite for 
such a form of domination. By virtue of one of his nature’s features, Morgenthau’s 
human being is pictured as continuously engaged in a quest for acquiring more and 
more power - interpreted as man’s engagement in a fight to impose the 
meaning/values that he has created, upon the others.
In Morgenthau’s view, humans’ ‘lust for power’ is endowed with a limitless 
character. In Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, he writes that while man’s vital needs 
‘are capable of satisfaction’, the lust for power ‘would be satisfied only if the last 
man became an object of his domination, there being nobody above or beside him’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 165). Taking all these into account, Morgenthau maintains, to 
deny the lust for power would mean to deny ‘the very condition of human existence 
in this world’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 172). As Morgenthau asserts further, when 
comparing man’s lust for power with his inherent selfishness,
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There is in selfishness an element of rationality presented by the natural 
limitation of the end, which is lacking in the will to power. (...) The selfishness 
of man has limits; his will to power has none (Morgenthau 1947, p. 166).
As Morgenthau argues in some of his other works, power tries to break down the 
barrier of individuality (Morgenthau 1962c, p. 192). Moreover, when the imposition 
is successful, it ‘negates the freedom of the individuals over whom it is exercised’ 
(Morgenthau 1950, p. 516). A similar vision of man’s unlimited lust for power is 
i endorsed by Morgenthau in a much commented upon essay called ‘Love and Power’. 
As mentioned briefly earlier, Morgenthau emphasises that ‘what man cannot achieve 
for any length of time through love, he tried to achieve through power: to fulfil 
himself, to make himself whole by overcoming his loneliness, his isolation’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 8). As Morgenthau tells us further, ‘the heights of the master’s 
power signal the depths of his despair’, and the acquisition of power naturally 
‘begets the desire for more, for the more men the master holds bound to his will, the 
more he is aware of his loneliness’ (Morgenthau 1970, pp. 194-5).
Morgenthau thus argues that humans always want more power. Equally 
important to him, however, is the fact that this desire is very likely to trigger 
catastrophic outcomes. Mirroring Nietzsche’s interpretation, Morgenthau argues that 
the human affirmation of power carries within it a highly destructive potential -  see 
Nietzsche’s assessments, for whom power was ‘evil’ (quoted in Kaufmann 1974, p. 
180), and whose ‘demon’ (quoted in Kaufmann 1957, p. 197) humans could not 
escape. Within this context, the ‘evil of power’, and what Morgenthau calls ‘the 
tragic element in life’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 176), are introduced and discussed.
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In Morgenthau’s account, the fight over power/meaning imposition can easily 
generate destruction and tragedy. Power and tragedy are interrelated, and the exercise 
of the former leads to the latter when power escapes humans’ control (and here, once 
again, one notices the metaphysical character of power, as interpreted by 
Morgenthau). What Morgenthau calls the ‘tragic meaning’ of existence, and also its 
‘irrationality’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 174), stem from man’s nature itself, from its 
characteristics - more precisely, from the human limitations exhibited in dealing with 
the lust for power. Here there is a double tragedy however: one originating from a 
gap between longings and the condition in which man finds itself; another which 
stems from the unintentional outcomes brought about by human practice.
Tragedy is a characteristic of human life to which Morgenthau devotes 
significant attention. As he emphasises in a letter to Michael Oakeshott dated 22 May 
1948, ‘I would not for a moment admit that tragedy is a category of art and not of life 
(...). Man is tragic because he cannot do what he ought to do. That contrast between 
duty and ability is a quality of existence, not a creation of art’ (Morgenthau Papers, 
Box 44, page 2). At this point, the positive, creation-affirming potentialities, 
provided by ‘the death of God’, seem to be called into question by an evil coming 
from within the human individuals, nourished by their inherent limitations.
Nietzsche once warned his readers that ‘whoever... wants to gain the 
consciousness of power will use any means’ (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann 1954, p. 
193). Mirroring his mentor’s view, Morgenthau passionately discusses the issue of 
power’s ‘demon’ and ‘evil’. By doing this, he locates himself within a Nietzschean 
milieu, in which the perils and possibilities stirred by the death of God are 
problematized, in a search for a viable solution likely to foster man’s creativity, 
while also imposing certain boundaries to it. In Morgenthau’s view, expressed in
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Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, the human lust for power easily escapes our 
control, it generates evil, and shapes ‘an evil world’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 173), 
where ‘even the action which approximates complete goodness... partakes 
paradoxically of evil’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 165). In this inescapable desire for 
power, contained within our nature, we can localise ‘the element of corruption and of 
sin’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 167). As Morgenthau asserts bleakly, ‘there is no escape 
from the evil of power, regardless of what one does’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 172), and 
‘corruption through power’ makes us all sinners: ‘as soon as we leave the realm of 
our thoughts and aspirations, we are inevitably involved in sin and guilt. (...) 
Whenever we act with reference to our fellow men, we must sin’ (Morgenthau 1947, 
p. 172).
In the first volume of his collection of essays published in 1962, Morgenthau re­
emphasises these ideas, and argues that man ‘cannot help sinning’ when he acts in 
relation to his fellow men: he ‘may be able to minimise that sinfulness of social 
action, but he cannot escape it, for no social action can be completely free of the taint 
of egotism which, as selfishness, pride, or self-deception, seeks for the actor more 
than is his due’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 319). Within his discussion of the evils of 
power, Morgenthau also emphasises that man’s aspiration for power over men denies 
what is the core of Judeo-Christian morality, namely respect for man as an end in 
himself: the power relation ‘is the very denial of that respect; for it seeks to use man 
as means to the end of another man’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 319). In Morgenthau’s 
account, ‘it is the very function of Christian ethics to call upon man to comply with a 
code of moral conduct with which, by virtue of his nature, he cannot comply’, which 
is ‘both unattainable and approachable’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 375). Morgenthau 
implies that most humans try to escape the conflict ‘between what is demanded of us
144
and what we can do’, for to face that conflict ‘’places an intolerable burden either 
upon our actions or our consciences’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 375).
Moreover, in Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau continues arguing along 
this line of thinking, and he maintains that humans’ will to power interposes itself 
between the will to live and the means to that end (see Morgenthau 1972, pp. 31-2), 
and that it orients action toward the achievement of its own end -  that is, ‘the 
accumulation, preservation, and demonstration of power’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 32). 
As Morgenthau tells us further, ‘that will to power not only takes the destruction of 
human life in its stride as a means to that end, but it is predicated upon it’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 32).
In Morgenthau’s view, the lust for power’s ‘evil’ is both intentional and 
unintentional, it is nourished by humans’ employment of malefic means, but also by 
their inability to envisage the consequences of their actions, directed towards 
meaning imposition. Once again, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and Science: 
Servant or Master? offer us valuable insights on Morgenthau’s position on the topic. 
In the former, Morgenthau writes that the human intellect ‘is unable to calculate and 
to control completely’ such consequences (Morgenthau 1947, p. 162). Men cannot 
master their innermost evil accordingly, they cannot ‘domesticate’ its ever expanding 
claims, and, despite their initial intentions - ‘generally good’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 
161) - they are often responsible for the unfolding of events which bring about tragic, 
destructive consequences. Man’s fate seems to be sealed:
Suspended between his spiritual destiny which he cannot fulfil and his animal 
nature in which he cannot remain, he is forever condemned to experience the
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contrast between the longings of his mind and his actual condition as his 
personal, eminently human tragedy (Morgenthau 1947, p. 188).
Meanwhile, in Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau argues that the tragic 
stands as the essence of humans’ suffering, and it is interpreted as ‘consciousness of 
the insufficiency of one’s existence’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 30) -  that is, of the 
limitations outlined above. According to Morgenthau, the awareness of the 
limitations demonstrated in dealing with the lust for power intensifies man’s 
suffering: ‘because he suffers he longs for more consciousness, and the more 
consciousness the more he must suffer’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 30).
As mentioned in the previous section, in opposition to many assessments of 
Morgenthau’s portrait of human nature, a strong case can be made that it actually 
contains two facets, which ‘help’ it to never turn black completely. In Morgenthau’s 
portrait of human nature we can perceive a second facet, of overcoming through 
creation and mastering. This thesis suggests that, in Morgenthau’s interpretation of 
man’s condition, one can also see the Nietzschean theme of overcoming. This is 
attained by humans who have the awareness of the destruction likely to be brought 
by their lust for power, and who also succeed in mastering it. From the same struggle 
for power can, therefore, also spring hope and re-enchantment, and the ‘rejuvenation’ 
of the age - a ‘task of destruction’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 15) - is therefore finalised 
by constructive means.
As Morgenthau implies, through mastering the lust for power, through employing 
power responsibly, man’s actions may account not only for mere destruction, but for 
a destruction which builds the path towards construction and transcendence. Thus, in
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his account, power can cut in different ways, and this ambivalence of power makes 
its analysis replete with difficulties.
After analysing the ‘creature’ facet of Morgenthau’s account of the human, we 
turn now to the development of the argument concerning the positive, constructive 
part of Morgenthau’s theory. The next section will show that in Morgenthau’s 
sophisticated account of man as creator one can perceive Nietzsche’s ‘shadow’, but 
also Max Weber’s.
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3.3 Man as Creator: the Issue of Responsibility
According to a recent assessment performed by Benjamin Mollov, the main 
transcendent elements present in Morgenthau’s thought are: morality in politics and 
statecraft, the responsibility of the intellectual to speak truth to power, the 
importance of philosophy to Morgenthau’s approach, and Morgenthau’s sustained 
emphasis upon the spiritual forces in man and politics (Mollov 2002, p. 22). For 
Mollov, these features support an assertion which only recently has started to gain 
ground: ‘despite his image as a Realpolitik thinker, Morgenthau throughout his 
career grappled with moral, philosophic and spiritual issues’ (Mollov 2002, pp. 31, 
203). The present thesis agrees with these assumptions, but it also attempts to go 
beyond them, and to portray Morgenthau as the proponent of an individualist ethical 
theory which addresses the break up of universal values in order to provide a solution 
likely to support order and re-enchantment. This section investigates some of the 
transcendent elements which make up the ‘constructive part’ of Morgenthau’s 
theory. A more detailed analysis will be made in chapters 4 and 5, which will address 
Morgenthau’s political theory in particular.
As revealed by Mollov, during one of his classes held at the University of 
Chicago at the beginning of his US academic career, Morgenthau asserted that there 
is one thing which distinguishes man from all other living beings: the fact that man
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‘aspires beyond himself, that he has the drive ‘to transcend one’s own natural limits 
and to become more than one is by nature’ (Mollov 2002, p. 50). As Morgenthau 
mentions in his first book published in the United States, this is indeed the 
significance of man’s aristeia, of his ‘heroic struggle to be and to be more than he is 
and to know that he is and can be more than he is’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 189). ‘A 
straw on the waves of that ocean which is the social world’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 
189), the human individual never stops longing for it. In a remarkable paragraph, 
Morgenthau pictures a battlefield, where the human being fights ‘with the forces of 
nature, his fellow-men’s lust for power, and the corruption of his own soul’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, pp. 189-90). In Morgenthau’s vision, the individual partakes in 
this confrontation as an authentic hero, his hopes being nourished by a symbolic 
light, ‘never extinguished’. He is a man by virtue of his creative, constructive 
capabilities and last but not least, his reason. Here it is important to point out that 
Morgenthau’s stance regarding reason, as revealed in this paragraph, does not 
represent a departure from his criticism of the ‘glorification’ of reason, outlined in 
section 3.2. In the paragraph below, Morgenthau perceives human reason as placed 
in the service of creation, and he consequently endows the concept with a positive 
connotation, whereas in the case discussed in section 3.1, he refers to a specific 
application of reason, namely to that embodied by modem science:
Above this struggle, never ended and never decided in the perpetual chance of 
victory and defeat, of life and death, a flame bums and a light shines (...): the 
reason of man, creating and through this creation illumining (...) the symbol of 
man himself, of what he is and of what he wants to be, of his weakness and of his
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strength, of his freedom and of his subjection, of his misery and of his grandeur
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 190).
Moreover, in an article published in 1950, while witnessing the Cold War 
unfolding, and also the behaviourist revolution (which some of his colleagues at the 
University of Chicago were key proponents of), Morgenthau sought to raise 
awareness about the phenomenon of power in international relations, and he 
expressed his fears regarding the ‘evil of power’. An important distinction spelled 
out by Morgenthau is that between what he calls ‘general evils’, which ‘flow from 
the ubiquity of the lust for power’ and, hence, are ‘beyond remedy by human effort’, 
and ‘specific evils’ (Morgenthau 1950, p. 516). The latter are those which result from 
concrete historical circumstances and which can be rectified, according to 
Morgenthau: they are ‘subject to correction by the processes of history, supported by 
conscious human effort’ (Morgenthau 1950, p. 516). In Morgenthau’s account, what 
is needed in this corrective endeavour, first of all, is the grasping of the true, ‘eternal 
laws by which man moves in the social world’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187). Here it is 
not Morgenthau’s intention to refer to laws which have been determined by scientific 
means. By ‘eternal laws’, Morgenthau implies that there are some human 
characteristics - such as the lust for power, and the evil generated by it - that a 
superior character must be aware of, in order to address them straight away, and to be 
able to master them properly. Such wisdom belongs to an exceptional individual, 
who correctly assesses ‘the distribution and relative strength of opposing forces’, 
fighting in their lust for meaning imposition, and who anticipates ‘the emerging 
pattern of new constellations’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187). As Morgenthau tells his 
readers in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, this individual is ‘the true realist’, who
150
‘does justice to the nature of things’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187). Because what he 
experiences stands as ‘the common lot of mankind’, he represents ‘the prototype of 
social man himself (Morgenthau 1947, p. 188); nevertheless, throughout 
overcoming his nature’s evils and, in the end, his overall condition, he represents 
humanity in its superior embodiment: as Morgenthau puts this, ‘the achievement of 
the wisdom by which insecurity is understood and sometimes mastered is the 
fulfilment of human possibilities’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 189).
Morgenthau is particularly interested to analyse this superior character as he 
appears on the international political stage, and not as a prototype of human beings in 
general. Consequently, the remaining part of this section will tackle the concept 
briefly, the detailed analysis being intended to develop in chapters 4 and 5.
In the international political realm, the collapse of the ‘common roof of shared 
values and universal standards of action’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 269), namely of a 
moral realm composed of Christian, cosmopolitan, and humanitarian elements 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 191), has led to a relativism which Morgenthau is aware of, 
and which he often points to throughout his career, as we have already seen. The 
mission to be attained by Morgenthau’s superior individuals in a realm which is so 
difficult to master, proves not to be an easy one, and Morgenthau emphasises this at 
various points in his career. As Morgenthau asserts in Politics among Nations, the 
struggle over power’s amplitude is outstanding - it is a struggle ‘universal in time 
and space’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 16). Meanwhile, in Science: Servant or Master?, he 
argues that power over men represents this struggle’s ‘ultimate standard’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 46). The subtle and complex struggle for the minds of men 
exhibits instability and diversity, and individuals’ actions directed towards imposing 
their particular interpretations, may generate an outstanding destructiveness. Because
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of these threats, the superior character’s task appears to Morgenthau to be more 
important than ever. He argues that in order to be deemed superior, an actor must 
possess wisdom, which he defines as ‘the gift to grasp intuitively the quality of 
diverse interests and power in the present and future, and the impact of different 
actions upon them’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 45). This is not a skill which can be 
learned: it is ‘a gift of nature, like the gift of artistic creativity, or literary style, or 
eloquence, or force of personality’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 45). Morgenthau’s concept 
of superior leadership, as it applies to the field of politics, will be analysed in 
chapters 4 and 5.
Morgenthau argues that, in such an age, a genuinely thoughtful and responsible 
statesman can still appear, and he can create ‘a new society out of his knowledge of 
the nature of man’ (Morgenthau 1947, pp. 187-8). Endowed with a crucial role in 
‘domesticating’ the all encompassing fight over power and ‘the enduring presence of 
evil’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 172), annihilating those many possible negative 
outcomes, Morgenthau’s superior character impresses with his wisdom, calmness 
and ‘pathos of distance’. As will be shown in chapters 4 and 5, while partaking with 
the Nietzschean symbol of the Ubermensch, Morgenthau’s superior actor also echoes 
Weber’s politicised hero, who masters ‘the destructiveness of power politics’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 16) throughout acting with an eye to consequences.
Nietzsche developed the issue of responsibility in his On the Genealogy o f  
Morals, this notion presupposing that man must ‘think in terms of causality, to see 
and anticipate from afar, to posit ends and means with certainty, to be able... to 
reckon and calculate’ (Nietzsche 1996, p. 40). Nietzsche’s position on responsibility 
was later ‘politicised’ by Max Weber (for a lengthy discussion on this topic, see 
Horowitz and Maley 1994), according to whom, by employing an the ethics of
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responsibility, ‘one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one’s actions’ 
(Weber in Gerth and Wright Mills 1948, p. 120). As we will see in the following 
chapters, Morgenthau picks up his mentors’ views on the superior human individual, 
especially within its Weberian, political formulation.
Only ‘philosophers, artists, and saints’ are ‘truly human beings and no-longer 
animals’, Nietzsche once asserted (quoted in Kaufmann 1974, p. 312). In projecting 
his superior hero, Morgenthau appears to follow this other assumption from 
Nietzsche. Morgenthau’s statesman has a good knowledge of human nature’s 
essence. Furthermore, he has ‘a special moral responsibility to act (...) in accordance 
with the rules of the political art’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 159), and his successful 
political action also echoes a well-known Weberian formulation: it is the ‘art of the 
possible’ (Weber 1948, pp. 23-4). The artistic, creative skills exhibited by this 
superior character can succeed in an ocean of evil power, and therefore, their 
importance should never be underestimated: as argued by Morgenthau, the social 
world ‘yields only to that intricate combination of moral and material pressures 
which the art of the statesman creates and maintains’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16). 
Throughout his neverending battle with the conflicting forces of the social field, 
throughout the struggle with his own limitations, with gaining self-knowledge, in 
order to master his inherent evil, and the others’, the statesman becomes the symbol 
of man fulfilling his destiny:
To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political 
wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act 
nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the 
least evil one is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral
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courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral 
destiny (Morgenthau 1947, p. 173).
‘Know thyself; you will then know the others’ inner essence, “tame” your 
common inclination towards evil, and construct’ -  this seems to be Morgenthau’s 
message. He tries to raise awareness that, instead of just passively waiting for a 
prophet to redeem the world, in such an era, humans can engage in a thoroughgoing 
act of self-reflection, and, become aware of their nature and its limitations - more 
precisely, of their lust for power’s evil essence - they can begin their own 
accomplished overcoming. It is here that we can see most clearly that Morgenthau’s 
superior hero resembles the Nietzschean symbol of the Ubermensch -  as a provider 
of ‘the meaning of the earth’ (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann 1954, p. 125), and an 
expression of ‘what man will become when he conquers himself (Jaspers 1965, p. 
128), namely his nature’s passionate longing for power.
This chapter has focused on Morgenthau’s metaphysics, with an emphasis on the 
significance of the ‘death of God’ diagnosis for his metaphysics, and for the 
development of his concern with the issues of meaning and disenchantment. The 
interpretation has thus moved away from materialistic readings of Morgenthau in 
order to point to the foundational assumptions in Morgenthau’s account, and to his 
views regarding the multi-perspectival character of truth and the multiplicity of 
meanings and value interpretations. It has argued that Morgenthau employs a 
nuanced and rich understanding of the power phenomena, which points to power as 
less as a mere influence and more as a creative act, in a league of its own. 
Morgenthau is fascinated with power as a creative value in itself, as interpretation 
and meaning imposition, and he sees the power related phenomena as forming a
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unity in multiplicity. This thesis maintains that following a well-known Nietzschean 
dictum, Morgenthau’s superior characters do destroy, but they destroy ‘only as 
creators’ (Nietzsche 1954, p. 140). In the end their actions, which spring from an 
outstanding effort to overcome the malefic inevitabilities contained within men’s 
nature, are clearly perceived as positive, and they account for what we can call -  
without creating a contradiction in terms - ‘positive destruction’. The difference 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ destruction stems from the actor’s pondering over the 
consequences, and therefore from his acting responsibly: ‘good’ destruction is that 
performed with an awareness of the consequences likely to follow from that 
particular action. Throughout the change of values which they perform, it is from 
these superior heroes that men’s long awaited meaning springs, since ‘what is good 
and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He... creates man’s goal and 
gives the earth its meaning’ (Nietzsche 1954, p. 308).
The next chapter will consider the broadening out of the scope of Morgenthau’s 
metaphysical assumptions, by examining the translation of his metaphysics into an 
interpretation of the political. It will show that Morgenthau’s vision focuses on 
developments such as the disenchantment of politics, which in his view is imperative 
to address after the death of universal values. Morgenthau perceives politics to be a 
realm characterised by intrinsic plurality, dynamic reinterpretations and conflictual 
meanings, and he criticises disenchantment, pointing to the meaninglessness of 
politics triggered by rationalization. The chapter will also shed light on 
Morgenthau’s account of the political embodiment of a constructive force. The 
second part of the chapter will show that Morgenthau’s superior hero is aware of the 
evil of political action, and instead of becoming the victim of a rationalization which
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reduces his creative potentialities, he responsibly affirms his individuality on the 
political stage, and counteracts disenchantment.
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4. The Disenchantment of Politics, and Morgenthau’s Leadership 
Theory
By 1964, Hans Morgenthau regarded the opportunities offered by the social and 
political order more optimistically. When asked about his earlier expressed 
disillusions, he replied (‘Sum and Substance’ interview, Morgenthau papers, Box 
172, p. 5): ‘I’m through with being disillusioned. I try now to come to terms with the 
positive values which human nature and human life, social and political life, 
contain’. At that time, Morgenthau was trying to raise his contemporaries’ awareness 
on the ‘death of God’, and the perils of technological advancement; at the same time 
however, his earlier revolt against disenchantment was tempered by the belief that 
mankind could really use the new potentialities provided by modem technology to its 
advantage, instead of its destmction (see 5th Lecture at the Oriental Institute, 7 April 
1950, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 23). Despite this softening of vision, the 
foundational assumptions embedded in Morgenthau’s theory -  the ‘death of God’, 
the subsequent advent of nihilism and disenchantment, and the fight over power 
interpreted as meaning imposition -  will endure in his account until the very end. 
Towards the end of his career, in Science: Servant or Master?, Morgenthau exposes 
modem man’s anxieties and disappointment with his existence, and argues that many 
dangers are still to be counteracted. In a familiar stance, he criticizes science’s
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disenchantment of human life, and its propensity for duplicity: ‘the same 
technologies produce medicines and poison gas, machines and weapons, nuclear 
energy and nuclear bombs’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 28).
The previous chapter explored Morgenthau’s metaphysics. Now it is time to 
examine the way in which Morgenthau’s diagnosis translates into an understanding 
of politics, and to focus on this in more detail. The present chapter shows that the 
Nietzschean and Weberian dimensions of Morgenthau’s philosophical outlook 
translate into a theory which emphasises politics’ inner dynamics and uniqueness, the 
propensity for political creation - understood as meaning imposition - but also the 
actor’s responsibilities in this regard.
In this interpretation, Morgenthau’s analysis proceeds along two axes: one is 
constituted by the triad truth -  meaning - the death of God, the other by the triad 
power -  politics -  the disenchantment of politics. Lang rightly argues that 
Morgenthau is ‘intensely interested in the intersection of ethics and politics’ (see 
Lang 2004, p. 5). Moreover, as this thesis asserts, Morgenthau’s political theory is 
built upon an acknowledgment of the ‘death of God’ -  of an external moral reference 
point, which could guarantee meaning - which has affected the political space, and of 
the consequences of this ‘death’ upon this space. In modernity, as interpreted by 
Morgenthau, humans live and act politically through values, they propagate values 
which are the end results of laborious interpretative processes. At the same time, a 
consensus upon values such as truth, justice and equality seem impossible to attain. 
As Morgenthau puts it in an article published in 1949, no one could give answers to 
questions regarding these values, which would be more than reflections of his own 
preconceptions, ‘for there are no standards at once concrete and universal enough to 
provide more than ex parte answers to such questions’ (Morgenthau 1949a, p. 211).
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As Morgenthau maintains years later in another writing which indicates his 
continuing interest with this topic, the substance of such answers derives not from 
abstract pronouncements, but from the concrete interests at stake, which ‘give 
concreteness to the abstractions’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 64).
A central feature of Morgenthau’s account is his analysis of what we can call the 
‘disenchantment of politics’, as caused by scientific rationalization. Mirroring 
Weber’s methodological assumptions, Morgenthau argues against ‘importing’ 
methods which belong to natural sciences into the field of the social sciences. 
Moreover, he maintains that in recent times, politics has been diminished in its 
status, and rendered meaningless by attempts to simplify its complex, contingent 
internal processes. In Morgenthau’s account, political scientists do not grasp their 
field of enquiry properly, engage in meaningless empirical investigation, and avoid 
values (see Lang 2004, pp. 22, 24). On the political scene, what Morgenthau calls 
‘the engineer of the revolution’ (Morgenthau 1947, pp. 31-2) is just one example of 
the new type of leader, who has emerged in the aftermath of the rationalist intrusion. 
This is a leader whose thoughts and actions demonstrate his allegiance to technology, 
and who, in Morgenthau’s view, fails to understand political reality properly -  that 
is, the reality of power and of meaning imposition.
The first section of this chapter examines the issues of perspectivism and a larger 
form of relativism in the political realm, and the consequences of these positions, as 
articulated by Morgenthau. In his account, Morgenthau distinguishes between 
domestic and international politics; however, this distinction will not be 
problematized in the present section. Section 2 will then focus on Morgenthau’s 
theory of politics, with a special emphasis on the disenchantment which has occurred 
in this sphere, according to Morgenthau. The examination of the specific
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characteristics of the autonomous sphere of thought and action called ‘politics’ will 
indicate that for Morgenthau politics after the death of God stands as a dangerous 
realm, disenchanted by rationalist approaches, plagued by ideological battles and 
threatened with technological destruction. As this thesis is keen to emphasise, 
Morgenthau returns to the critique of rationalism throughout his life, with views 
unchanged. In modernity, human existence and within it, the sphere of politics itself, 
have been disenchanted, and therefore reduced to calculations which tell us nothing 
about their intrinsic meaning. This is the meaning assigned in the thesis to the 
concept of ‘the disenchantment of politics’.
In Morgenthau’s interpretation of the political, man is the propagator and also the 
victim of the struggle for power - what Morgenthau calls animus dominandi, 
borrowing the term from St. Augustine. This is a force which from time to time 
shakes the social order to its foundations, and administers to our consciousness ‘that 
shock of wonderment that is the beginning of a meaningful science of politics’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 31). As Morgenthau adds, ‘when he can no longer be sure of 
himself, incomprehensible even in his familiar appearance’, man ‘can be saved from 
despair only by an understanding that portends mastery’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 31). 
Subsequently, section 3 argues that in Morgenthau’s vision, salvation from 
metaphysical dread and re-enchantment of the (political) world can only come 
through knowledge. Morgenthau is eager to emphasise that, in the political realm, 
‘true’ knowledge is achieved by ‘genuine’ political actors who employ power 
responsibly and are characterised by detachment and prudence.
The chapter will end by drawing attention to what at first glance may look like a 
contradiction in Morgenthau’s theory: while pointing to the perspectivism and 
relativism which characterise the political realm in the aftermath of the death of God,
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Morgenthau also asserts that in international politics, universal moral values which 
transcend national values must continue to exist. There are sound reasons to argue 
that this sophisticated position does not necessarily constitute a contradiction, but 
stems from the way in which Morgenthau interprets the meaning of politics. This 
topic will be developed in chapter 5.
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4.1 Plurality and Perspectivism in the Political Realm
The previous chapter has provided an analysis of Morgenthau’s metaphysics, 
with an emphasis, amongst other things, on its special understanding of the concept 
of ‘truth’. This section will show that for Morgenthau, the meaning of ‘truth’ in 
modernity represents a scholarly concern which permeates both his metaphysics and 
his political theory, and it will proceed to provide an interpretation of the latter. 
Morgenthau is aware of the importance of truth in the shaping of power, and 
consequently, in his theory of the political, these two concepts are interrelated. In the 
collection of essays Truth and Power, Morgenthau expresses his faith ‘in the power 
of truth to move men -  and, more importantly, statesmen -  to act’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 5). In Morgenthau’s account, power ‘needs truth to be wise and great’, and 
by the standards of truth, the men of power are ultimately judged (Morgenthau 1970, 
p. 33). Moreover, Morgenthau argues that the decisive distinction between the 
intellectual and the politician lies in their orientation toward different ultimate 
values. Despite this incompatibility, the two worlds are potentially intertwined, ‘for 
truth has a message that is relevant to power, and the very existence of power has a 
bearing upon the expression and the recognition of truth’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 14).
Morgenthau’s ‘basic commitment’ (Molloy 2004, p. 1) to the discovery of the 
truth of politics, and to the disentangling of the relationship between truth and power,
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is exacerbated by the awareness that the place of truth as a universally valid principle 
is occupied by a multiplicity of different truths in the aftermath of the death of God. 
The previous chapter showed that by adopting this position regarding the plurality of 
truths which characterises modernity, Morgenthau agrees with relativism, as a 
philosophical orientation which implies that there are many kinds of truth, and that 
what counts as true in a given context ‘depends upon the conventions of particular 
societies, traditions, scientific paradigms, or modes of discourse’ (Nardin 1988, pp. 
150-1). Furthermore, Morgenthau’s interest in the concept of ‘truth’ transpires in his 
diagnosis of political modernity which emphasises perspectivism. As Morgenthau 
explains in Science: Servant or Master?, the individual looks at the political scene 
from a perspective which is determined by his philosophy, and which he will share 
with some, but not with others (Morgenthau 1972, p. 31). For Morgenthau, in every 
truth there is a perspective. As he states his assumption most clearly (albeit in a 
somewhat informal manner) in one of his unpublished lectures,
One observer may stand at one end of the valley, another at the opposite end (...), 
still another is on the summit of a mountain, and finally someone stands at its 
foot, and each one of them sees entirely different things (undated lecture, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 10).
Morgenthau’s endorsement of perspectivism and of a certain degree of relativism 
shows up at various points in his career. A good example arises in his discussion of 
the meaning of the political scientist’s membership of a pluralistic society, such as 
the US. Here, Morgenthau says, the scholar is simultaneously a member of ‘a 
multiplicity of sectional societies of a religious, political, social, and economic
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character, all exerting parallel or contradictory pressures upon him’ (Morgenthau 
1955, p. 38). As Morgenthau points out, all these groups are ‘committed to a 
particular social “truth”’, and the political scientist ‘cannot help deviating from one 
or the other of these “truths” if he does not want to forego his moral commitment to 
discovering the truth of society altogether’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 38), and towards 
imposing a universalization of values and truth.
Furthermore, in an article written in 1955, Morgenthau maintains that the 
political scientist’s mind is ‘moulded’ by the society which he observes, and from 
this it follows that the observer’s mind is by its very nature ‘unable to see more than 
part of the truth’ (Morgenthau 1955, pp. 445-6). The truth ‘which a mind thus 
socially conditioned is able to grasp is likewise socially conditioned’ (Morgenthau 
1955, pp. 445-6), and taking into account these observations, Morgenthau concludes 
that ‘the truth of political science is of necessity a partial truth’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 
445). As argued by Morgenthau in one of his early lectures held at the University of 
Chicago,
If you ask what is the truth with regard to a particular problem of foreign affairs 
and you consult five books written respectively by an American, an Englishman, 
a Russian, a Frenchman, and a Chinese, you will find you have, if not five 
different truths, then five formulations of truth, stressing different points of view 
(Lecture 7, 16 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 6).
Meanwhile, in Science: Servant or Master? Morgenthau maintains that the 
political scientist is ‘a product’ of the society which it is his mission to understand’ 
(Morgenthau 1972, p. 36), and that the influence of the observer’s personal
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perspective upon the ‘truth’ must always be taken into account. Consequently, the 
political theorist has to face two limitations: the limitation of origin, ‘which 
determines the perspective from which he looks at society’, and the limitation of 
purpose, which ‘makes him wish to remain a member in good standing of that 
society, or even to play a leading role in it’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 31).
Morgenthau’s commitment to perspectivism and a certain degree of relativism 
also shows up in his interpretation of some of the political processes which 
characterise democratic regimes. In a statement before the US Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights, which echoes those of his fellow academic and friend 
Hannah Arendt, Morgenthau emphasises that democracy is predicated upon a 
pluralism of persons, political philosophies, and policies, vying for political power (1 
March 1973, Morgenthau Papers, Box 107, p. 3). Meanwhile, in a paragraph quoted 
by Lang, Morgenthau explains that in such a political order, people implicitly 
endorse a relativistic conception of truth and virtue. As Morgenthau puts it, in a 
democracy, you believe in your own truth, but you also ‘don’t deny the possibility 
that the other side might also have a parcel of truth’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lang 
2004, p. 37). In Morgenthau’s understanding of the democratic phenomena, ‘since 
relativism assumes that there is no absolute truth, at least no absolute truth 
recognizable or intelligible by man, you have to give all groups within the state an 
equal chance to prove their truth’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lang 2004, p. 37). From 
Morgenthau’s perspective, democratic elections are just one example of this fight 
over truth, which he is interested in depicting: by means of the electoral process, 
‘you give the other side a chance to make its claim prevail, and put the different 
truths that fight with each other to the scrutiny of the electorate’ (Morgenthau quoted 
in Lang 2004, p. 86).
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When referring to the international political sphere, which makes up his main 
area of enquiry and reflection, Morgenthau maintains that here the appeal to moral 
principles ‘has no concrete universal meaning’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 35). To act in 
this realm means to act in a sphere whose features are very different from the past, 
which has undergone transformations of an unprecedented novelty and magnitude 
(Morgenthau 1982, p. 39). Morgenthau emphasises the magnitude of the 
transformations within the international political scene in writings published at 
various stages in his career, and his analysis is contextually bounded. As he explains 
in his 1962 collection of essays published at the height of the Cold War, the 
international realm has been transformed by three great revolutions in his view: the 
political revolution, which ‘has destroyed the modem pluralistic state system and 
replaced it with a bipolar world’; the technological revolution, which ‘has created the 
technical means both for the total destmction and the total unification of the world’; 
last but not least, the moral revolution ‘has split the world into two hostile camps, 
divided not only by political interests but also by political philosophies and ways of 
life’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 83).
For Morgenthau however, the fundamental transformation is represented by the 
collapse of universal norms. As he states in one of his unpublished lectures given in 
1946, on the international scene there is no working system of ethics (Lecture 25, 
11 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 10), this ethics is extremely weak 
and inefficient. No particular interpretation of moral principles is able to prevail, and 
so you arrive not only at a political and social, but also at a moral anarchy (Lecture 
28, 18th March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 4). Morgenthau refines his 
interpretation a few years later, in Politics among Nations, and here he spells out the 
meaning which he assigns to the notion of the ‘death of God’ most clearly: in
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international politics, the ‘death of God’ is interpreted by Morgenthau as the ‘death’ 
(disintegration) of an international morality ‘composed of Christian, cosmopolitan, 
and humanitarian elements’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 14). Morgenthau does not hide his 
nostalgic yearning for the way in which, in his view, international relations used to 
be conducted in the past: where there used to be consensus, now there is moral 
dissolution. In Morgenthau’s account, the ‘golden age of isolated normalcy’ - and 
here Morgenthau employs an idealized vision of the past represented by the 18th and
tVi19 centuries - is gone ‘forever’ in the realm of international politics, and no effort, 
however great, and no action, however radical, will bring it back’ (Morgenthau 1949, 
p. 219).
Morgenthau argues that as a consequence of the ‘empty transcendent space’ 
referred to earlier, moral principles once endowed with universal meaning such as 
justice or equality, are now capable of guiding political action ‘only to the extent that 
they have been given concrete content and have been related to political situations by 
society’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 38). A good example is represented by Morgenthau’s 
interpretation of the means-ends relation. In the aftermath of the ‘death of God’, 
following the escalation of perspectivism and relativism, the relation means-ends 
becomes ‘artificial and particular’, and open to debates: Morgenthau maintains that 
one may argue form the point of view of a particular political philosophy, but one 
‘cannot prove from the point of view of universal and objective ethical standards that 
the good of the end ought to prevail over the evil of the means’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 
8). In Morgenthau’s interpretation, what is the end for one group of persons may be 
used as means by another group, and vice versa. The means-end relation has ‘no 
objectivity’, and ‘is relative to the social vantage point of the observer’ (Morgenthau 
1945, p. 8).
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The supposed universal and static meaning of the concept of equality is 
questioned by Morgenthau in a similar manner: as Lang interprets Morgenthau’s 
position on the topic, ‘our conception of equality is determined by certain ethical and 
cultural preconceptions that are subject to change in time’ (Lang 2004, p. 44).
In a similar fashion, to Morgenthau the idea of universal and absolute freedom 
represents a contradiction in terms, since in any given society not everyone can be as 
free as anyone else, there being differences in the degree of freedom enjoyed. 
Moreover, as he maintains in an undated manuscript, freedom is not a condition of 
empirical existence, but of moral existence (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 199). 
Thus, it applies to the moral realm of our being, with all its creative, interpretative 
qualities. In Morgenthau’s view, freedom has two incompatible meanings, which 
derive from two incompatible positions and perspectives: freedom for the holder of 
political power signifies the opportunity to exercise political domination, while 
freedom for the subject means the absence of such domination. Furthermore, the 
concept of freedom appears ambivalent to Morgenthau. As he suggests in an 
unpublished version of ‘Dilemmas of Freedom’, most members of society experience 
two forms of freedom at the same time: ‘the freedom of the many to compete in the 
marketplace for acceptance of their different truths requires the abrogation of the 
freedom of one to impose his conception of truth upon all’ (undated, Morgenthau 
Papers, Box 111, p. 2).
Closely related to Morgenthau’s concept of freedom is that of justice, which 
bears Nietzschean reminiscences too. Justice, immortality, freedom, power, and love 
are the poles which in Morgenthau’s view attract and thereby shape the thoughts and 
actions of men. Man can experience the latter three; what he cannot have, says 
Morgenthau in Truth and Power, is the kind and quantity of freedom, power, and
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love he would like to have (Morgenthau 1970, p. 61). With justice, as with 
immortality, it is different: ‘the question here is whether man can have it at all’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 61). Even if assuming the reality of justice, men are incapable 
of realising it: in Morgenthau’s harsh conclusion, men are too ignorant, too selfish, 
and too poor to do what justice demands of them (Morgenthau 1970, p. 67).
A very important assumption within Morgenthau’s account concerns the non­
existence of a concept of justice with a universal meaning. Morgenthau argues that 
justice is relative, and that instead of ‘justice’ one finds interests, which represent 
dividing universals: ‘powerful and weak alike now tend to think of justice as being 
synonymous with personal interests’ (see Morgenthau 1970, pp. 61, 62). In 
Morgenthau’s view, man equates ‘with a vengeance’ his vantage point and justice 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 65), and all men look at the world, and judge it, from the 
vantage point of their interests (Morgenthau 1970, p. 64). In Morgenthau’s view, 
from an empirical perspective, following the death of God, there are as many 
conceptions of justice as there are vantage points, and ‘the absolute majesty of justice 
dissolves into the relativity of so many interests and points of view’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 64). Moreover, turning Kant’s categorical imperative upside down, men take 
for granted, says Morgenthau, that the standards of judgment and action produced by 
the peculiarities of their perspective can serve as universal laws for all mankind’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 64) -  and here, once again, the spectre of meaning imposition 
enters the picture. In the international political sphere, there is no society above 
national societies to comprehend them all, and from this Morgenthau concludes in 
Politics among Nations that justice among nations ‘has no concrete universal 
meaning’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 211).
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A similar vision informs Morgenthau’s interpretation of human rights, as a 
concept endowed by some with universal acceptance. Such an understanding of 
human rights is criticised by Morgenthau on the basis of the same perspectivist and 
relativist principles, and he responds to the US proponents of this meaning of human 
rights. As Morgenthau contends in his famous 1979 Carnegie Council for Ethics in 
International Affairs lecture, human rights ‘are filtered through the intermediary of 
historic and social circumstances, which will lead to different results in different 
times and under different circumstances’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 15). Subsequently, 
Morgenthau objects to the concept of rights, and uses instead the formulation ‘basic 
interests’, whose expression may vary at different times and in different places 
(Morgenthau 1979, p. 15). As he states, the attempt to impose upon the rest of the 
world the respect for human rights is a daring and ignorant endeavour, throughout 
which an abstract principle is ‘presented to the rest of mankind not for imitation, but 
for acceptance’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 5). By contrast to these tendencies, according 
to Morgenthau, diversity must be preserved and respect for it strengthened.
As seen above, Morgenthau problematizes the existence of concepts endowed 
with a universal meaning in politics, both domestic and international, and raises 
awareness on the demise of international morality in the political realm. Most 
importantly, in Morgenthau’s account, the rise of nationalism represents one of the 
decisive phenomena which have brought about the collapse of the international 
society within which the international morality had operated.
The ‘mechanics’ behind nationalism’s manifestation in the international realm is 
simple to Morgenthau: as he puts it in Politics among Nations, since, within the 
national community, ‘only a relatively small group permanently yields power over 
great numbers of people’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 74), the ‘powerless’ experience an
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overwhelming frustration, and they ‘project those unsatisfied aspirations unto the 
international scene’ -  and this unsatisfied lust for power forms the essence of 
nationalism in Morgenthau’s account (Morgenthau 1949, p. 74). Surprisingly for 
Morgenthau, the identification With the nation is not condemned, but highly regarded 
by modem society, which ‘encourages and glorifies’ the population’s tendencies ‘to 
identify itself with the nation’s struggle for power on the international scene’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 75). The moral principles which are invoked in international 
affairs are after the death of God ‘completely distorted in practical application by the 
national egotisms of the individual nations’, and they turn into ideologies (Lecture 
28, 18 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 2). On the international scene, 
the multiplicity of nations maintains the competition for meaning imposition alive, 
and the disintegration of the international morality mentioned above is thus 
continued, until one side wins and imposes a certain morality for a while. As 
Morgenthau maintains in one of his unpublished lectures dated 18th March 1946, this 
confrontation is infinitely subtle, and it is driven by the passionate desire to attain the 
goal of meaning imposition: ‘this is not a stmggle between good and evil, tmth and 
falsehood, but of power with power’ (Lecture 28, 18 March 1946, Morgenthau 
Papers, Box 169, p. 3).
Morgenthau’s distaste for nationalism is obvious. Nationalism -  ‘this nervrose 
nationale’ (Nietzsche quoted in Strong 2000, p. 210) - provides ‘an artificial and 
“overly modest” meaning for life’ (Nietzsche quoted in Strong 2000, p. 210). To 
Morgenthau, it is an ‘abstraction’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 73), which moreover 
encourages conformism, and thus denies the manifestation of individuals’ creative 
powers. What is more dangerous is that, while looking for the international success 
of a particular nation’s interpretation of reality, people embrace what Morgenthau
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calls the ‘new morality of nationalism’, which is ‘not universalistic and 
humanitarian, but particularistic and exclusive’ (Morgenthau 1949, pp. 190, 191). 
Individuals’ outstanding feelings of insecurity and frustration have given rise to an 
increased desire for compensatory identification with the collective national 
aspirations for power’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 268), and to what Morgenthau calls 
‘nationalistic universalism’, for whom the nation is ‘the starting point of a universal 
mission, whose ultimate goal reaches the confines of the political world’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 269). At present, Morgenthau asserts in Politics among 
Nations, on the international scene, such aspirations are ‘supported by virtually total 
populations, with an unqualified dedication and intensity of feeling’ (Morgenthau 
1949, p. 79), exposing ‘the fervor of a secular religion’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 77), 
and the aura of a prophetic mission:
Carrying their idols before them, the nationalistic masses of our time meet in the 
international arena, each group convinced that it... does for humanity what it 
seems to do for itself, and that it fulfils a sacred mission ordained by 
providence.... Little do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which 
the gods have departed (Morgenthau 1949, p. 196).
Morgenthau’s assessment of the modem state is equally critical, and it echoes the 
Nietzschean Zarathustra’s words. ‘The new idol’, the ‘coldest of all cold monsters’, 
God’s fake ‘ordering finger’, the place ‘where the slow suicide of all is called 
“life”’(Nietzsche 1968, pp. 160, 161, 162) - this is the way in which Nietzsche 
describes the state, by means of his prophet’s voice. In his turn, Morgenthau 
perceives it as a ‘legal fiction’ and a ‘mortal God’, and by employing this latter
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formulation, Morgenthau emphasises the state’s importance in the modern age: ‘for 
an age that believes no longer in an immortal God, the state becomes the only God 
there is’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 169). In Morgenthau’s account, the modem nation­
state has become in the secular sphere ‘the most exalted object of loyalty on the part 
of the individual, and at the same time the most effective organization for the 
exercise of power over the individual’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 169). Morgenthau notes 
that ‘while society puts liabilities upon aspirations for individual power, it places 
contributions to the collective power of the state at the top of the hierarchy of values’ 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 169). It is clear that for both Nietzsche and Morgenthau 
therefore, the modem state turns into a structure which suppresses agency’s 
manifestation, draining ‘the potential sources from which creation of new values 
could come’ (Strong 2000, p. 205), and humans become prisoners within its cage. In 
this way, the state exercises not only the well-known ‘monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber 1948, p. 78), but also a monopoly 
of meaning, which Morgenthau is keen to criticize (this does not mean, however, that 
Morgenthau is anti-statist and agrees with the withering away of the state, or that he 
encourages unbound, unregulated action/creation. This point will be addressed in the 
thesis later on). Furthermore, the state exhibits a false, pseudo-encouragement of 
individuals’ affirmation, throughout a process empty of substance, of authenticity: as 
one of Nietzsche’s interpreters puts it, in reality, ‘there is no creating will behind it, 
no public arena except the shadow of a dead God’ (Strong 2000, p. 205).
Having outlined Morgenthau’s foundational commitments to perspectivism and 
to a larger form of relativism (which are pivotal for the development of his political 
theory), and also his position on concepts such as truth, justice and equality, we now 
turn to the articulation of his vision of politics and political power. Section 4.2 will
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provide an analysis of the specific nature of politics, with an emphasis on its 
dynamic, confrontational but also creative nature. While praising politics as the 
manifestation of creative individual forces, Morgenthau is also aware of the 
individual’s fight for meaning imposition, with both its negative and positive likely 
outcomes. In Truth and Power, Morgenthau claims that ‘we take it for granted that 
the standards of judgment and action produced by the peculiarities of our perspective 
can serve as universal laws for all mankind’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 64). ‘It is not so 
much morality which limits individual interests, but the individual interests which 
identity themselves with morality’, Morgenthau maintains (Morgenthau 1970, p. 69). 
Morgenthau holds to a universal core of values in order to avoid the likely 
destructive outcomes of the struggle for power, and this makes up a position which 
will be analysed in section 4.3 and then in chapter 5 in more detail.
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4.2 On Politics as a Quest for Power, and the Perils of 
Disenchantment
In an interview given in 1964, Hans Morgenthau argues that politics ‘has really 
not the aim to make people better, or to alleviate their pain or their misery’ (‘Sum 
and Substance’, Morgenthau papers, Box 172, p. 2). On the contrary, it has ‘the aim 
of maintaining or increasing or destroying, as the case may be, the power of one man 
or one group of men as over the power of another man or of another group of men’ 
(‘Sum and Substance’ interview, Morgenthau Papers, Box 172, p. 2). This is 
Morgenthau’s account made public in the same discussion in which he expressed his 
optimism regarding the potentialities offered by modernity’s political realm. For 
Morgenthau politics can only be about power, understood as a fierce contest for the 
imposition of interpretations among creative and dynamic actors. Morgenthau adds 
in the discussion referred to above that the problem and ‘secret’ of politics consists in 
finding a balance between freedom and order. Taking into account the diversity of 
contexts and the unpredictability of developments within the political sphere, the 
solution to this problem is ‘always dynamic and at the same time precarious’. It 
follows then, that the task of politics is ‘never ended’ (‘Sum and Substance’ 
interview, Morgenthau Papers, Box 172, p. 2).
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Following the Nietzschean vision of the will to power, Morgenthau emphasises 
the unpredictability, fluctuating and pervasive quality of the concept. In one of his 
early, unpublished lectures, he maintains that power is never anything stable, 
anything which is defined once and for all, but is in constant flux, and it must always 
be conceived in relative terms (see Lecture 7, 16 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, 
Box 169, p. 8). Meanwhile, in an article published in 1955, Morgenthau emphasises 
that power is the very ‘life blood of the action’, and the struggle for power - 
‘elemental, undisguised, and all-pervading’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 454) - stands as a 
phenomenon which makes up a unity in multiplicity. Last but not least, in 
Morgenthau’s view, expressed in The Decline o f Democratic Politics, the 
phenomenon of power and the configurations to which it gives rise play ‘an 
important, yet largely neglected, part in all social life’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 50).
The vision of power which transpires is that of an entity which is always 
changing, and whose agents are engaged in unpredictable actions, with uncertain 
outcomes. For Morgenthau, politics is an open question, dynamic and with a life of 
its own, and it can endow human existence with significance. Following the death of 
God, Morgenthau maintains, men must seek to actively participate in politics, to 
make decisive choices, their involvement and actions being likely to save them from 
the pitfalls of bureaucratization. Morgenthau is keen to criticise the scientific 
embodiment of reason for its conception of politics and for its attempts directed 
towards meaning imposition, which lead to the disenchantment of politics in his 
view.
Morgenthau brings power to the centre of his theory, and builds his account on a 
universalist assumption. In Petersen’s view, as it was the case with Nietzsche, for 
Morgenthau, ‘the hope of identifying an Archimedean point of incontestable
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knowledge and pure identity is a mirage’, and Morgenthau’s concept of power 
‘appears to be rooted in an attempt to frame the totality of relations that make up a 
world at any one time, without reducing them to a single principle’ (Petersen 1999, 
pp. 88-9). Morgenthau explains the need for such a concept in his article ‘Power as a 
Political Concept’, in which he emphasises that by making power its central 
principle, a theory of politics ‘does not presume that none but power relations control 
political action’ (Morgenthau 1971a, p. 31). What Morgenthau draws attention to at 
this point is the theoretical need to establish such a conceptual point of reference. To 
quote Morgenthau’s detailed account of his position, a theory of politics must 
presume
the need for a central concept which allows the observer to distinguish the field 
of politics from other social spheres, to orient himself in the maze of empirical 
phenomena which make up the field of politics, and to establish a measure of 
rational order within it. A central concept, such as power, then provides a kind of 
rational outline of politics, a map of the political scene (Morgenthau 1971a, p. 
31).
As seen in the previous section, the human individual is always center staged by 
Morgenthau. In his account, not all action is political but only that which involves 
human agents who strive to gain power by imposing their particular interpretations 
upon the others. There are strong grounds indeed for arguing that Morgenthau’s is a 
politics mainly made up by individuals. As Morgenthau states in a relevant article 
published early in his career, on the political scene ‘it is always the individual who 
acts, either with reference to his own ends alone or with reference to the ends of
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others’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 8). Morgenthau argues further that the action of 
society, of the national, or of any other collectivity, political or otherwise, as such 
‘has no empirical existence at all’. What empirically exists are always the actions of 
individuals ‘who perform identical or different actions with reference to a common 
end’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 8). Unsurprisingly then, Morgenthau’s definition of 
political power expressed in Politics among Nations points to the human being, and 
to his nature, as the reference point. Power stands as ‘man’s control over the minds 
and actions of other men’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 73), it consists in ‘the psychological 
relations between two minds’, giving those who exercise it ‘control over certain 
actions of those over whom it is exercised’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 14). Moreover, as 
Morgenthau explains in his article The Evil o f Power, power can be conceived of as 
‘a quality of a certain individual in his relations with another individual’: ‘in this 
sense we can say that A has power over B or that B fears the power of A’ 
(Morgenthau 1950, p. 514). Certain people have enormous power drives, while 
others have moderate power drives, and others have very little, if any. Despite these 
differences in degree, there is no difference in kind to Morgenthau.
In Morgenthau’s view, one cannot understand politics, and international affairs in 
particular, ‘without being aware always that what is happening on the political, and 
more particularly on the international, scene is only a particular application of 
something which is innate in every human being, an application to collectivities of 
certain elemental motivations which operate in each individual man’ (Lecture 7, 16 
January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 9). As he restates this in an 
unpublished manuscript, ‘the nature of politics is linked to the nature of man in its 
origin, in its substance, and in its immediate goal. We envisage the political as a 
force inherent in each individual and directed toward other individuals’ (Morgenthau
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quoted in Frei 2001, p. 198). These assumptions are fundamental to Morgenthau’s 
theory, and he reiterates them at various points in his career: in his first two books 
published in the US, what Morgenthau calls the ‘elemental bio-psychological drives’ 
- ‘the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate’ - are common to all men 
(Morgenthau 1949, p. 17), and politics is rooted in this common lust for power 
(Morgenthau 1947, p. 16). As Morgenthau often emphasises, ‘there can be no actual 
denial of the lust for power without denying the very conditions of human existence 
in this world’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 15), since ‘there is no social action which would 
not contain at least a trace of this desire to make one’s own person prevail against 
others’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 17). Meanwhile, in his collection of essays published 
in 1962, Morgenthau similarly argues that society is a product of human nature, and 
the drive to dominate manifests itself ‘whenever human beings live in social contact 
with each other’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 73). Moreover, in the context of his 
unpublished university lectures, he emphasises that power is always the power of 
man over man, and the striving and struggle for power is not a phenomenon of the 
political scene alone , but ‘a general phenomenon of human life in society’ (Lecture 
7, 16 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 5). Politics is therefore not so 
much a separate sphere of practice defined by a particular principle, but one which 
concerns the intensification of a particular manifestation which exists in all forms of 
interaction. Man’s aspiration for power is not an accident of history, but ‘an all- 
permeating fact which is of the very essence of human existence’ (Lecture 7, 16 
January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 10), a universal experience of 
humanity:
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It finds in politics its most extreme and most violent and brutal manifestation, but 
it is everywhere, hidden behind ideologies, disguised by the conventions of the 
good society. It is to be found wherever men live together in social groups, and 
that is everywhere (Lecture 7, 16 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 
9).
For Morgenthau, the political world encompasses the fight over power, as an 
intrinsic element of social relations (Lecture 7, 16 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, 
Box 169, p. 6), diverse in its manifestations and unpredictable in its outcomes: 
politics makes up ‘a universal force inherent in human nature, and necessarily 
seeking power over other men’ (see for example Morgenthau 1972, p. 31). Politics 
nourishes a permanent struggle, whose immediate goal is power, and the modes of 
acquiring, maintaining, and demonstrating power ‘determine the technique of 
political action’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16). For Morgenthau, this struggle is fierce, 
and it accounts for the brutality exhibited by what he takes to be the facts of political 
life. The specificity of politics as a sphere of practice resides in this ongoing 
competition directed towards meaning imposition, and its constituting actors are 
eager to make their own interpretation ‘the truth’ for all, adopted and recognised as 
such. The change of the meaning at stake in the political game is achieved at the end 
of a demanding battle over power, and the successful meaning imposition exercised 
by an actor is reflected in the others’ following of it. Morgenthau argues that 
throughout this fierce struggle for meaning imposition, truth becomes a mere 
function of political power: ‘who has the power to say what truth is will make truth’ 
(Lecture 4,12 April 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 18).
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Important for the present discussion is Morgenthau’s assumption according to 
which power can be experienced, evaluated, guessed at, but it is ‘not susceptible to 
quantification’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245). As Morgenthau explains in Truth and 
Power, certain elements that go into the making of power, be it individual or 
collective, can be quantified. Nevertheless, we should not make the mistake to equate 
such quantifiable elements with ‘power as such’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245). In 
Morgenthau’s example, it is certainly ‘possible and necessary’ to determine how 
many votes a politician controls, but these are not a reliable indicator of how much 
power that political actor actually has (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245). In Morgenthau’s 
categorical formulation, if one wants to know how much power this politician or that 
government has, he ‘must leave the adding machine and the computer for historical 
and necessarily qualitative judgment’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245).
These statements represent a good introduction to the main theme of this chapter: 
‘the disenchantment of politics’. In Morgenthau’s view, in modernity, human 
existence and within it the sphere of politics itself have been disenchanted, which 
means that they have been subjected to, and reduced to, calculations which tell us 
nothing about their intrinsic meaning. There is a strong case that disenchantment is 
central to Morgenthau’s understanding of modem politics, and in the articulation of 
this topic, Morgenthau mirrors Weber’s criticism regarding the consequences of 
rationalism, and the employment of methods pertaining to the natural sciences in the 
domain of the social sciences in particular. As Molloy puts it, unsurprisingly given 
his background and training, Morgenthau’s political science ‘was derived from the 
German understanding of science as Wissenschaft, and was essentially hermeneutic 
rather than “scientific” in the Anglo-American understanding of that word’ (Molloy 
2004, p. 6).
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As we saw when examining Weber’s position on the issue of disenchantment, 
Weber argued that that the increasing intellectualization and rationalization of 
modem life ‘do not lead to an increased and general knowledge of the conditions 
under which one lives’ (Weber 1948, p. 32). The present thesis contends that this 
view stands as a leitmotif for Morgenthau’s approach on the issue too. A crucial 
problematic to Morgenthau, at first he deals with it in the context of his confrontation 
with the post-war US so-called ‘behavioralist revolution’, which he witnessed 
unfolding at the University of Chicago. Nevertheless, he returns to the critique of 
rationalism throughout his life, and his views do not change. Rationalist attempts 
have rendered politics meaningless, and Morgenthau fights against this tendency, 
continuously trying to raise awareness that the ‘truth’ of political science is not 
mainly about international treaties or institutional reform. On the contrary, it is the 
tmth about power, ‘its manifestations, its configurations, its limitations, its 
implications, its laws’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 446), about power, with all its arrogance 
and blindness, its limits and pitfalls (see Morgenthau 1970, p. 28).
In The Decline o f Democratic Politics, Morgenthau explores this issue at length, 
and he draws readers’ attention to the fact that political problems ‘grow out of certain 
conflicts of interests, certain antagonisms which no amount of knowledge can 
eliminate as such’(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 313). Such problems can simply not be 
solved ‘by the invention of a mechanical formula, which will allow mankind to 
forget about them and turn its attention toward a non-yet solved political problem’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 313). Being projections of human nature into society, 
Morgenthau maintains, such problems cannot be settled at all: they ‘can only be 
restated, manipulated, and transformed, and each epoch has to come to terms with 
them anew’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 313). In Morgenthau’s bleak conclusion, politics
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dies, and its meaning is lost at the hands of scientism: ‘the ideal of scientism as 
applied to politics is the disappearance of politics altogether’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 
313).
Morgenthau argues that the experience of the bureaucratization and 
mechanization of social life and the consequent diminution of the human person are 
‘particularly pronounced in the political sphere’, (Morgenthau 1970, pp. 436-7). 
Contemporary political relationships are marked by an unprecedented discrepancy in 
power between the wielder of power and its object, and power ‘overwhelms the 
individual not only by its irresistibility, but also because of its mechanized and 
bureaucratized nature, by its unfathomable anonymity’ (Morgenthau 1970, pp. 436- 
7). In Morgenthau’s view, the individual lives ‘in something approaching a 
Kafkaesque world, insignificant and at the mercy of unchallengeable and invisible 
forces’ (Morgenthau 1970, pp. 436-7). Within this context, Morgenthau repeatedly 
emphasises ‘the unbridgeable gap’ that exists between the reality of the political 
issues with which humans must come to terms, and the modes of thought and action 
by which they are being governed (see Morgenthau 1972, p. 189). In Truth and 
Power, he warns his readers that theoretical understanding ‘cannot say, with any 
degree of certainty, which of the alternatives is the correct one and will actually 
occur’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 256), while in Science: Servant or Master?, he states 
that in the ‘real’ political world, man ‘cannot afford to treat political problems as 
though they were scientific ones’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 61). Moreover, in an early 
unpublished speech held at the Chicago Institute for Religious and Social Studies, 
Morgenthau claims that any ‘true and genuine’ culture is, on the one hand, able to 
understand the facts of political life as they exist, while on the other hand, it is able to 
transcend these facts by ‘a spiritual conception of life’ (5 February 1946,
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Morgenthau Papers, Box 153, p. 2). However, says Morgenthau, ‘our civilization 
refuses to recognize the facts of political life, and because of this refusal, it is unable 
to transcend those facts through a spiritual conception of life’ (5 February 1946, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 153, p. 2).
Human plurality leads to unpredictability in social and political affairs. 
Consequently, Morgenthau contends that there exists an element of uncertainty 
which makes it impossible to plan effectively in the international sphere, and he 
often mentions ‘the secrets of the human mind’, and the contingent character of 
political history. However, instead of finding an acknowledgment of these facts 
(which to him are unquestionable) in IR, Morgenthau finds a mode of thought which 
maintains that you can deal with international politics in the same exact, precise and 
objective way in which you deal with chemistry, physics, or any other exact science 
(see Lecture 4, 12 April 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 7). In Morgenthau’s 
view, a chasm exists between human reality, with all its forces -  ‘indifferent, if not 
actively hostile, to the commands of reason’ - and the precepts of rationalism as they 
are applied to politics. This chasm is unbridgeable and stands as proof of the inability 
of rationalism to grasp the ever changing distributions of forces which characterise 
this field. Molloy aptly summarizes this position by saying that for Morgenthau 
modem thought, as represented by rationalism, is ‘basically inadequate and 
inapplicable to the task of interpreting the social world’ (Molloy 2004, p. 5).
Morgenthau’s critique of rationalist politics, and his outcry against the 
disenchantment of politics, appear in many of his works, and mark a guiding thread 
and a central pillar among his theoretical concerns. In Scientific Man vs Power 
Politics -  an early, very virulent attack upon rationalism in politics, and also a 
forceful plea against the disenchantment of this realm - Morgenthau argues that in
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this field, in the past, the lust for power pursued its violent game; now, by contrast, 
we witness the performances of the proponents of a ‘science of peace’ (Morgenthau 
1947, p. 70), for whom politics ‘plays the role of a disease to be cured by means of 
reason’ (Morgenthau 1947, pp. 66-7). According to their hopes, in this field, the all 
too worshipped ‘goddess’ -  reason -  ‘would reign supreme through the medium of 
the political scientist, the economist, the sociologist, the psychologist’ (Morgenthau 
1947, p. 34). The reform by rationalisation, by simplifying an otherwise complex 
reality and disenchanting it, is ironically portrayed by Morgenthau:
Political manoeuvring should be replaced by the scientific ‘plan’, the political 
decision by the scientific ‘solution’, the politician by the ‘expert’, the statesman 
by the ‘brain-truster’, the legislator by the ‘legal engineer’ (...) Even revolution 
becomes a ‘science’, the revolutionary leader the ‘engineer of the revolution’ 
(Morgenthau 1947, pp. 31-2).
Meanwhile, in The Decline o f Democratic Politics, Morgenthau rejects scholars’ 
academic formalism which, in its concern with methodological requirements, ‘tends 
to lose sight of the goal of knowledge and understanding, which method must serve’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 45). Time and again, he stresses the gap between the moral 
ideal and the facts of political life, and he criticises the theorising, ‘abstract in the 
extreme and totally unhistoric’, which is now to be found in the realm of 
international politics (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 45). As Morgenthau suggests, rationalist 
theorising ‘endeavours to reduce international relations to a system of abstract 
propositions with a predictive function’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 65), and this is an 
action which he is quick to condemn. Following the rationalists’ emphasis on
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theoretical abstractions which do not properly convey the processes at work in 
politics, a ‘divorcement’ from reality has been performed in this domain 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 33).
In Morgenthau’s contention, it has become obvious that ‘the great issues of our 
day are not susceptible to rational solutions within the existing system of power 
relations’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 6). In Truth and Power, he argues that the 
rationalists use the wrong intellectual resources to understand, and to deal with, the 
main political questions. They are not aware of the concreteness of historic situations 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 256), and their contributions seem to neglect ‘the moral 
dilemmas, political risks, and intellectual uncertainties inherent in politics’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 243). They overlook the fact that political events are unique 
occurrences indeed. Rationalists also seem to forget that in the realm of politics there 
are psychological forces ‘that interfere with the smooth operation of the rational 
calculus’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245). As Morgenthau is keen to emphasise, the 
proponents of rationalism need to take into account that their theories are not created 
in a vacuum, but in a social context and political space ‘in which truth, superstition, 
and different conceptions of ends and means struggle for influence upon thought and 
action, and they contribute to the outcome of that struggle’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 
247). Morgenthau argues that politics, domestic and international, is susceptible to ‘a 
radically different kind of understanding from that which is appropriate to the world 
of nature’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 201). This happens because, for Morgenthau, when 
one tries to understand the phenomena which make up this domain, he deals with 
human individuals, as spiritual and moral beings (bio-psychological drives are 
therefore put in accord with moral considerations), whose actions and reactions ‘can
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be rationalized and quantitatively understood only in the lowest level of their 
existence’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245).
In Truth and Power, Morgenthau asserts pessimistically that the common aim of 
rationalist enterprises is to accomplish ‘a pervasive rationalization of international 
relations by means of a comprehensive theory’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 242). Their 
ultimate purpose is to increase the reliability of prediction, and therefore to remove 
uncertainty from political action (Morgenthau 1970, p. 242). Moreover, rationalist 
approaches are reductionist to Morgenthau, as they try to reduce, for instance, 
politics to economics (Morgenthau 1970, p. 244). In their account, nations confront 
each other not as ‘living historical entities with all their complexities’, but as rational 
abstractions, after the model of “economic man”, ‘playing games of military and 
diplomatic chess according to a rational calculus that exists nowhere but in the 
theoretician’s mind’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 244). These theories espouse a dogmatic 
attitude, and preach ‘a kind of metaphysics’: they do not try to reflect reality, but 
want ‘to superimpose upon a recalcitrant reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the 
desire for thorough rationalization’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 243). As Morgenthau 
argues further, in a strikingly Weberian formulation, the dogmatism of the 
contemporary theories of international relations reveals itself as a ‘new 
scholasticism’, that is, an intellectual exercise, frequently executed with a high 
degree of acumen and sophistication, ‘that tells us nothing we need to know about 
the real world’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 246), because they do not take into account, 
and do not reflect upon, the social and political ‘reality’ of the struggle for power as 
meaning imposition.
Morgenthau concludes by saying that the new theories are utopian, and he 
criticises them for their underestimation or even plain neglect of the struggle for
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power and of the contingency of historical developments. What Morgenthau calls 
present day utopias reflect their authors’ desires and wishful thinking, not the real 
physical world, which to him appears dominated by the principle of indeterminacy, 
by perspectivism and a larger form of relativism, and predictable ‘only by way of 
statistical probability’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 245). In Morgenthau’s view, the only 
difference between the rationalist utopias and those of the past comes from the fact 
that they ‘replace the simple and obvious deductions from ethical postulates with a 
highly complex and sophisticated methodological and terminological apparatus, 
creating the illusion of empirical demonstration’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 243).
In Morgenthau’s bleak picture of modernity after the death of God, political 
institutions have lost their transcendent meaning, and they expand quantitatively ‘in 
order to experience in the faultless functioning of an imposing apparatus a certainty 
of meaning that they have actually lost’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 21). Following the 
developments outlined above, the meaning of politics - as an autonomous sphere of 
thought and action capable of a destructive struggle, but also of construction and re­
enchantment - is destroyed, and its disenchantment completed. Rationalist 
approaches have disenchanted politics by imposing a meaning which fails to do 
justice to the myriad of unpredictabilities contained within the political realm, to the 
protean nature of politics as a sphere of human interaction par excellence. As 
Morgenthau maintains, instead of working towards revealing the meaning of politics, 
they have imposed an erroneous interpretation, and have rendered politics 
meaningless.
In Morgenthau’s account, expressed in an early article called ‘The Evil of Politics 
and the Ethics of Evil’, three consequences of disenchantment stand out: ‘the 
incapacity for meaningful political action, the temptation to support the powers-that-
188
be and justify the status quo, and, consequently, the discredit of the systems of 
thought leading to such results’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 3). The incapacity for 
meaningful political action is the one which, this thesis argues, appears to be the 
most dangerous to Morgenthau because it affects the superior agent from whose 
responsible actions re-enchantment is likely to spring. As we saw, Morgenthau 
maintains that rationalism removes the uncertainty of choice from (international) 
political acts. The statesman is rendered powerless in front of the rationalist attack, 
which leaves him without room to demonstrate his political creativity, without the 
power to decide, and then to implement his decisions. He turns into a slave of 
rationalism, which imposes upon him an interpretation which neglects perspectivism 
and uncertainty, as intrinsic characteristics of politics. Morgenthau contends that 
what rationalism does is not so much to inform the will of the statesman, but to 
replace it. Each social problem is supposed to be soluble by one rational solution, 
scientifically determined, and the political act itself ‘is transformed into the technical 
application of the scientific solution’ (Morgenthau 1971, p. 619). In Morgenthau’s 
interpretation, politics, formerly a struggle of interests defined in terms of power, ‘is 
reduced to the demonstration of the truths the social sciences have to offer for the 
solution of political problems’ (Morgenthau 1971, p. 619). The role of the statesman 
is therefore reduced to that of reproducing the findings of scientism, with no creative 
will behind it, with no awareness of the contingency and perspectivism which 
characterise politics.
The ascendancy of what Morgenthau calls ‘the scientific elites’ constitutes not 
only a proof of their monopoly of esoteric knowledge, but also of ‘the abdication, in 
the face of it, of the politically responsible authorities, and of the politically 
conscious public’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 236). The retreat from the confrontation
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with rationalism, and from politics altogether, is often criticised by Morgenthau. In 
his article ‘The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil’, he contends that the retreat 
from politics amounts for a particular kind of selfishness, ‘which cultivates the peace 
of one’s own conscience, bought by abstention from meaningful political action’ 
(Morgenthau 1945, p. 4). In view of the forces forever engaged in a battle over good 
and evil, and of the ethical and political risks which are unavoidably incurred in 
meaningful political action, the actor’s abstention from it for the sake of moral purity 
is condemned, since it ‘seems to miss the point’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 4). Here it is 
clear that for Morgenthau the homo politicus duty is to act, to take a stand, and to try 
to counteract the disenchantment of the political sphere, by means of reaffirming his 
creativity. If he does not, Morgenthau suggests, the dominance of rationalist politics 
may trigger consequences likely to be more dramatic than it is generally assumed, 
such as a nuclear total war.
In Morgenthau’s account, there are indeed many dangers in applying an 
‘unrealistic’, ‘quarantined’, scientific interpretation to political affairs. As 
Morgenthau argues in some of his seminal writings published in the seventies, in 
response to the arms race which was escalating at that time, technological 
development is bad because the natural sciences have put into the hands of 
governments ‘the technical means with which to exercise totalitarian control over 
their citizens, and to destroy humanity’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 11). Moreover, they 
have ‘drastically impaired man’s freedom and dignity, and have alienated him form 
society and government’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 11).
Morgenthau notes that in modernity scientific arguments have become 
‘indispensable weapons’ in the struggle for power within the executive branch, and 
the scientific elites are the providers of these weapons. Starting out as the
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disinterested purveyors of esoteric knowledge, the scientific elites have thus ended 
up ‘by rationalizing and justifying political interests by dint of their possession of 
esoteric knowledge’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 231-2). Consequently, science has turned 
into a means, into a mere instrument for acquiring, defending, and demonstrating 
power (Morgenthau 1972, p. 14). In this context, Morgenthau often emphasises the 
relationship between fascism and scientism, and he contends that, ‘in a sense’, 
fascism represents the fruition of scientism: it stands as ‘an important example of an 
attempt to deal with international affairs scientifically’ (see Morgenthau’s reply to 
Oakeshott, 22 May 1948, Morgenthau Papers, Box 44, page 1). In Morgenthau’s 
view, expressed in an unpublished lecture, fascism contains a strong ‘scientific 
element’ (Lecture 1, 3 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 10). Along 
with liberalism and Marxism, fascism tries ‘to understand international affairs in a 
scientific way and to control them according to certain scientific laws’, ‘to subject 
political affairs to scientific analysis and scientific control’ with cold and ruthless 
calculation (Lecture 1, 3 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, pp. 9-10). As 
Morgenthau mentions in Scientific Man vs Power Politics, the appearance of fascism 
in our midst ‘ought to have convinced us that the age of reason, of progress, and of 
peace, as we understood it from the teachings of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, had become a reminiscence of the past’, and the failure of fascism has 
given Western civilization ‘another chance to re-exercise its own philosophy, to 
revive its own assumptions, and to reconcile its traditions with the experiences and 
exigencies of modem life’ (Morgenthau 1947, pp. 13, 15).
This section has shown that in Morgenthau’s view rationalist politics imposes a 
particular set of meanings onto modem understandings and practices of politics 
which does not do justice to the latter. On the contrary, for Morgenthau, they
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represent erroneous and dangerous impositions which theorists must depart from if 
they want to embark on discovering the ‘real’ wonderment and meaning of the 
political. As Morgenthau often reminds his readers, in the ‘true order of things’, it is 
the political will that dominates (Morgenthau 1971b, p. 620), and this is a will 
primarily informed not by scientific theories, but by wisdom. Therefore, in 
Morgenthau’s account, another form of power politics does exist, and it represents a 
viable and desirable alternative to scientific power politics. Morgenthau’s alternative 
is what this thesis would like to call ‘thoughtful politics’.
Morgenthau maintains that his superior hero is not a rationalist subject. He is 
endowed with greatness, which represents ‘the ability to push the human potential for 
achievement in a particular respect to its outer limits, or beyond them’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 133). As Morgenthau explains in Truth and Power, when we speak of great 
painters and great writers, we call them great ‘because they have done what others 
may do well, indifferently, or badly, with a measure of excellence that at least 
intimates perfection’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 133). The actions undertaken by the great 
political actor can re-imbue the political with meaning, and therefore re-enchant the 
world, and they can contribute to the achievement of the supreme goal of the age, as 
spelled out by Morgenthau in The Decline o f Democratic Politics: ‘the restoration of 
politics as an autonomous sphere of thought and action’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 3). 
Contrary to many assessments of Morgenthau’s theory which emphasise the 
contrary, and point to the supposedly immoral character of his vision of politics, here 
it becomes clear that Morgenthau does not endorse an interpretation of the political 
world made up only of a ‘pure’ struggle for domination, capable of never ending 
destructiveness. Morgenthau’s theory is also about construction through
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responsibility, about construction as ‘art’, about politics as a sphere of human action 
which can provide outstanding opportunities.
The best way of tackling the constructive part of Morgenthau’s theory is through 
unpacking Morgenthau’s vision of leadership. The next section is devoted to this 
task, and it will focus on the re-enchantment brought about by thoughtful politics, 
which to Morgenthau represents a viable and constructive alternative to the 
destructiveness and disenchantment of scientific politics.
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4.3 Thoughtful Politics, as a Solution to the Evil of Politics
Hans Morgenthau’s In Defense o f the National Interest opens with a quotation 
which is relevant for the present discussion of the wise statesman’s qualities, and of 
his mission. Morgenthau quotes here from Winston Churchill - one of the few 
statesmen he admired for their ‘art’, along with Richelieu, Mettemich, and Bismarck, 
and in whose thought he saw, as admitted in an early unpublished lecture, ‘not only 
eloquence, but a summary of the experience and the wisdom of the ages’ (5th Lecture 
at the Oriental Institute, 7 April 1950, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 15). 
Morgenthau quotes Churchill arguing that although people cannot live without 
idealism, ‘idealism at other people’s expense, and without regard to the 
consequences of ruin and slaughter which fall upon millions of humble homes, 
cannot be considered as its highest or noblest form’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 2). In this 
quotation, significantly placed at the beginning of one of his major contributions to 
IR theory, a theme surfaces which is dear to Morgenthau: the responsible, 
consequentialist oriented politics, in which great characters are engaged.
Taking into account the central place it holds in Morgenthau’s theory, it is 
surprising that scholars have not treated Morgenthau’s account of leadership 
methodically and at length so far. This gap is filled here, and an outline follows of 
Morgenthau’s analysis of thoughtful leadership, with an emphasis on its capacity to
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provide solutions to the disenchantment and evil of politics. As will be shown below, 
there are strong grounds for holding that, for Morgenthau, while scientific politics 
acts in relation to scientific truths, thoughtful politics acts in relation to anticipated 
consequences.
Moreover, in contrast to critics who have emphasised the supposed lack of 
concern with values embedded in his theory, there is no better place to see 
Morgenthau’s ethical concerns at work than his account of leadership, and this is the 
reason for examining it in detail. Morgenthau links his interpretation of leadership 
with his discussion of values, and his account stands as an ethical analysis of 
individual political action. Aware of what he calls ‘the curious dialectic of ethics and 
politics, which prevents the latter (...) from escaping the former’s judgment and 
normative direction’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 2, p. 5), Morgenthau pleads for a re­
enchantment informed by knowledge, performed by an actor likely to use the 
opportunities provided by the death of God to create and impose values, while also 
keeping an eye on the consequences of his actions, and demonstrating prudence. In a 
modernity plagued by rationalism, and in a disenchanted political sphere, 
Morgenthau suggests that there seems to be one hope available. This hope springs 
from the responsible imposition of meaning performed by a character whom 
Morgenthau calls the ‘genuine’ statesman or diplomat, who exhibits wisdom and 
greatness.
When discussing the issue of human greatness, Morgenthau borrows from Pascal 
and Emerson. For the former, man was great because he was aware of being 
miserable. As Pascal said, being miserable is synonymous with knowing oneself to 
be miserable, ‘but it is also great to know that one is miserable’ (Morgenthau 1970, 
p. 4). The awareness of human limitations, and the propensity for reflectivity and
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self-knowledge, are thus crucial constitutive elements of greatness. Moreover, in his 
notes for a projected monograph of Abraham Lincoln, Morgenthau quotes from 
Emerson: ‘he is great who is what he is from nature, and never reminds us of others’ 
(March 1975, Morgenthau Papers, Box 116, p. 2). Greatness is here synonymous 
with uniqueness, and it is native too. Morgenthau incorporates these attributes of 
greatness into his discussion of the statesman/diplomat, and in the articulation of the 
latter concept, he echoes Weber’s account of charismatic leadership. This thesis 
argues that although Morgenthau’s account of wisdom has some similarities with 
Weber’s charisma (to be spelled out below), it cannot be reduced to the notion of 
charisma in the Weberian sense. Morgenthau’s account employs a multi-faceted 
interpretation of leadership which points to its author’s particular concern with 
meaning imposition, understood as a creative endeavour.
To Weber, ‘charisma’ is the quality of a personality ‘which is esteemed as 
extraordinary’, and because of it the bearer is ‘considered to be endowed with 
supernatural or superhuman or at least extraordinary - not given to every man -  
powers or properties, or as God-sent or exemplary, and hence as “the Leader’” 
(Weber quoted in Lash and Whimster 1987, p. 317). Similarly, to Morgenthau, 
greatness is a quality inherent in some of the human individuals, not something to be 
acquired like power and riches. It is a ‘gift of heaven’, which is granted to those who 
deserve it, not to those who desperately try to achieve it: as Morgenthau asserts in 
The Decline o f Democratic Politics, ‘those who seek greatness with frenzied effort 
reveal through their very frenzy that they are lacking what it takes to be great’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 173). Moreover, for Morgenthau wisdom represents ‘the gift 
of intuition’, and political wisdom ‘is the gift to grasp intuitively the quality of 
diverse interests and power in the present and future, and the impact of different
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actions upon them’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 45). Clearly, for Morgenthau, political 
wisdom cannot be learned: as he asserts further in Science: Servant or Master?, it is 
4 a gift of nature, like the gift of artistic creativity, or literary style, or eloquence, or 
force of personality’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 45). As such, it can be deepened and 
developed by example, experience, and study, but it 'cannot be acquired through 
deliberate effort by those from whom nature has withheld it’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 
45).
In the context of one of his unpublished discussions of the different types of 
authority -  which mirrors the Weberian traditional-legal-charismatic triad -  
Morgenthau asserts that the modem charismatic leader differs from the pre-modem 
one, whose charisma was established by a religious sanction, and whose legitimacy 
was more stable due to its being derived from, and backed up by, what Morgenthau 
calls 4an objective order’ (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 199, p. 18). 
Furthermore, in Morgenthau’s account, all types of government contain a charismatic 
element, 'for they all require an implicit belief in the superior endowment of the 
rulers with wisdom, virtue, and power’ (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 199, p.
16). This to Morgenthau does not mean, however, that political greatness is 
widespread, or easily attainable. In a political world in which so many actors are still 
ignorant of what they lack, and seek salvation in a rationalised, disenchanted 
experience, the charismatic, superior characters impress through their rare thoughtful 
reflection, and their commitment toward responsible creation. The sadness which 
these statesmen often feel is, despite appearances, a sign of strength: as Morgenthau 
states in Politics among Nations, knowing what they knew about themselves, their 
actions, and the world, 'they could not be but sad’, and their sadness 'denotes the
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resigned acceptance of the moral and intellectual imperfections of the political world 
and of their precarious place within it’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 135).
According to Morgenthau, there are two qualities which are not necessarily 
present in the intellectual, but are essential in the statesman: first, a sense of limits -  
‘limits of knowledge, of judgment, of successful action’; second, ‘a commitment to a 
grand design, bom of a sense of purpose that neutralizes the doubts arising form the 
awareness of limits’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 135). The latter part of this quotation 
shows that for Morgenthau, the human capacity for achieving creative excellence, for 
going beyond the limits of the ‘customary’ in order to bring about a ‘grand design’, 
makes up another element of greatness. Man’s capacity for transcendence through 
creation is here emphasised.
Cavalli remarks that Weber ‘attributed to charismatic leaders the power to 
produce the most important change -  that taking place in interiore homine ’ (Cavalli 
in Lash and Whimster 1987, p. 317). Similarly Morgenthau suggests that genuine 
political thinking is action since, at the very least, ‘it changes the consciousness of 
the thinker’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 59). By changing himself, the statesman also 
changes the political world. In Morgenthau’s formulation, expressed in Science: 
Servant or Master?, ‘the political world exists in relations among men, and if the 
consciousness of even one single man is changed, the political world is changed at 
this particular point’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 59). What the statesman says and does 
forms ‘an integral part of a dynamic filed of pressures and counterpressures,’ and 
consequently his words and actions ‘must be adapted carefully to the conditions from 
which they arise, and which they are intended to influence’ (Morgenthau 1970, p.
To be superior, a statesman must also possess the ability to look at oneself from a 
distance without being impressed, that is ‘to see the world as it is, undistorted by the 
involvement of his ego’ (Morgenthau 1972, pp. 133, 157). This is a demanding task, 
of whose difficulty Morgenthau is well aware. As he maintains in Science: Servant 
or Master?, the statesman’s words and actions are easily bound to fall short of the 
logical consistency and ‘theoretical purity’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 17), which are the 
earmarks of the intellectual detached from action. By submitting to such a vision of 
the genuine statesman, Morgenthau endows his ideal political actor with detachment, 
and this is a quality which he defines most clearly in his collection of essays Truth 
and Power:
The political actor (...) must detach himself from his own emotions and 
aspirations and judge the other man with an objectivity similar to that with which 
a scientist tries to understand the phenomena of nature. He must put himself into 
the other man’s shoes, look at the world and judge it as he does. Anticipate in 
thought the way he will feel and act under certain circumstances (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 69).
Morgenthau’s superior political actor must gauge the importance of a new 
government, of a revolution, or of a new invention. He must evaluate these factors 
correctly, but he must also anticipate changes in the distribution of power 
(Morgenthau Papers, Box 153, pp. 6-7). In Morgenthau’s view, anticipation seems to 
be a paramount quality indeed: a wise statesman must ‘anticipate the future 
development of the distribution of power, and he must adapt his foreign policy to the 
future trends which he is able to anticipate’ (Morgenthau Papers, Box 153, p. 7). As
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mentioned earlier, these are no easy tasks at all in Morgenthau’s account, especially 
under the ‘gambling-like’ conditions, which characterise foreign affairs. The extreme 
difficulty of the job of the statesman Ties chiefly with the insecurity he is confronted 
when he tries to evaluate correctly those different factors, not only with regard to his 
own country, but also with regard to all others’ (Morgenthau Papers, Box 153, p. 7).
The responsibility to act with an eye to consequences is, for Morgenthau, crucial 
in differentiating a statesman only with the name from a ‘genuine’ one. The latter 
carries within him ‘a special moral responsibility to act wisely -  that is, in 
accordance with the rules of the political art’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 10). In Scientific 
Man vs Power Politics, Morgenthau contends that politics ‘is an art and not a 
science’, and that what is required for its mastery is ‘the wisdom and the moral 
strength of the statesman’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16). He adds further that ‘the social 
world, deaf to the appeal to reason pure and simple, yields only to that intricate 
combination of moral and material pressures which the art of the statesman creates 
and maintains’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 16).
According to Morgenthau, all action affecting others is subject to the ethics of 
responsibility, and in order to demonstrate wisdom a diplomat should always work 
according to its principles: as emphasised by Morgenthau in Politics among Nations, 
the one ‘who thinks in legalistic and propagandists terms is particularly tempted to 
insist upon the letter of the law... and to lose sight of the consequences which that 
insistence may have for its own nation and for humanity’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 441). 
From this perspective, it is not surprising to Morgenthau that responsible statesmen 
and diplomats ‘do less than they probably could’, and ‘refuse to consider certain ends 
and to use certain means’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 174). As Morgenthau tells his 
readers in Scientific Man vs Power Politics, the success in preserving international
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order depends ‘upon extraordinary moral and intellectual qualities which all the 
leading participants must possess’, and a statesman who does not correspond to these 
high standards, by ‘judging contrary to the exigencies of the moment’, may ‘ruin his 
country forever’ (Burke quoted in Morgenthau 1947, p. 187). The importance and 
subtlety of such an endeavour makes statecraft depart from all bureaucratic, 
vocation-less, ‘rationalised’ professions: in determining the goals of his country, in 
assessing those of others, in employing the adequate means suited to the pursuit of 
certain objectives, the statesman turns into an artisan, and his decisions are crucial 
not only for his country, but for humanity at large. As emphasised by Morgenthau in 
Politics among Nations, ‘failure in any one of these tasks may jeopardize (...) the 
peace of the world’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 419).
Morgenthau reminds his readers in Science: Servant or Master? (Morgenthau 
1972, p. 41) that the lack of wisdom has often defeated political action throughout 
history. For Morgenthau, the evil of politics stems from the fact that the immorality 
inherent in all human action is ‘to a higher degree and more obviously present in 
political than in private action, owing to the particular conditions under which 
political action proceeds’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 13). As Morgenthau explains in his 
early article The Evil o f Politics and the Ethics o f Evil, ‘what is done in the political 
sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action’ 
(Morgenthau 1945, p. 10). What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and 
hence with disastrous results appears to Morgenthau to be ‘morally defective, for it 
violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others and hence 
political action par excellence is subject’ (Morgenthau 1945, p. 10). The essence and 
meaning of political wisdom, and of the political actor’s fate, are summarised by 
Morgenthau in the following paragraph taken from the article above:
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To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political 
wisdom. To know with despair that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act 
nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the 
least evil one, is moral judgment. In the combination of political wisdom, moral 
courage, and moral judgment, man reconciles his political nature with his moral 
destiny (Morgenthau 1945, p. 5).
In order to act successfully on the political stage, the statesman must demonstrate 
that he has got ‘a respectful understanding’ of the object, nature, interests, 
propensities, and potentialities of politics (Morgenthau 1970, p. 69). Subsequently, in 
Morgenthau’s portrayal of the superior statesman, the grand themes of power 
interpreted as meaning imposition, responsibility and (self) knowledge are 
interrelated. For Morgenthau, the genuine statesman is endowed with the gift of 
recognizing ‘in the contingencies of the social world the concretisations of eternal 
laws’ (Morgenthau 1947, p. 187) - the ‘mechanisms’ of human nature. Moreover, in 
Morgenthau’s view, expressed in Politics among Nations, before the adoption of a 
decision, the statesman should first and foremost ask himself consequence-related 
questions, and ‘beyond the victory of tomorrow’, his mind, ‘complicated and subtle’, 
must anticipate the ‘possibilities of the future’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 441).
In a relevant quotation taken from Truth and Power, Morgenthau asserts that 
great statesmen are those who possess ‘a lucid awareness, both intellectual and 
moral, of the nature of the political act, of their involvement in it, and of the 
consequences of that involvement for themselves and for the world’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 134). It is precisely this awareness the one which gives thoughtful statesmen
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‘the intellectual distinction and moral sensitivity that set them apart from the 
common run of politicians’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 134). In an age in which religion 
can no longer assure salvation, man can be saved from despair ‘only by an 
understanding that portends mastery’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 69): understanding thus 
paves the way to transcendence.
The superior political character must be aware of the evil of political action, of 
the fragile and ever changing political developments, which can easily escape 
control. In Morgenthau’s view, there is no escape from the evil of power, and 
political ethics ‘is indeed the ethics of doing evil’: ‘No ivory tower is remote enough 
to offer protection against the guilt in which the actor and the bystander, the 
oppressor and the oppressed, the victor and his victim are inextricably enmeshed. 
While it condemns politics as the domain of evil par excellence, it must reconcile 
itself to the enduring presence of evil in all political action’ (Morgenthau 1970, p.
17). The superior political actor must know all these, and must be aware that the 
threat to human existence emanates from politics (Morgenthau 1970, p. 30), and that 
the vital task of the age is ‘to transform the shock of wonderment that has its source 
in politics to the theoretical, systematic understanding of that source’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 32). In Morgenthau’s conclusion, that understanding has two purposes: to 
create a philosophical order in our minds, ‘through the transformation of an 
unintelligible and discordant reality into a theoretical system for its own intellectual 
sake’, and to serve ‘as a preliminary to the elimination of the threats to human 
existence, by transforming reality’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 33).
The statesman’s position and role in relation to the disenchantment of politics 
plays an important role in Morgenthau’s account of leadership. Within this context, 
Morgenthau reintroduces his criticism directed towards the political actors’
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endorsement of empty moral abstractions, and their surrender to the forces of 
rationalization and disenchantment. Morgenthau warns that charismatic legitimacy is 
vulnerable to failure once it is stripped of its enchanted, ethereal quality: as it is a 
‘gift from heaven’, Morgenthau argues, so it must ‘at the very least guard against the 
exposure of being of this world’ (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 199, p. 23). 
Once it is so exposed, it is emptied of its substance, and becomes disenchanted and 
meaningless, since ‘both the rulers and the ruled have lost faith in the wisdom, the 
virtue, and the unchallengeable power of the government, which faith is the vital 
force of any legitimacy’ (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 199, p. 23).
Morgenthau continuously guards against the statesmen’s submission to the 
disenchantment of politics, and argues that what they must do instead is to try to 
counteract the phenomenon, and to acknowledge the contingencies and power 
struggles which make up the political world. According to Morgenthau, a foreign 
policy guided by abstractions is bound to fail, because it ‘accepts a standard of action 
alien to the nature of the action itself (Morgenthau 1982, pp. 33-4). Consequently, 
he criticises those statesmen who invoke abstract, supposedly universal moral 
principles, ‘in whose image the world was to be made over’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 4), 
and who choose the path of what Morgenthau calls ‘the moral crusade’. In writings 
composed in response to the Cold War ideological battle, Morgenthau criticises the 
political crusader who ‘projects the national moral standards onto the international 
scene not only with the legitimate claim of reflecting the national interest, but with 
the politically and morally unfounded claim of providing moral standards for all 
mankind to conform to, in concrete political action’ (Morgenthau 1982, pp. 36-7). To 
counteract this tendency, Morgenthau tries to raise the political actor’s awareness on 
the perspectivism and relativism which, in his view, currently permeate the realm of
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(international) politics. He tries to make the statesman acknowledge the 
contingencies of power, ‘the rich complexities of experience’, and ‘the dreadful 
uncertainties’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 90) with which the political world confronts its 
protagonists (Morgenthau 1982, p. 82). He asks the political actor to take into 
account the importance of the cultural arrangement that supports his particular 
philosophic conception, and to realise that the empirical evidence which is presented 
to him has been ‘artificially created’ by this very cultural arrangement (see Lang 
2004, p. 58). The genuine statesman, Morgenthau contends, is one who is aware of 
the social and intellectual forces that struggle for the minds of men, of the tragic 
inherent in human existence, and of the essential ambivalence of political moral 
judgment (see Lang 2004, p. 100). He takes into account the fact that politics is not 
abstract, quantifiable and static, but a very sophisticated and dynamic struggle.
Finally, Morgenthau argues that the statesman can afford to be generous and 
idealistic as long as this behaviour is not likely to affect adversely the national 
interest ‘conceived as power among other powers’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 223). For 
Morgenthau, the national interest is an important variable which the statesman must 
take into account prior to implementing a political decision. It concerns the power 
relationships among nations, and as such its importance should not be 
underestimated, Morgenthau maintains. When a policy of generosity and idealism 
appears to be incompatible with the national interest, the statesman ‘must make up 
his mind and choose one or the other’ (Morgenthau 1949, pp. 33-4). As Morgenthau 
explains in Politics among Nations, a foreign policy which oscillates between these 
alternatives ‘will neither reap the benefits of the one, nor avoid the pitfalls of the 
other’ (Morgenthau 1949, p. 212). The analysis of the concept of the national interest 
does not form the object of the thesis, hence this brief mention of it here and in
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section 5.2 later, in the context of the discussion of Morgenthau’s vision of political 
construction, which points to the connection between the national interest and the 
demanding tasks of leadership.
Several of Morgenthau’s books (see, for example, Morgenthau 1947 and 1949) 
end with sections devoted to the constructive potentialities of statecraft. In both 
cases, what Morgenthau emphasises is statesmanship’s potential for benign mission, 
and his overall message ends therefore on a positive note. In Morgenthau’s words, 
expressed in an unpublished lecture held at the University of Chicago, ‘an element of 
art enters into the solution of political problems’, and in politics, ‘you have to be a 
creative artist’ (Lecture 28, 18 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 13). 
Human greatness can thus be found on the political arena, although, in Morgenthau’s 
view, very few are those who can rightfully claim to be ‘great’. As Morgenthau 
explains years later in Truth and Power, after all, greatness is not a quality that the 
big masses of today want to discover in their leaders: on the contrary, they want their 
politicians to be ‘wholehearted’ and ‘uncomplicated’ in the pursuit of power 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 137). According to Morgenthau, in a democracy, it is 
ordinariness, not greatness, which gains power: ‘once a great man (...) has gained 
power under the cover of ordinariness, he can afford to bare his greatness to the 
multitude, but not before’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 137).
Instead of succumbing to wishful thinking, endless schemes and moral 
abstractions, and also to a rationalization which reduces their creative potentialities, 
and renders their endeavours meaningless, the statesmen should try to responsibly 
affirm their individuality on the political stage, and to counteract disenchantment. In 
Morgenthau’s account, thoughtful statesmen represent therefore viable alternatives to 
the optimistic proponents of liberal internationalism, and forces likely to deal
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successfully with the disenchantment brought by rationalist thinking. Moreover, by 
virtue of their wisdom, they are likely to be successful in confronting the evil of 
politics, and its most destructive consequences. In Morgenthau’s interpretation, 
rather than being possessed by power, great statesmen are those who possess power, 
and ‘rather than being devoured by it, they tame it’ (Morgenthau 1962a, pp. 133-4).
In this chapter the specific characteristics of politics in Morgenthau’s account 
have been addressed, and its disenchantment caused by rationalist endeavours 
analysed. The struggle for power as meaning imposition has been highlighted, and 
the dangers and the possibilities stirred up by the death of universal values have also 
been addressed. Last but not least, the chapter has outlined Morgenthau’s critique of 
action for action’s sake, and also his endorsement of a vision of responsible 
imposition of meaning, performed by superior political characters.
Surprising as it may appear to some observers in light of the considerations 
spelled out earlier, to Morgenthau the ‘real world’ has not become a myth yet, there 
is still a ‘true’ meaning of politics, and in a godless and disenchanted world, 
universality of values is still a possibility. Morgenthau criticises those statesmen who 
invoke abstract, supposedly universal moral principles, and tries to raise the political 
actor’s awareness on the perspectivism and relativism which characterise present day 
politics. On the other hand however, he also pleads for a re-enchantment informed by 
a return to universal values and tradition.
The next chapter is dedicated to the analysis of Morgenthau’s commitment 
towards universal values, and of the meaning of this endorsement for his theory. 
Most importantly, it also deals with the question of the supposed tension in 
Morgenthau’s account, which stems from his commitment to both individual value 
creation and universal, transcendental values. The chapter argues that Morgenthau’s
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sophisticated position provides a solution to the challenges raised by contemporary 
politics. It is a solution which tries to reconcile identity with difference, unique 
creativity with universal humanity, while also justifying the continuing relevance of 
tradition, perceived as a barrier against the proliferation of action for action’s sake. 
Morgenthau’s concept of thoughtful politics stands as an ethical politics performed 
by superior statesmen who adhere to a set of standards understood as an ethos, to 
values which come to us from the past, and are still relevant to present day political 
problems.
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5. Closing the Openness: Morgenthau on Meaning, Tradition, 
and the Statesman’s Mission
Chapter 3 has addressed Morgenthau’s allegiance to the ‘death of God’ 
diagnosis, his awareness of the relativism and perspectivism of moral judgment, and 
his concern with the status of truth and meaning in modernity. Meanwhile, chapter 4 
has analysed the translation of Morgenthau’s metaphysics into a political theory with 
power as meaning imposition and disenchantment at its core, and has discussed the 
elements which make up Morgenthau’s vision of political leadership. The present 
chapter represents the resolution which brings together the strands of the argument so 
far, and focuses on Morgenthau’s commitment to the creative restoration of tradition, 
and on his attempt to close the openness announced by Nietzsche. The creative 
restoration of the ‘old’ constitutes Morgenthau’s solution to the nihilistic crisis, and 
the unit by which he argues that the strength of political leadership is measured. 
Morgenthau’s strategy for avoiding absolute relativism encompasses the use of a 
particular conception of man in order to stabilize meaning, and involves a constant 
move between universality and particularity, obvious in his conceptualisation of the 
statesman. The argument of the chapter demonstrates that Morgenthau finds the idea 
of tradition in politics very appealing, and he perceives it as a foundation likely to
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offer guidance in the production of theory, and in the interpretation of current 
political developments.
The present chapter also aims to shed light on the apparent tension present in 
Morgenthau’s thought, nourished by Morgenthau’s often vague statements, between 
the emphasis on the creative overcoming of the ‘old’ morality, and his preaching of a 
return to the wisdom of the former. As outlined in previous chapters of the thesis, 
Morgenthau takes on board Nietzsche’s relativist and perspectivist assumptions, and 
Weber’s rationalization theme, and incorporates them into a theory permeated by a 
pessimistic account of modernity. He takes issue with the search for certainty, order 
and meaning, and with the unfolding of disenchantment, and stresses that political 
decisions cannot be right or wrong in terms of universal values and laws 
(Morgenthau 1959, p. 6). Morgenthau’s diagnosis of political modernity criticises the 
fact that many political actors still find the spell of certainty appealing. As he puts it, 
they need ‘meticulous ascertainment of the facts, precise planning, and elaborate 
organization’, and try ‘to create the illusion of certainty where there can be no 
certainty’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 149).
On the other hand, however, at the same time with emphasising the relativity of 
moral judgment, Morgenthau maintains that there exists one moral code, albeit 
filtered through cultural and moral particularities (see Morgenthau 1979, p. 10). 
Moreover, in an early article, he argues that there are certain truths in the field of the 
social, and more importantly, the political sciences, which have ‘a particularly stable 
and permanent quality’, being ‘as objective in truth as any statement of the natural 
sciences can be’ (Lecture 4, 9 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). In 
Morgenthau’s view, there is still a ‘true’ meaning of politics, there is still one ‘truth’, 
springing from the wisdom of tradition, derived from the dictum of the ‘old’ moral
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order. As Morgenthau explains, there has to be a meaning, a singular foundation on 
which to base all interpretations, because in this way only, everything falls into place 
(Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 176). Thus, Morgenthau does not reject the old 
moral framework, on the contrary. He pleads for its consideration in politics, and for 
a stabilization of the meaning of politics which appears very important to him in light 
of the threats posed by actions for actions’ sake, and by nuclear total destruction.
Morgenthau’s argument reveals a different understanding of plurality -  not 
unbound, but always regulated, carefully expressed so as to avoid a total relativism, 
and to emphasise the wisdom of tradition, while also referring positively to humans’ 
interpretative potential. Depending on the particular contexts within which he was 
writing, Morgenthau emphasised the two aforementioned facets of his theory at 
various points in his career, and as stated earlier, this led to him being perceived as 
contradictory. The argument that follows will show that these two facets coexist 
without contradiction, and their coexistence is to Morgenthau absolutely necessary, 
taking into account modernity’s grappling with the crisis of values and with 
rationalization. The present reading argues that by holding such a vision, Morgenthau 
is ambivalent but not contradictory, and that the two stances complement each other 
within a sophisticated political theory, which represents Morgenthau’s answer to the 
crisis of values and leadership, and is relevant to debates on modernity and 
postmodemity. Their co-existence also stands as a proof of Morgenthau’s concern 
with morality, and his rejection of amoralism and of an ‘anything goes’ absolute 
relativism.
The chapter begins with an interpretation of Morgenthau’s account of moral 
universality, and an emphasis on his understanding of tradition as universality. 
Morgenthau’s concept of tradition is constituted within a formalistic and abstract
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scheme, which he hardly ever explains in detail. Subsequently, the chapter provides a 
much needed interpretation, and a clarification, of the meaning of Morgenthau’s 
concept of tradition, and shows that it applies to two realms: of values and of 
knowledge. The first section also argues that for Morgenthau, just like for Nietzsche 
(see Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 242), tradition does not only constitute a past that 
has gone, but our present as well, and it provides a necessary core of meaning. It 
nurtures responsible creativity and prevents the excesses of relativism, while also 
allowing for the consideration of cultural and historical differences.
The second section of the chapter focuses on Morgenthau’s superior political 
actor, who is in charge of the reinterpretation of tradition referred to earlier. His 
creative thinking ‘illuminates the political experience of the day -  and of all days -  
by discovering within it the perennial forces, problems, and patterns of interaction, of 
which political life consists’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 1).
As shown in previous chapters, the issue of human agency is central to 
Morgenthau’s theory, and he focuses on it with the awareness that humans are as 
much the problem as they are the solution to the ongoing moral and technological 
crisis of modernity. The chapter will show that Morgenthau’s superior hero is a 
creator who gains acceptance by virtue of his responsible actions, which are not a 
mere reproduction of tradition, but an imaginative reframing of it, relevant to the 
context and problems of the day. This is indeed the meaning attached by Morgenthau 
to the concept of political creativity.
2 David Chandler developed this compelling argument at a CRIPT workshop on the topic of 
posthuman politics, held at Goldsmith College on 9th November 2006.
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5.1 Creation as Re-Interpretation: Morgenthau’s Meaning
of Universality
In his short study of Nietzsche, modernity and aestheticism, Alexander Nehamas 
provides a persuasive interpretation of the tension within Nietzsche’s thought, 
between his awareness of nihilism and subsequent celebration of human creativity, 
and his longing for a metaphysical overcoming of morality. As Nehamas explains, it 
is impossible to call Nietzsche ‘the last metaphysician’ as Heidegger did, because 
Nietzsche maintains a ‘double relation’ to any grand narrative, including, in 
particular, the philosophical tradition itself: ‘he undermines that tradition, though he 
knows he cannot completely reject it; he looks beyond it, though he knows that he 
cannot see anything fundamentally different there’ (Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 
231). In Nehamas’s view, Nietzsche’s attitude towards Modernity was complex and 
divided indeed: ‘absolute rejections, like absolute distinctions, are very much what 
he constantly, absolutely tried to avoid’ (Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 226).
Such an ambiguous position has attracted criticism, observers pointing out that 
Nietzsche remains an idealist and a moralist in several key respects (see Ansell 
Pearson 2005, p. 116). As Ansell Pearson emphasises, Nietzsche’s analysis of the 
phenomenon of European nihilism is ‘too centred on a crisis of meaning and, as a 
result, it perpetuates the very thing it seeks to overcome, namely, metaphysics’
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(Ansell Pearson 2005, p. 103). Within this context, Nietzsche’s allegiance to Kant is 
often referred to: although he was a severe critic of Kant’s attachment to 
metaphysics, Nietzsche ‘could not renounce philosophy’s pretension to legislate 
through the creation of new values’ (Ansell Pearson 2005, p. 115. For an analysis of 
the ‘Kantian foundations’ of Nietzsche’s thought, see also Hill 2005).
The argument here is driven by the reading that, similarly to Nietzsche, 
Morgenthau himself does not renounce modernity’s moral foundation, as represented 
by Judeo-Christian and Kantian values, and he does this with good reasons. First, he 
still believes in this framework’s value, and in its potential to provide meaning. 
Second, he is aware that his criticism is enclosed within the bounds of the very 
tradition he takes issue with, and that he cannot thus renounce it completely. From 
this latter perspective, the present reading suggests that Nehamas’s assessment of 
Nietzsche captures well the essence of Morgenthau’s own position in relation to 
grand narratives, and his views regarding the co-existence of contingency and 
perennity, following the death of God.
As previous chapters have shown, Morgenthau focuses on ‘truth’ -  as a concept 
which according to some analysts, dominates and ‘conditions’ his thinking about the 
nature of politics (Molloy 2004, p. 1) - and questions its validity, in the aftermath of 
the ‘death of God’, when, he maintains, the breakdown of universal religion and 
universal humanism has left the world exposed to the perils of disenchantment (see 
Lecture 28, 18 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 2). Morgenthau 
subscribes to Nietzsche’s views regarding the advent of nihilism, as ‘the state in 
which a being has the need to call himself continually into question, to raise 
continually the question of the grounds of his existence, without anything being able 
to count as such grounds’ (Ansell Pearson 2005, p. 123). Moreover, he is aware of
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the competition for meaning imposition, in which humans eager to commit others to 
their particular version of the ‘truth’, are presently engaged. Following the demise of 
universal values, humans look at the world and judge it from the vantage point of 
their interests and beliefs, and depending on circumstances. On the political scene in 
particular, Morgenthau asserts, he who believes he has a monopoly of truth in 
matters political is free to propound his ‘truth’, which to him appears to be all the 
truth there is’ (Morgenthau 1975, p. 4). As Morgenthau states in his 1970 book Truth 
and Power,
We judge and act as though we were at the center of the universe, as though what 
we see everybody must see, and as though what we want is legitimate in the eyes 
of justice. Turning Kant’s categorical imperative upside down, we take it for 
granted that the standards of judgment and action produced by the peculiarities of 
our perspective can serve as universal laws for all mankind (Morgenthau 1970, p. 
64).
We have seen that Morgenthau pleads in favour of the creative overcoming of 
morality, and he praises men’s capacities in this regard. He thus holds faith in the 
opportunities provided by the collapse of universal values and ‘standards of action’, 
as ‘ties’ which to him appear to be weaker and weaker (Lecture 4, 9 January 1946, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). The present reading maintains that like 
Nietzsche, for Morgenthau the affirmative ethics which follows the demise of 
universality represents ‘a veil of beautiful possibilities’ (Nietzsche quoted in Ansell 
Pearson 2005, p. 67). Interestingly enough however, while praising the death of a 
universal God of values and meaning, and while asking humans to strive towards
new, creative ways of thinking and action, Morgenthau also displays a nostalgia for 
what he calls the ‘golden age of normalcy’. He decries the disintegration of those 
‘great intellectual systems from which the Western world used to receive its 
meaning’ (see Morgenthau 1982, p. 4), and claims that the ‘golden age’ can indeed 
be restored. Far from rebuking modernity’s values, Morgenthau insists on their 
creative re-working, in light of various cultural backgrounds and political 
developments. For Morgenthau, life is endowed with an ethical framework within 
whose confines humans can interpret - and thus generate a plurality of meanings - 
and then struggle for the imposition of their newly created meanings. Nevertheless, 
their interpretations must always be in accord with the initial, traditional framework 
referred to above. Aware that he cannot abolish modernity’s universal platform of 
values, Morgenthau works out the implications stirred by the latter’s weakening, and 
claims that any ‘true’ creation must resonate with the old moral order.
Morgenthau points to the fluctuating international political situation on numerous 
occasions, and in this context, he pleads for an adaptation of modes of thought and 
action to the political developments of the day. What is needed, Morgenthau asserts 
in one of his ‘Reflections on the Nuclear Age’ lectures given in 1962, is ‘radical 
political change, commensurate with the radical novelty of the problems that require 
solution’ (Lecture 11, 15 May 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 4). Humans 
need to change their traditional habits of thought and action, in response to a changed 
world: ‘if we do so, we will be the masters of the new age. If we fail to do so, we will 
become its victims’ (Morgenthau 1965, Morgenthau Papers, Box 172, p. 14). While 
emphasising the changed character of the new world, which requires further changes 
at the level of the individual, Morgenthau also maintains that in the international 
political realm there should still be universal moral values which transcend national
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values. In an unpublished lecture Morgenthau hints at the experience of Nazi 
Germany, and argues that a ‘complete’ relativism is dangerous, as it ‘leads either to 
mere propaganda (...), or irrelevant empirical studies of a mere quantitative nature’ 
(Lecture 4, 12 April 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 15).
A good example of Morgenthau’s nuanced position on the issue of values and the 
relationship universal -  particular is represented by his 1979 speech on the topic of 
human rights. The context is very important in understanding the meaning of 
Morgenthau’s plea: his paper was written during a time when the US 
administration’s emphasis on the universal respect of human rights was at its height. 
Morgenthau begins his presentation by pointing to what he takes to be a decline in 
the adherence to moral values in general, and he argues that men live ‘in a situation 
in which the moral restraints that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
contributed greatly to the civilized relations among nations are in the process of 
weakening, if not disappearing’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 3). He then turns to a critique 
of a universal interpretation of human rights, by emphasising the abstract and relative 
character of the concept. In response to the claim according to which human rights 
have universal validity, he maintains that human rights are ‘filtered through the 
intermediary of historic and social circumstances, which will lead to different results 
in different times and under different circumstances’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 3). 
However, in the same paper, when discussing the necessity of a universal moral 
code, Morgenthau also tackles the issue of universality, and the way in which he 
addresses this concept helps him avoid falling into a relativist position. He argues 
that such a unique moral code does exist, albeit filtered through cultural and moral 
particularities (Morgenthau 1979, p. 10), and not fully discernible to humans. As 
Morgenthau argues further, there are certain ‘basic’ moral principles which are
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applicable to all human beings. Such a principle is the preservation of life -  in 
Morgenthau’s formulation, ‘I assume that the sacredness of human life is a general 
moral principle, subject to certain qualifications’ (Morgenthau 1979, p. 25). As he 
concludes,
There exists a moral order in the universe which God directs, the content of 
which we can guess. We are never sure that we guess correctly, or that in the end 
it will come out as God wants it to come out. (...) The moral code is something 
objective that is to be discovered (Morgenthau 1979, pp. 35, 10).
Morgenthau places the concept of ‘humanity’ on the second pillar of his 
fundamental dichotomy: the ephemeral vs. the perennial. He thus implies that 
difference cannot exist without identity, and emphasises the necessary multiplicity 
within unity: the more humans are different, the more they are the same in their 
intrinsic humanity, and in their adherence to the traditional ‘God’ of meaning and 
universal values. Morgenthau often emphasises that the individual must always see 
national problems in their universal perspective, and be aware ‘that there are 
universal moral values which transcend national values’ (Lecture 4, 9 January 1946, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). For Morgenthau, the absence of a ‘working 
system of international ethics’ (Lecture 25, 11 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 
169, p. 10) does not mean that this system has been rendered worthless, on the 
contrary: in his interpretation, its constituting pillars are valuable in guiding human 
action. The present reading maintains that while claiming this, Morgenthau reveals 
that to him, the transcendent space is not empty, but still meaningful. As Petersen 
explains, for Morgenthau, like in Nietzsche’s case, ‘man undeniably resides in a
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shared space of meaning and intelligibility without which he would not be man but 
beast, because consciousness and its corollary, agency, presuppose determinacy - that 
is, the existence of a whole’ (Petersen 1999, p. 88).
The transcendent character of Morgenthau’s theory has been noted by several 
observers. Mollov for instance states that the main transcendent elements present in 
Morgenthau’s theory regard ‘morality in politics and statecraft’, ‘the responsibility of 
the intellectual to speak “truth to power’” , ‘the importance of philosophy to 
Morgenthau’s approach to international relations’, and his sustained emphasis upon 
the ‘spiritual forces in man and politics’ (Mollov 2002, p. 22). Meanwhile, Frei 
argues that Morgenthau’s normative ethics juxtaposes ‘the is with the ought to be 
that is not of this world’, which transcend individual existence and reach upward, 
‘toward a heaven of supreme values (hochste Werte) in order to place life under 
timeless obligations’(Frei 2001, p. 166). These values, objective, independent and 
eternal, ‘serve as ultimate goals and also as standards for evaluating thought and 
action’ (Frei 2001, p. 166). Frei criticises Morgenthau for his laconic, insufficient 
explanation of the values envisaged, which make up the transcendental realm 
referred to above. Moreover, he singles out this lack of information as the main cause 
which has led to the perpetuation of the claim that Morgenthau’s theory is amoral.
Indeed, Morgenthau rarely addresses the issue of moral values directly, or states 
his position clearly, and this has led to confusions and misinterpretations. In fact, 
Morgenthau maintains an ambiguous position regarding the content of the moral 
order he refers to throughout his life. During one of his lectures given in 1962 for 
instance, he argues that ‘only God knows what the objective standards actually are’ 
(Lecture 11, 15 May 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 22). Moreover, when 
asked by a student about the nature of the standards envisaged, Morgenthau once
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again does not provide a clear-cut answer, telling his student instead that ‘what you 
are really asking me is what is my political philosophy, and that is a very indiscrete 
(sic) question’ (Lecture 4, 12 April 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p. 23). The 
nature of the values endorsed is only revealed unequivocally in an unpublished letter, 
in which Morgenthau mentions that he affirms two basic moral values: ‘the 
preservation of life, and freedom in the sense of the Judeo-Christian tradition and, 
more particularly, of Kantian philosophy’ (Letter to Edward Dew, 1962d, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 17, p. 1). He therefore returns to Kant ‘silently’, after 
having distanced himself in his youth from neo-Kantians like Kelsen, as we have 
seen in chapter 2.
A critical assessment of Morgenthau’s position is performed by Paul Saurette, 
who integrates his discussion of Morgenthau within a broader analysis of the 
philosophical foundation of the Will to Truth and Order, which in his view informs 
International Relations, in both its Realist and Idealist renditions (Saurette 1996, p. 
2). As Saurette argues, this foundation sets profound limits on the horizon of 
normative theory, by establishing as ‘natural’ an intellectual framework which 
circumscribes the very definition, and thus the normative potential, of politics 
(Saurette 1996, p. 2). In his thorough analysis of Nietzsche’s and Arendt’s 
contribution towards revitalising the political, in light of the philosophical crisis of 
modernity, Saurette points to Nietzsche’s exploration and critique of the 
philosophical tradition of the Will to Order (Saurette 1996, p. 2), and emphasises the 
importance of Nietzsche’s attack upon the concept of ‘truth’. Saurette argues that 
once it becomes clear that our modem understanding of political action - be it 
domestic or international - evolved from and depends upon this philosophical 
foundation of the Will to Tmth and Order, ‘it also becomes apparent that both these
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models are increasingly untenable in late modernity’ (Saurette 1996, p. 2). From this 
perspective, Morgenthau’s position, with all its emphasis on the quest for ‘truth’, and 
the necessity of a universal foundation of standards, appears unsatisfactory to 
Saurette. He argues that
it is absolutely paradoxical and yet completely consistent for Morgenthau to 
decry the international as the realm of irrationality and emergency, while 
nostalgically yearning for objective scientific laws which would allow the 
statesman to impose theoretical order on international politics, and thus lead to 
the actual control and mastery of the international realm (Saurette 1996, p. 15).
The argument developed here acknowledges Morgenthau’s contribution, 
similarly to that of Nietzsche, in questioning the Will to Order, and the concept of 
‘truth’ following the ‘death of God’. It also suggests that Morgenthau’s theoretical 
attempt resonates precisely with what Saurette has called ‘Nietzsche’s paradoxical 
charge’: ‘to overcome the will to truth and found a renewed philosophical Will to 
power, while simultaneously avoiding the abyss of modem nihilism’ (Saurette 1996, 
p. 21). Similarly to Nietzsche, whose ambivalent position was masterfully articulated 
by Nehamas at the beginning of this section, Morgenthau implies that constructive 
endeavours cannot avoid being based upon modernity’s realm of values, and he is 
aware that the ‘old’ tablet is impossible to be erased. Instead, Morgenthau argues, 
they should be re-interpreted and reintegrated within the realm of a post-Nietzschean 
experience. Morgenthau emphasises that such a foundation provides humans with the 
necessary guidance in confronting a disenchanted existence, while also being 
adamant that this realm is not fixed, but open to a variety of interpretations,
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according to concrete historical and cultural factors. Following from this, for 
example, Morgenthau pleads in favour of the adaptation of the Ten Commandments 
‘to the concrete conditions under which men live’. As Morgenthau justifies this 
position, in one of his lectures on Aristotle from 1970, ‘to comply with the Ten 
Commandments in the literal sense requires total human goodness, a total virtue that 
is not attainable by the man in the street’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lang 2004, p. 94).
As emphasised several times throughout the thesis, there are strong reasons for 
taking the view that Morgenthau’s foundationalism transpires in his analysis of the 
political realm in the aftermath of the ‘death of God’. As seen from an early lecture 
given in the US, Morgenthau maintains that politics contains certain ‘truths’, which 
have ‘a lasting character, being as objective as any statement of the social sciences 
can be’ (Lecture 3, 7 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). In support of 
this claim, Morgenthau points to human nature, which comprises ‘the basic 
psychological and mental qualities of man’, which have remained constant 
throughout history (Lecture 3, 7 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). 
Significantly, this view is held by Morgenthau throughout his career. A constitutive 
feature of human nature -  the lust for power -  makes up another one of 
Morgenthau’s examples of a ‘perennial truth’ (see Morgenthau 1962a, p. 20). As he 
explains in his collection of essays published in 1962, ‘there are a number of 
qualities of men relevant to political action, which are of a permanent character, and 
out of those permanent qualities certain basic and typical configurations and 
problems arise which are also permanent throughout history’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 
20).
In contrast to those observers who have criticised him for his emphasis on a 
supposedly unregulated struggle for power, Morgenthau argues against the
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glorification of power for power’s sake, and condemns the mistake of overlooking 
‘those transcendent concepts by which political life must be judged, spiritualized and 
elevated’ (Lecture 4, 9 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). Careful to 
distinguish his concept of political action from mere action for action’s sake, 
Morgenthau implies that the former is held in check by what he calls ‘a transcendent 
orientation’. Informed by the values of truth and order amongst others, and still 
successful in endowing human life with meaning, the universal moral foundation 
referred to above should not be overlooked in the political realm. More importantly, 
in Morgenthau’s account, its constituting values make up the very end of politics. As 
he is keen to emphasise, ‘to say that a political action has no moral purpose is absurd: 
for political action can be defined as an attempt to realize moral values through the 
medium of politics, that is, power’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 110).
The need for foundations in politics is clear to Morgenthau, and he reiterates it at 
various stages in his career. In an article published in 1955, in reaction to the so- 
called ‘behavioralist revolution’, Morgenthau points that ‘even the most anti- 
philosophic science of politics is founded upon a philosophic understanding of the 
nature of man and society, and of science itself (Morgenthau 1955, p. 449), and 
forcefully adds that ‘political science is of necessity based upon, and permeated by, a 
total world view -  religious, poetic as well as philosophic in nature -  the validity of 
which it must take for granted’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 449). Morgenthau decries the 
denial of the legitimacy and relevance of political philosophy for political science, 
and concludes that by means of this denial, political science ‘cuts itself off from the 
very roots to which it owes its life, which determine its growth, and which give it 
meaning’ (Morgenthau 1955, p. 449). Moreover, in one of his clearest accounts on 
the topic, published in 1962, Morgenthau argues that ‘certainly’ there must exist
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‘objective criteria’ in politics, which are not clearly seen ‘because of the different 
interests and the particular historic situation in which the observer finds himself 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 20). As Morgenthau explains in an unpublished lecture, ‘there 
must be some element of scientific objectivity inherent in international affairs. For if 
nothing could be said about international affairs beyond mere subjective opinion, 
then there would be no science of international affairs at all’ (Lecture 2, 4 January 
1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 3). As he expresses a similar idea years later, 
in The Decline o f Democratic Politics, without the assumption of the objectivity of 
certain standards for thinking and action, humans ‘would not be able to think 
systematically about politics at all’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 220). Order and justice 
and truth itself would become ‘the mere by-products of ever changing power 
relations’ - and this is a development which everyone should guard against (see 
Morgenthau 1962a, p. 52). As Morgenthau concludes with a categorical formulation, 
despite maintaining a relativistic theoretical point of view, in practice political actors 
must always act ‘on the assumption of such objective standards’ (Morgenthau 1962a, 
p. 14).
Morgenthau’s commitment to this position can be found in other writings too. As 
he maintains, in a later account on the topic, made public in his lectures on Aristotle, 
and around the time when he was working on the important statement-book Science: 
Servant or Master?, political problems are immutable, and any social investigation 
‘receives its sense and meaning from a philosophic presupposition’ (Morgenthau 
quoted in Lang 2004, p. 15). That presupposition, Morgenthau adds, ‘may be 
unconscious, inchoate, or unsophisticated. But it exists’ (Morgenthau quoted in Lang 
2004, p. 24). While acknowledging that political concepts are not mechanical, but get 
their concrete, substantive meaning from the particular cultural environment within
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which they are applied (Morgenthau quoted in Lang 2004, p. 44), Morgenthau also 
points that, in contrast to the technical and scientific problems, the social and 
political ones do not change throughout history:
The problem of authority, the problems of the relations between the individual 
and the state, the purpose of the state, the common good, the issue of law 
versus naked power, the problem of violence, the class problem, the 
distribution of wealth in political terms -  all those problems are of a perennial 
nature. They have not been discovered or invented in the 20th century 
(Morgenthau quoted in Lang 2004, p. 44).
In Morgenthau’s interpretation, the above considerations make up what he calls 
‘the tradition of political thought’, from which ‘truth’ in matters political stems. 
Morgenthau affirms the value and wisdom of tradition at the very beginning of his 
academic career. The Morgenthau who emerges from the unpublished lectures argues 
in favour of creative thought, and emphasises the latter’s illumination of the political 
experience of the day by rediscovering ‘the eternal truth and perennial laws of 
foreign policy as they have been formulated throughout the ages’ (5th lecture at the 
Oriental Institute, 7 April 1950, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 1). Without 
overlooking the lust for power and power politics itself, ‘in all their threatening 
ugliness’ - unquestionable central elements of politics for Morgenthau -  the superior 
actors should nevertheless promote a return to tradition, universal meaning, and 
religious knowledge. As Morgenthau explains in a moving paragraph taken from one 
of his unpublished lectures,
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Let us also face the facts of spiritual life, those transcendent values which give 
meaning to our political struggles and to our political sufferings, and which 
may enable us to overcome, first in our own consciousness, and then on the 
political scene itself, the misery of political power (Morgenthau 5 February 
1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 2).
Moreover, an extended analysis of the concept of tradition is undertaken in the 
preface to one of the collections of essays which Morgenthau published in 1962, and 
there are strong reasons for taking the view that this can be read as a reaction to the 
aforementioned ‘behavioralist revolution’. This book, Morgenthau states, assumes 
‘not only the continuing value of the tradition of political thought for the 
contemporary world, but also the need for the restoration of its timeless elements’: it 
is especially concerned with the restoration of politics, ‘as an autonomous sphere of 
thought and action’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 3). In Morgenthau’s account, political 
thought in every epoch ‘is but the particular manifestation and application of a 
general philosophy’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 2). Moreover, each epoch of history has 
the task ‘to disengage from the tradition of political thought those truths which fit its 
own experience and, in turn, to separate out of the welter of its own experience the 
perennial configurations of political life’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 2). In Morgenthau’s 
view, therefore, tradition is a living and evolving concept: each epoch ‘must test 
yesterday’s dogmas against the facts of today, and today’s orthodoxies against the 
perennial truths’, liberating itself from ‘the dead hand of tradition’, while not falling 
victim to new dogma, or else being lost in the labyrinth of uncomprehended 
experience (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 2).
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The re-interpretation of tradition and its positioning at the centre of politics are 
imperative to Morgenthau, taking into account the context he writes against 
(behaviouralism). He denounces the ‘presently fashionable’ theorizing about IR, 
which is ‘abstract in the extreme and totally unhistoric’, and which endeavours to 
reduce IR to a system of abstract propositions with a predictive function 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 65). Morgenthau criticises the proponents of this theorizing 
for their neglect of the teachings of tradition, and for their attempt ‘to throw all 
tradition overboard, and either to deny the existence of objective political truth 
altogether, or else to seek it in some novel political arrangement or device, 
apparently unencumbered by past political experience’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 2). In 
contrast to Morgenthau’s theory, which is historical, in his account the behaviourists 
overlook the contingencies of history and the concreteness of historic situations, and 
consequently their assumptions ‘must fail both as guides for theoretical 
understanding, and as precepts for action’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 66). Finally, in a 
formulation which he will reiterate in his human rights lecture, fifteen years later, 
Morgenthau warns against the careless use on the international scene of a particular 
interpretation which overlooks the ‘truth’ of politics. While finding the perennial 
truths of politics imbedded in the shell of historic contingencies, Morgenthau asserts, 
each generation is nevertheless ‘tempted by its prideful or spiteful identification with 
its own times to give the contingent the appearance of the perennial’ (Morgenthau 
1962a, p. 2). The picture of politics following these endeavours is bleak:
Of politics nothing is left but the struggle of individuals and groups for access to 
the levers of power, in terms either of majority or oligarchic rule, crying out 
again either for expert management or else for utopian reform, oblivious of the
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distinction of what is desirable and what is possible and of the ineluctability of 
power itself (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 3).
Against a disenchanted political life, Morgenthau advances the ideal of 
restoration. He pleads in favour of a reconsideration of tradition, convinced of the 
latter’s wisdom and capacity to guide political action in a post-Nietzschean era. In 
his critical reaction to the behavioralist developments, we notice his forceful 
commitment to tradition, perceived as a living, evolving concept, open to new 
interpretations, yet also made up of an immutable hard core of meaning. To what he 
takes to be the behaviouralists’ abstractions, Morgenthau opposes an almost equally 
abstract vision, which nevertheless differs from that of the behaviouralists in its 
emphasis on change and responsible creativity, as the basis for a successful politics.
Along with the issue of the grounding of value, the erosion of the authority of 
tradition preoccupied Nietzsche too (see Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 226). He was 
aware that ‘once the value of tradition has been called into question, we cannot 
appeal to the fact that, say, a practice belongs to a tradition as a reason for valuing it’ 
(Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 226). Nevertheless, Nietzsche regarded tradition 
positively, and guarded against the latter’s neglect: ‘one considers tradition a fatality; 
one studies it, recognizes it (as “hereditary”), but one does not want it; it is the 
disorganizing principle that gives our age its character’ (Magnus and Higgins 1996, 
p. 226). Similarly to Nietzsche, who is aware that tradition ‘does not only constitute a 
past that has gone (...), but our present as well4, and who claims that ‘suspiciousness 
of tradition and of the past is of a piece with resignation about the new and the 
future’ (Magnus and Higgins 1996, p. 227), Morgenthau pleads in favour of a re­
enchantment informed by the values brought to us by previous centuries.
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In this task, a crucial role in Morgenthau’s account is played by the statesman, 
who has the necessary skills to implement responsible creation. It is him who can 
contribute to the accomplishment of the vital task of our times: the understanding of 
the ‘true’ meaning of politics, which to Morgenthau has got a lot to do with power 
struggle and conflicting moral voices, and little to do with rationalist measurements 
and calculations. Like Nietzsche’s Ubermenschen, Morgenthau’s statesmen are ‘the 
strongest’, to quote one of Nietzsche’s most discerning observers. They are ‘the most 
moderate ones who do not need extreme articles of faith, but can concede a good 
deal of contingency and nonsense and even love it, and who can think of man with a 
moderation of his value without becoming small and weak in return’ (Ansell Pearson 
2005, p. 102).
This chapter has so far examined the concept of ‘tradition’ in Morgenthau’s 
theory. The focus now turns to the issue of political creativity, and to the superior 
interpreter of tradition in particular, as he is portrayed by Morgenthau: the statesman. 
The analysis of the statesman is important and necessary in this context since the 
superior actors are the only ones who in Morgenthau’s account can re-interpret 
tradition responsibly, and avoid action for action’s sake. While the last section of 
chapter 4 has pointed to these superior actors’ endorsement of a Weberian ethics of 
responsibility, the following section will differ from chapter 4 in its discussion of 
Morgenthau’s critique of unskilled statesmanship/diplomacy, and in its depiction of 
the issues in Morgenthau’s account likely to attract criticism.
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5.2 The Statesman and His Mission: Re-enchantment
In his 1970 collection of essays called Truth and Power, Hans Morgenthau 
embarks on a detailed analysis of political leadership, which mirrors his interest in 
the topic, and argues that there are two ways to be great in the pursuit of power 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 133). On the one hand in Morgenthau’s dichotomy, there are 
those statesmen who have chosen power as the ultimate aim in life, and who must 
use truth and virtue as means to their chosen end, and discard these when they do not 
serve that end (Morgenthau 1970, p. 133); the examples given here are Borgia, 
Stalin, and Machiavelli’s prince. On the other hand, perhaps surprisingly for those 
who still see him as a hard-nosed Machiavellian, Morgenthau’s second 
understanding of political greatness is that which ‘owes less’ to Machiavelli, and 
more to Plato’s postulate of the philosopher-king, and to the Hebrew-Christian ideal 
of the wise and good ruler (Morgenthau 1970, p. 133). In this latter case, political 
greatness does not consist in the single-minded pursuit of power, but also in the 
ability to subordinate it to the transcendent intellectual and moral values mentioned 
in the previous section of the chapter. While the first type of greatness is exemplified 
by the political actor who seeks to reduce his fellow men to a means for his ends, the 
latter is embodied by the responsible statesman, whose actions represent the creative 
re-interpretation of tradition.
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Morgenthau’s superior characters are often portrayed, and their role emphasised, 
within the context of his discussion of the fate of man, following the three great 
revolutions -  political, technological and moral - which have marked ‘the definite 
and radical end of the political, technological, and moral conditions under which 
Western world has lived for centuries’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 40). In Morgenthau’s 
account, the ‘death of God’, and the present disregarding of values, in part 
stimulated by technology (see Morgenthau 1979, p. 35), require the emergence of 
strong political agents, who engage in acts directed towards meaning imposition, 
perceived as a demanding, crucial enterprise.
Just like for Weber, for Morgenthau skilful (that is, creative and responsible) 
leadership is required to address the issues raised in a post-Nietzschean age 
characterised by nihilism and disenchantment. Morgenthau’s discussion of leadership 
within the context of democratic regimes is a case in point. In Morgenthau’s 
interpretation, just like in Weber’s, the advantage of ‘leader-democracy’ over 
‘leaderless democracy’ stems from the fact that the former furthers the creative 
power-politics of great politicians, while the former tends to the ‘diminution of 
control or, more precisely, to a lightening of the burden of leadership’ (Mommsen 
quoted in Stammer 1971, p. 116). While echoing Weber, whose thinking was 
characterised by ‘a markedly aristocratic individualism’ throughout his life 
(Mommsen quoted in Stammer 1971, p. 114), Morgenthau is in this regard not very 
far from Nietzsche’s interpretation either, for whom history gained meaning only 
from the creative activity of great personalities (Mommsen quoted in Stammer 1971, 
p. 114).
In his analysis of leadership, Morgenthau often points to what he takes to be the 
two constituting realms of politics - the ephemeral and the perennial -  and therefore
231
introduces the issue of tradition in the discussion. In Morgenthau’s words, expressed 
in his seminal preface to The Decline o f Democratic Politics, ‘both the tradition of 
political thought and the contemporary experience of political life (...) contain two 
elements: one contingent and ephemeral, the other necessary and perennial’ 
(Morgenthau 1962a, p. 1). In facing the realm of the ephemeral - made up of 
situations informed by particular contexts - the statesman must act with a view to the 
teachings of the tradition of political thought, and moreover, he must recreate and 
adapt the latter, so as to fit his present day experiences. There are indeed strong 
reasons for taking the view that in Morgenthau’s account, there is no tension between 
these realms. He regards them as forming two equally important frameworks, against 
which the statesman’s skills are tested. Differing from the behaviouralists, who 
emphasise predictability and calculation in politics, Morgenthau’s vision is built 
upon an account of the human agent who is perceived as unpredictable and thus 
unlikely to conform to such calculations. Moreover, it places a considerable burden 
of responsibility on the superior actor’s shoulders, who has to constantly move 
between universality (tradition) and particularity (current political events), and to 
absorb knowledge and inspiration from the former so as to skilfully tackle 
developments within the latter. In Morgenthau’s interpretation, men 
contemporaneously live in a period of history characterised by ‘the breakdown of 
universal religion and universal humanism’, in which old ideas, old practices and old 
institutions ‘become obsolete very quickly -  they are no longer able to fulfil their 
purpose’ (Lecture 16, 6 February 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). Within 
this context, ‘it is vitally important that these traditional modes of thought and action 
be adapted quickly, and if necessary, radically to new circumstances’ (Lecture 16, 6 
February 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7). The importance of this back-
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and-forth movement between tradition and innovation is captured by Morgenthau in 
a significant paragraph from an unpublished lecture, in which he argues that
The fate of the United States and of the civilized world will depend upon the 
speed and adequacy with which the United States will be able to rediscover the 
perennial foundations of its foreign policy, and to adapt that foreign policy to the 
changed conditions of a revolutionary age (Lecture 16, 6 February 1946, 
Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7).
The ephemeral and unpredictable is difficult to accommodate and intimidating, 
and Morgenthau is well aware of this. In one of his early unpublished lectures, he 
asserts that an element of art enters into the solution of political problems, and is 
keen to emphasise that this to him is ‘more than a metaphor’ (Lecture 28,18 March 
1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 13). You have to be a creative artist ‘in order 
to feel the distribution of power at a particular moment, to see the relation of the 
different aspects of the problems to each other, and to find a stable solution for this 
particular problem’ (Lecture 28, 18 March 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p.
13). At the highest level of international politics, ‘there is much less of a science than 
of the gamble or “art” of international politics’, and the insecurity with which the 
statesman is confronted stands as one of the most challenging features of his mission 
(Lecture 17, 8 February 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 4). The ‘true’ 
statesman is the one who faces not just tradition, but also everyday experience 
successfully, and throughout his actions, he re-imbues the political with meaning, 
and re-enchants the world. Taking into account the importance of the statesmen’s 
enterprise, Morgenthau’s lamenting of the current situation, characterised by lack of
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diplomatic excellence, is not at all surprising. To him, regrettably, the diplomatic art 
has recently degenerated, and even ‘died out’, and the diplomat has started to look 
like ‘a mere relic of the past’ (Lecture 20, 15 February 1946, Morgenthau Papers, 
Box 169, p. 11). As Morgenthau insists, immediate action is needed, in order for 
these trends to be reversed.
Morgenthau directs his critique to the unskilled diplomacy, whose rigid 
proponents embrace rationalization and are afraid of the changes which are part and 
parcel of the political. Moreover, he criticises present day diplomats for the fear of 
the unknown which makes them apply the teachings of tradition in a canonical way, 
which does not take the contextual factors into account. In the book In Defense o f the 
National Interest, Morgenthau condemns what he calls ‘the abdication of leadership’, 
whose manifestations in the field of policy are ‘thrift, muddling, improvidence, and 
fear of the new and unknown’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 237). In Morgenthau’s account, 
the unpredictability of the political environment should not frighten, but inspire. 
More importantly, while confronted with the unpredictable, the diplomat/statesman is 
given the opportunity to demonstrate his creative potential, and this should not be 
missed.
A fluctuating, always evolving factor which the statesman has to take into 
consideration and address, is the national interest. By contrast to the abstract, 
blueprint like teachings of the proponents of liberal internationalism, the national 
interest is a variable, and it challenges the statesman by virtue of its changing nature. 
While thinking in terms of the national interest, ‘conceived as power among other 
powers’, the statesman ‘must take the long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, 
paying with small losses for great advantages; he must be able to temporize, to 
compromise, to bide his time’ (Morgenthau 1982, p. 223). As Morgenthau warns in
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his book In Defense o f the National Interest, ‘a foreign policy guided by moral 
abstractions, without consideration of the national interest, is bound to fail; for it 
accepts a standard of action alien to the nature of the action itself (Morgenthau 1982, 
pp. 33-34). This does not mean, however, that the national interest is devoid of moral 
purpose. As noticed by Good, Morgenthau invests the national interest with moral 
content, and thus endows it with a transcendent frame of reference: ‘while 
constructed from the raw materials of self-interest, self-preservation and power, 
Morgenthau’s “national interest” incorporates in its design a notion of responsibility 
that by its nature must transcend pure self-interest’ (Good 1960, p. 610). In his 
analysis, Good points to the transcendental character of Morgenthau’s notion of 
national interest both approvingly and critically, and he draws attention to what he 
takes to be Morgenthau’s ‘excessively’ transcendental views (as shown in the 
previous section, Good is not alone in criticising the ‘excess of transcendence’ on 
Morgenthau’s part (see also Frei 2001):
In relating interest to principles, Morgenthau, to say the least, is ambivalent. 
Indeed, the overall impact of his thought leads one to conclude that Morgenthau’s 
concept of principle is so transcendental that it can play only a judgmental role in 
the life of political, sinful man, saving him from hypocrisy (by demonstrating to 
him that he is not God), but not necessarily saving him from cynicism (by failing 
to demonstrate that he is more than a beast) (Good 1960, p. 613).
As mentioned earlier, Morgenthau’s theory makes reference to two coordinates, 
one temporary, the other perennial - as Good puts it, Morgenthau ‘sees two realms, 
the realm of the actual characterized by “the misery of politics”; and the realm of the
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universal ethical norm’ (Good 1960, p. 613). The second level of Morgenthau’s 
account of leadership therefore concerns the statesman’s response to the perennial 
realm of values and teachings brought to us by the past ages. As we have seen, to 
Morgenthau political creativity is not synonymous with political action for action’s 
sake, it does not lead to purposeless relativism, or means that ‘anything goes’. For 
Morgenthau, the statesmen’s creativity always manifests itself within the confines of 
a tradition, with which their deeds must be in accord, and against which these must 
always be judged. Subsequently, as emphasised in an unpublished lecture, 
Morgenthau argues that the traditional methods of diplomacy must be adapted to the 
ever-changing conditions of the international environment, yet at the same time ‘their 
objective, rational essence must be preserved’ (Morgenthau 1957a, p. 8). This to 
Morgenthau appears to be the main task posed by the rediscovery of the traditions of 
diplomacy, ‘for both the theoretical observer, and the practitioner of diplomacy’ 
(Morgenthau 1957a, p. 8).
The statesmen’s rediscovery and then propagation of the eternal truth and the 
perennial laws of foreign policy, ‘as they have been formulated throughout the ages’ 
(Morgenthau 1946d, p. 12), is of utmost importance to Morgenthau. The meaning 
imposition exercised by superior individuals is necessary in order to avoid what we 
could call ‘negative destruction’, and these heroes’ actions, which at a first glance 
may appear destructive themselves, are in the end portrayed by Morgenthau 
positively. By giving politics its meaning back, through genuine statesmen’s 
interventions, order and peace are likely to be brought into the picture of reality.
As emphasised by Morgenthau, any ‘true’ political culture faces the facts of 
political life, but at the same time it transcends those facts ‘in terms of a moral 
conception of life’ (undated, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 15). The need for a
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stable ground, able to provide the necessary all-encompassing meaning and truth, and 
to counteract the likely destructive effects of the fight for meaning imposition, is 
therefore imperative. As emphasised by Morgenthau in Truth and Power, the 
establishment of peace does depend upon the application of ‘political intelligence’ to 
international problems, and this is what for Morgenthau represents ‘the supreme task 
of diplomacy’: ‘to create out of disparate and contradictory national interests a higher 
harmony’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 107). As Morgenthau puts this in a talk at the US 
Army War College, ‘the ultimate goal of all statesmanship, of all politics (...) is to 
reconcile conflicting interests, to mitigate them, to accommodate them in a peaceful 
manner’ (Morgenthau 28 September 1959, Morgenthau Papers, Box 170, p. 17). 
Meanwhile, in an earlier statement, he argues that
We need an intelligent and responsible foreign policy, we need intelligent and 
responsible statesman to formulate it and to put it into effect, and we need skilful 
diplomats, who in the daily give-and-take of diplomatic negotiations, are able to 
prevent frictions from degenerating into open conflicts, to iron out difficulties, 
and to solve real conflicts of interest by peaceful negotiation and compromise 
(Morgenthau July 1945, Morgenthau Papers, Box 168, p. 2).
A few potential problems arise from Morgenthau’s vision of the statesman, and 
they mainly stem from Morgenthau’s insufficient clarification of the concept. Nobel 
for instance questions the statesman’s relationship to rationalism, and notes the 
rational ‘essence’ of Morgenthau’s account of politics. He argues that ‘far from 
venting his lust for power on the world, Morgenthau’s statesman represents the 
essence of rationality’, and he is ‘the wholly disinterested guardian of that supreme
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abstraction of realist theory: the “national interest’” (Nobel 1995, pp. 65, 80). In 
Nobel’s account, Morgenthau’s theory is ‘essentially a model of rational politics’, ‘a 
critical instrument rather than an explanatory one’, which although derived from 
historical experience, has sought ‘to transcend that experience’ (Nobel 1995, p. 81). 
In Nobel’s view, the theory of power politics ‘stood in the way of a proper 
understanding of practical problems, rather than helping to resolve them’, and the 
rational essence/rational map of the political process, which Morgenthau ‘believed 
could be read from the historical record’, was ‘elusive’, ‘inaccurate and even 
misleading’ (Nobel 1995, pp. 81-2).
The present analysis acknowledges and agrees with Nobel’s assessment 
regarding the statesman representing the essence of rationality, but argues that its 
author overlooks the distinction present in Morgenthau’s works between rationalism 
and rationality (see the argument developed in chapter 3 of the thesis). As 
emphasised by Molloy, in Morgenthau’s account, ‘where rationalism provides 
merely an illusion of control over knowledge derived from a traditionalist 
interpretation of science, rationality is an effective approach to knowledge, it is what 
makes knowledge possible in international relations’ (Molloy 2004, p. 3). 
Morgenthau hangs on to a vision of rational politics, and he does this with good 
reason: in his account rationality can help meaning imposition, and the responsible 
actor, by using his reason amongst others, avoids the dangers of succumbing under 
the temptation of action for action’s sake. This is a productive account of rationality, 
which points to its creative possibilities, and therefore endows it with a positive 
connotation in the context of the analysis of meaning imposition as a creative 
endeavour par excellence.
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As seen above, on the one hand, Morgenthau asks the statesman to disregard the 
findings of scientism, and to fight against the disenchantment brought by the latter 
trend of thought. Morgenthau is aware that the political actor’s mind seeks the 
predictability to which it is accustomed from domestic politics, ‘meticulous 
ascertainment of the facts, precise planning, and elaborate organization years in 
advance’ (Morgenthau 1970, p. 149). Subsequently, he tries to raise the statesman’s 
awareness that this kind of certainty is impossible to be achieved in an unpredictable 
realm of political experience: the statesman ‘must cross the Rubicon without 
knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, or what he will find on the other side’ 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 147). Rather than seek unattainable knowledge, he must 
reconcile himself to ineluctable ignorance (see Morgenthau 1970, p. 147). As 
Morgenthau expresses this view clearly in Truth and Power,
The decision of the statesman has three distinctive qualities. It is a commitment 
to action. It is a commitment to a particular action that precludes all other courses 
of action. It is a decision taken in the face of the unknown and the unknowable 
(Morgenthau 1970, p. 146).
On the other hand, however, in Morgenthau’s interpretation re-enchantment does 
not exclude systematic knowledge, on the contrary. In Science: Servant or Master? -  
a book which contains a fierce critique of scientism and technology - Morgenthau 
preaches the cause of a living political philosophy understood as ‘a rational guide to 
political action’, and he argues that it is indeed the vital task of our age ‘to transform 
the shock of wonderment that has its source in politics to the theoretical, systematic 
understanding of that source’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 33). Acting in the spirit of this
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demand, as mentioned earlier, Morgenthau’s superior political hero must ‘take the 
long view, proceeding slowly and by detours, paying with small losses for great 
advantages; he must be able to temporize, to compromise, to bide his time’ 
(Morgenthau 1982, p. 223). Moreover, he must demonstrate what Morgenthau calls a 
‘realist reasoning’, which is ‘based upon the calculations of advantage and 
disadvantage’. He must always calculate, and make ‘a rational choice between peace 
and war’ (Morgenthau 1959, p. 6).
Nobel’s assessment above implies that at this point the statesman is likely to turn 
into a rationalist subject himself, and by doing this, instead of fighting 
disenchantment, he may become an exponent and a propagator of it. Taking into 
account Morgenthau’s critique of rationalization and of its proponents, it can be 
argued that his account of the calculating superior actor is more like reminiscent of 
Weber’s notion of prudence, and that he does not think of his wise hero as a being a 
rationalist actor, of the kind which, as seen in the previous section, he is so keen to 
criticise. Moreover, as emphasised in an earlier paragraph, Morgenthau maintains the 
distinction between rationalism and rationality, and argues that the latter can help the 
implementation of a thoughtful politics. Nevertheless, due to the insufficient 
explanation of his ambivalent stance on the issue, these positions, largely un­
addressed in Morgenthau’s work, are easily likely to be seen as contradictory. In a 
letter sent to Michael Oakeshott in 1948, Morgenthau agrees with Oakeshott’s 
criticism on the topic, and acknowledges that his attempts ‘to make clear the 
distinctions between rationalism and rational inquiry, scientism and science’, had 
been ‘in vain’ (Morgenthau, 22 May 1948, Morgenthau Papers, Box 44, p. 1).
Morgenthau’s views about the statesman’s impact on tradition, and his concept of 
creativity in political thought, lead to other important questions: how can the
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statesman be creative, when what he is advised by Morgenthau to discover, are the 
old ‘perennial forces’? If ‘truth’ is the truth of tradition, then what is the input of the 
present, and is there really any value in it, apart from the value given by the re­
reading -  be it skilful - of the wisdom provided by the past? As seen from above, the 
present interpretation argues that Morgenthau’s two realms of the political are 
intermingled, and they work in harmony towards providing the skilful actor with the 
opportunity to affirm his political creativity. The statesman does have an input in 
these endeavours, and as explained earlier, he does not simply replicate the teachings 
of tradition, but recreates them with an eye to present day developments. This vision 
implies coherence, and the argument developed here maintains that Morgenthau’s 
account on the topic is coherent. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to see it as likely to be 
perceived as contradictory, due to the lack of explanation on Morgenthau’s part. As 
argued in previous chapters, Morgenthau often failed to provide a detailed analysis of 
his concepts. In this case as well, the meaning and scope of the statesman’s creativity 
can easily be questioned due to Morgenthau’s scarce explanation of his vision of 
creative leadership.
While some philosophers are ‘constructive’, others - Morgenthau included - 
‘eradicate error, disinfect a region of human self-deception, and show that certain 
beliefs, even if they can still be held, cannot be held in the old way’. These are 
Martin Wight’s words, taken from his review of Morgenthau’s Dilemmas o f  Politics 
(Wight 1959). The argument here builds on this assessment and points to one of 
Morgenthau’s most important contributions in the field of political theory. Following 
the ‘death of God’, humans in general, and political leaders in particular, have to 
reconsider their relationship with a world characterised by nihilism and 
disenchantment, and they must strive to re-enchant it by using their creative
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capacities. Moreover, while doing this, Morgenthau tells us, they must also take into 
account the wisdom of a thoroughly questioned past, whose merits and value should 
nevertheless be acknowledged. How do we come to terms with the unique and the 
familiar, with moral and political creativity on one hand, and moral and political 
submission to tradition, on the other? In our judgments, should we treat one of these 
two realms preferentially? Morgenthau’s theory of leadership provides answers to 
such questions, by equally emphasising the realm of contingency and that of 
permanence, the ephemeral and the everlasting. In Morgenthau’s account, these 
realms are equally important: while the current political context provides the actors 
with the opportunity to exercise their creativity, tradition forms that realm of ‘true’ 
knowledge and universal ethics with which the actor’s deeds must always be in 
harmony in order to avoid a politics of action for action’s sake, which Morgenthau 
constantly criticises on normative grounds. Following from this, for Morgenthau, the 
purpose of each new political age should be one of rediscovering tradition - that 
‘store of objective, general truths’ inherited by us from the past’ (Morgenthau 1962a, 
p. 45) -  but also of making it ‘speak’ to the present relevantly: as Morgenthau puts it, 
‘to rediscover and reformulate the perennial problems of political ethics, answering 
them in light of the experience of the age’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 1). While decrying 
the ‘death of God’ and the advent of moral nothingness, Morgenthau pleads for ‘a 
new approach, which could foster a system of binding values, justifying the boldest 
adventures and truly great endeavours’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 154). 
Because he wants to avoid action for action’s sake, Morgenthau longs for ‘new ties, 
that once again embed human life in a broad spiritual system, and thereby imbue it 
anew with meaning and sacredness’ (Morgenthau quoted in Frei 2001, p. 154).
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This chapter has analysed Morgenthau’s account of tradition in both moral and 
epistemological terms, and has pleaded for a reconsideration of it, in light of the 
central place it occupies in Morgenthau’s theory. It has also pointed to 
Morgenthau’s use of a particular conception of man in order to stabilize the meaning 
of politics, and thus to avoid absolute relativism, and has analysed Morgenthau’s 
concept of superior leadership. Moreover, it has pointed to the potential sources of 
criticism in Morgenthau’s theory: an ‘excessively transcendental’ vision of ethics; an 
allegiance to moral values which are never spelled out clearly; an insufficiently 
detailed account of the scope of political creativity; a vision of the statesman which, 
since missing a clear distinction (to be made by Morgenthau) between rationalism 
and rationality, may be read as a plea in favour of rationalist politics, which 
Morgenthau is otherwise keen to criticize.
The final chapter of this thesis will draw together the findings arrived at in the 
present interpretation, which regard the role of Nietzsche and Weber in the 
articulation of Morgenthau’s perspective, Morgenthau’s endorsement of the ‘death of 
God’ diagnosis, the centrality of the topic of meaning in his account, power as 
meaning imposition, the disenchantment of human life and politics, and 
Morgenthau’s concept of the creative leader. It will also provide an evaluation of 
Morgenthau’s theory, stressing its importance for 21st century International 
Relations, and emphasising the need to revisit Morgenthau and his solution to the 
apparent contradictions and dichotomous choices of modernity and postmodemity.
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6. Conclusion: Hans Morgenthau’s Discussion of Meaning, 
Disenchantment and Leadership
This chapter rounds off the arguments developed throughout the thesis, 
highlighting the key points arrived at in previous chapters, and indicating their 
originality by reference to other evaluations of Morgenthau’s theory. This chapter 
also points to certain issues in Morgenthau’s account which have attracted criticism, 
and spells out the position taken in the thesis. The chapter ends with an assessment of 
the importance of Morgenthau’s thought for the modemity/postmodemity dichotomy 
as manifested in International Relations, indicating its relevance to debates related to 
the death of universal values and the legitimacy of a singular meaning and truth.
The first original element brought by the present thesis concerns the idea that 
Morgenthau’s thought is not essentially modem, dichotomous and contradictory as 
assumed by some scholars, but works within a dynamic understanding of the 
modemity/postmodemity dichotomy. It provides a sophisticated account which both 
challenges modernity’s endorsement of totalities, and pays tribute to the need for 
metaphysical certainty. The thesis has spelled out the way in which Morgenthau’s 
thought is at the crossroads of modernity and postmodemity, understood as moods 
and attitudes towards knowledge and values, and his writings express a complex 
awareness and an allegiance to both attitudes. This finding is important because it
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paves the way to an understanding of Morgenthau which explains his commitment to 
certain positions too easily dismissed as contradictory by observers.
Moreover, the thesis has demonstrated the crucial continuity in Morgenthau’s 
political theory. Morgenthau shows a commitment to an orientation and to ideas 
which remained constant throughout his life. Starting from Morgenthau’s few and 
scattered but solid references to the importance of Nietzsche’s and Weber’s thought 
in the shaping of his perspective, the argument here has unpacked the strong 
connection between Morgenthau, Nietzsche and Weber. Morgenthau’s experiences 
in native Germany, as well as the affinities between Morgenthau and Nietzsche, and 
Morgenthau and Weber, have been analysed by some scholars already (see Turner 
and Factor 1984, Frei 2001). Nevertheless, no analyst has so far linked Morgenthau 
with Nietzsche and Weber in a single account, and the literature has not indicated 
before the Weberian influence on Morgenthau as representing a political 
institutionalization of Nietzschean assumptions. The present reading has addressed 
these connections in chapter 2, while in chapters 3, 4 and 5, it has demonstrated their 
importance in the articulation of Morgenthau’s theory, while also indicating 
Morgenthau’s innovative reworking of central Nietzschean and Weberian concepts.
Closely related to this issue, another original element discussed by the present 
reading is that of ‘the disenchantment of politics’, which represents a topic of utmost 
concern to Morgenthau in this interpretation. Morgenthau decries the employment of 
methods pertaining to natural sciences in the field of the social sciences, and claims 
that rationalist approaches do not provide the real meaning of politics, which to him 
is represented by the unpredictable, always evolving struggle for power. On the 
contrary, rationalization disenchants politics and imposes upon it a certainty of 
meaning which is unattainable in this field. The Aristotelian ‘shock of wonderment’,
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the mystery of politics referred to often by Morgenthau, succumbs under 
technological developments which do not tell us anything about its intrinsic meaning.
The fourth original finding discussed in this interpretation concerns 
Morgenthau’s account of the human agent and his leadership theory in particular, 
which are closely connected to the ideal of re-enchantment. Morgenthau’s genuine 
statesman stands as a creative force which can counteract disenchantment, work out a 
fruitful interpretation of the tradition of political thought, and re-imbue the political 
with meaning and values. In Morgenthau’s account, man’s destiny is creation, and 
the statesman is given the opportunity to create on the political scene by imposing a 
meaning which overcomes the dangers likely to accompany the aftermath of the 
‘death of God’. The meaning of political creativity is unveiled in the statesman’s 
struggle to impose interpretations in a responsible manner, while holding an 
awareness and skilful anticipation of the consequences of his impositions.
The thesis started with an outline of the meanings of modernity and 
postmodemity to be employed in the thesis, with an emphasis on the concept of 
postmodemity as a mood within modernity. It also explored the 
modemity/postmodemity dichotomy in International Relations, and indicated their 
diverging claims regarding the universality of moral values and the gaining of 
knowledge. The introductory chapter also stressed the importance of Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis -  ‘God is dead’ -  for the unfolding of a postmodern stream of thinking 
which questioned modernity’s appeals to totality in moral and epistemological terms. 
Within this context, the thesis introduced Morgenthau’s works, and pointed within 
the literature survey to scholars’ reading of them as being built upon modernity’s 
firm soil of certainty and belief in epistemological absolutes.
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While chapter 2 focused on Morgenthau’s intellectual upbringing in native 
Germany, with both the positive and negative influences, on his reading of Nietzsche 
and Weber, and on his intellectual trajectory in the US, chapter 3 showed that 
Morgenthau’s metaphysics was based on a philosophical outlook which agreed with 
Nietzsche’s and Weber’s diagnosis of the death of God, and pointed to the 
disenchantment of human life as a development likely to trigger disastrous 
consequences. The thesis thus went further than current interpretations which point 
to Morgenthau’s concern with values in politics with little further clarification, by 
taking the step of discussing the centrality of the death of the God of universal values 
in Morgenthau’s account, and his subsequent scholarly interest in the idea of 
meaning. As shown in chapter 3, Morgenthau points to the disintegration of a 
universal realm of values and knowledge, and acknowledges the plurality of truths 
which follows the demise of universality. His theory is built on perspectivist 
assumptions and on a certain kind of relativism informed by an awareness of 
historical and cultural differences, and it emphasises the importance of the observer’s 
‘personal equation’, which is subject to change and varies in accordance to the 
contextual factors.
Morgenthau’s account is informed by an individualist ontology, and he places 
human agents at the center of his interpretation of disenchanted life and politics. 
Morgenthau’s individual experiences a ‘metaphysical shock’ (Morgenthau 1972, p. 
27), and searches for security, still longing for a certainty which cannot be attained 
under present conditions. In Morgenthau’s view, the search for a singular meaning is 
therefore in vain. Most importantly, he argues that after the death of God, a fight for 
meaning imposition ensues among individuals. According to Morgenthau, the world 
now resembles a stage on which actors are engaged in a continuous struggle for
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meaning imposition, for the victory of one’s values and interpretation of the world 
upon the others. In a post-Nietzschean world, the meaning of power is meaning 
imposition for Morgenthau, and man, meaning and power make up a conceptual triad 
which characterises politics as a dynamic and sophisticated realm. Morgenthau 
employs a relational understanding of power, and the essence of politics is revealed 
in this ongoing struggle for meaning imposition among various agents, which 
constitutes a mosaic of human relations unpredictable in both the means employed 
by the agents, and the results attained. Meaning imposition as a form of power is a 
move consciously made in the thesis, and this interpretation, unlike that of power as 
influence, is more fruitful in depicting the creative potential of power, in both its 
positive and negative outcomes. The reading of power as meaning imposition points 
to the creativity of power unequivocally, and challenges materialistic readings of 
Morgenthau’s theory which overlook the creative facet of the power phenomena 
which Morgenthau continuously emphasises in his works.
While chapter 3 examined Morgenthau’s metaphysics, chapter 4 focused on 
Morgenthau’s translation of his metaphysics into an understanding of politics. In this 
context, the theme of the disenchantment of politics was introduced and discussed. 
As mentioned in chapter 4, the analysis of Morgenthau’s critique of rationalization is 
far from new. The novelty brought by the thesis is represented by the in-depth 
analysis of the issue of the disenchantment of politics, with an emphasis on 
Morgenthau’s concern with the loss of meaning in politics. Morgenthau is 
preoccupied with the concept of meaning and with the downfall of universal values, 
and his political theory is permeated by a critical examination of present day 
interpretations of politics that overlook the moral issues and dynamic, unpredictable 
developments which to Morgenthau are part and parcel of the political.
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As argued in chapters 3 and 4, in Morgenthau’s account the concepts of 
destruction and transcendence are constituted within a dynamic relationship, and 
their differentiation stems from humans’ use of power understood as meaning 
imposition. If employed irresponsibly, power leads to destruction. If used 
responsibly, it paves the way to transcendence. At one pole, one notices the issue of 
destruction in Morgenthau’s theory, a destruction which finds its origin in humans’ 
‘lust for power’, and is endowed with a limitless character. The individual’s 
destructive potential is aided by technological developments which may pave the 
way to total destruction, hence the tragic nature of the ‘death in the nuclear age’, 
which to Morgenthau represents a symbol of meaninglessness. In a time with no 
values universally endorsed, man is likely to return to an obscurantist, aimless 
activism. Expressing his horror at the action for action’s sake philosophy endorsed 
by the Nazis, Morgenthau argues that activism per se does not provide man with 
answers to the ‘metaphysical shock’, that salvation from ‘empirical misery’ and 
‘metaphysical doubt’ is not possible by means of acting in this way (Morgenthau 
1971, pp. 622-3). In this context, he argues against filling in the aftermath of the 
death of God with a philosophical attitude which celebrates creativity for its own 
sake.
At the other pole of Morgenthau’s account of the human, one finds responsible 
creation and re-enchantment, which are promoted by the statesman/diplomat. The 
meaning of creative political thought is unveiled in the actions of the exceptional 
character who skilfully reformulates ‘the old’. As Morgenthau asserts in his 
‘American foreign Policy’ lecture, the main task of the US is to resuscitate traditional 
interests and methods: ‘the future of humanity depends on this enterprise, of 
rediscovering the perennial foundations of its foreign policy and of adapting that
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foreign policy to the changed conditions of a revolutionary age’ (Morgenthau 24 
June 1954, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 2).
For Morgenthau, the purpose of each new political age is that of rediscovering 
tradition - that ‘store of objective, general truths’ inherited by us from the past’ 
(Lecture 4, 9 January 1946, Morgenthau Papers, Box 169, p. 7) -  but also of making 
tradition relevant to the present developments on the political arena. In this 
interpretation, political creativity means a skilful, contextually aware reinterpretation 
of tradition, and not a dogmatic or un-reflexive following of it: it means ‘to 
rediscover and reformulate the perennial problems of political ethics, answering them 
in light of the experience of the age’ (Morgenthau 1962a, p. 1). Within this context, 
the importance of the statesman’s mission is extraordinary to Morgenthau. Aware of 
the plurality of interpretations of tradition in the aftermath of the death of God, the 
statesman must have the intellectual and political qualities to make a responsible 
choice, and to impose his vision of tradition creatively, in a non-destructive way, 
which celebrates plurality as well as disciplines it. He fights disenchantment by 
virtue of his constructive and responsible vision.
As pointed out in chapter 5, this thesis also acknowledges the ambiguities 
contained in Morgenthau’s account. The literature survey performed at the beginning 
of the thesis has emphasised the abundance of Cold War assessments which point to 
the alleged amorality of Morgenthau’s theory. Meanwhile, while acknowledging 
Morgenthau’s consideration of moral values in politics, other scholars have criticised 
the insufficient explanation of the values envisaged, and also Morgenthau’s too 
transcendental universal ethical norm (see Good 1960, p. 613). Perceived as nothing 
more than an advocate of a cold-blooded struggle for power, Morgenthau ended up 
being criticised for what he used to condemn forcefully: the neglect of moral
considerations in the interpretation of events in the international political arena. The 
argument developed here has made the case that moral commitments are far from 
temporary or accidental in Morgenthau’s account. On the contrary, his theoretical 
edifice presupposes a moral foundation, and the moral aspects of his thought arise 
from a particular metaphysical outlook. Having discussed Morgenthau’s concern 
with values at length, this thesis has brought convincing arguments to refute the 
views above, which spring from a superficial or partial reading of Morgenthau, 
regarding Morgenthau’s neglect of moral considerations. It has shown that 
Morgenthau creatively re-worked a particular metaphysical position from Nietzsche 
and Weber, which was informed by a concern with the idea of meaning as generated 
by values.
Chapter 5 of the thesis also focused on another stream of criticism directed at 
Morgenthau, concerning the issue of the statesman looking suspiciously like a 
proponent of rationalism. On the one hand, Morgenthau asks the statesman to fight 
against scientism. Aware that the political actor’s mind seeks the predictability to 
which it is accustomed from domestic politics, ‘meticulous ascertainment of the 
facts, precise planning, and elaborate organization years in advance’ (Morgenthau 
1970, p. 149), Morgenthau attempts to raise the statesman’s awareness that this kind 
of certainty is impossible to be achieved. In Morgenthau’s account expressed in 
Truth and Power, the statesman must ‘commit himself to a particular course of 
action in ignorance of its consequences, and he must be capable of acting decisively 
in spite of that ignorance’, and here Morgenthau seems to contradict his previous 
assertions regarding wise and responsible, consequence-oriented leadership. Rather 
than seek unattainable knowledge, the statesman must ‘reconcile’ himself to 
ineluctable ignorance (see Morgenthau 1970, p. 147).
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On the other hand, however, in Morgenthau’s interpretation re-enchantment does 
not exclude systematic knowledge. As Morgenthau puts it in an unpublished lecture, 
the statesman must demonstrate a realist reasoning ‘based upon the calculations of 
advantage and disadvantage’. He must always calculate, and make ‘a rational choice 
between peace and war’ (Lecture 11,15 May 1962, Morgenthau Papers, Box 171, p.
14). The statesman thus seems to turn into a rationalist subject himself, and by doing 
this, instead of fighting disenchantment, he is likely to become its propagator.
The thesis has argued that this is a superficial tension in Morgenthau’s thought. 
Morgenthau’s account of the calculating superior actor is reminiscent of Weber’s 
notion of prudence, and moreover it fits with the view endorsed throughout the 
thesis, according to which Morgenthau retains a distinction between rationalism and 
rationality, and he regards the latter positively. Based on an in-depth reading of all of 
Morgenthau’s published and unpublished works, the argument developed here 
maintains that Morgenthau does not think of his thoughtful leader as a being a 
rationalist actor, but one who actively puts his reason to good use and acts in the 
political realm responsibly. Nevertheless, due to the insufficient clarification of his 
stance on the issue, Morgenthau’s remarks on the calculating statesman expose him 
to an array of questioning such as that expressed by Nobel in his article published in 
1995, and mentioned in chapter 5. In the present interpretation, assessments such as 
this make the mistake of overlooking the above distinction between rationalism and 
rationality in Morgenthau’s account. Nevertheless, this reading admits that they also 
feed on ambiguities which Morgenthau himself did not fully address in his work.
Finally, this thesis takes issue with those assessments which have located 
Morgenthau’s theory solely within modernity. Chapter 5 depicts Morgenthau arguing 
in favour of a renaissance of tradition in terms of values, knowledge and politics,
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with all their metaphysical certainties. At the same time however, chapters 3 and 4 
show us that he also embraces the Nietzschean and Weberian predicaments, and 
maintains a plurality of truths and perspectives typically postmodern, as an attitude 
within modernity which questions the latter’s foundational assumptions (in the 
understanding of the term outlined in chapter 1). Morgenthau ingeniously works his 
way along both modernity’s and postmodemity’s paths, and his thought resembles a 
bridge which connects the two attitudes and incorporates their assumptions within a 
higher unity. Consequently, this thesis maintains that Morgenthau’s thought contains 
elements which indicate a complex commitment to both modem and postmodern 
assumptions, both a critique of the old moral and epistemological order and an 
advocacy of a return to it (albeit filtered through the lenses of historical and cultural 
particularities). Morgenthau employs a productive way of working between the 
modem and the postmodern, and his writings are a proof of the possibility to do valid 
analyses by embracing both modem and postmodern assumptions.
According to the view advanced in this thesis, an awareness of these subtleties is 
needed in order to do justice to Morgenthau’s all too often simplified account. 
Although logically contradictory to some observers, this account represents a viable 
model of settling politics, and it addresses dichotomies which inform the relationship 
between modernity and postmodemity and that between identity and difference in a 
way which is useful to ongoing discussions in International Relations on these topics.
The opening up of thinking space inaugurated by the postmodems of IR has 
triggered re-assessments of classical realism which have encouraged the questioning 
of realists’ allegiance to a singular meaning and truth. While questioning 
Morgenthau’s thought similarly, the present reading has pointed to a crucial feature 
in Morgenthau’s account: that it questions meaning, values and tmth itself, albeit in
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response to particular contextual elements (Nazi Germany, the Cold War, the threat 
of total nuclear destruction etc). This interpretation has argued that taking into 
account its emphasis on the treatment of difference and contingency, on the need to 
regard differences productively, while sticking to a flexible and creative vision of 
universality, Morgenthau’s thought is relevant to current IR debates which are 
replete with issues pertaining to identity and difference and unity and multiplicity, 
and whose theorists attempt to find successful means for addressing divisions. The 
key role in Morgenthau’s account is held by the statesman, whose responsible 
imposition of meaning transcends differences, and leads to order and construction in 
an otherwise anarchic environment. The resolution of divisions stands as the main 
question to be addressed in International Relations according to Morgenthau, and his 
solution places great emphasis on the superior political actor’s role. In Morgenthau’s 
interpretation, the practical skill of political leadership resolves the dichotomous 
choices of modemity/postmodemity and the contemporary predicament that 
Morgenthau perceived of the disenchantment of politics.
In some accounts, Morgenthau provided international affairs in the US ‘with 
philosophical underpinnings that allowed it to emerge from the morass of legalistic 
and moralistic argumentation and to claim equal rank with other branches of the 
study of human affairs’ (Coser 1984, p. 223). To others, he is the one Who has helped 
‘to lay the foundation for international politics’ (Thompson 1960, pp. 32-3), and ‘the 
most brilliant and authoritative political realist’ (Niebuhr quoted in Smith 1987, p. 
71). As Fermi concludes, ‘it would be an exaggeration to claim that Morgenthau was 
alone in his teachings, but it is difficult to conceive of realist principles being as 
powerfully communicated without his clear and fearless voice’ (Fermi 1968, p. 87). 
This thesis has shown that Morgenthau is not only a founding father, not simply a
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name and figure of the past. On the contrary, this reinterpretation, taking the debate 
forward in several respects, has demonstrated the present relevance of his approach, 
and of the issues which permeate it: the death of God, the disenchantment of politics, 
power as meaning imposition, thoughtful leadership as a responsible and creative 
meaning imposition. Morgenthau’s way of tackling dichotomies, of pleading in 
favour of unity while also encouraging diversity, may constitute a viable theoretical 
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